APPLES AND PINEAPPLES

Why do corruption and trust levels differ between Denmark and Mexico? A comparative analysis of two extreme OECD countries

Resumen

Why do corruption and social trust levels differ so drastically between Mexico and Denmark, despite both being OECD members? This article compares Mexico-first, positioning it as a paradigmatic Latin American case of low social trust and high corruption, with Denmark as a contrasting extreme. Drawing on institutional theory, social capital theory, and historical institutionalism, we develop a dynamic feedback model in which institutional quality, corruption incentives, social trust, and collective action co-evolve in either vicious or virtuous equilibria. Using theory-guided process tracing and descriptive indicators, we show how weak enforcement, patrimonial legacies, and recent populist institutional reversals in Mexico have undermined trust and entrenched corruption, while early meritocratic reforms and sustained bureaucratic professionalism in Denmark generated durable high-trust institutions. The article contributes to Latin American debates on governance by demonstrating why formal reforms alone are insufficient without credible enforcement and trust-building. Policy implications highlight enforcement sequencing, bureaucratic incentives, and institutional resilience as prerequisites for sustainable anti-corruption reform.