APPLES AND PINEAPPLES

David Gómez_Álvarez, Gert Tinggaard Svendsen — jue, 24 sep 2026 00:00:00 -0600

Why do corruption and social trust levels differ so drastically between

Mexico and Denmark, despite both being OECD members? This article

compares Mexico-first, positioning it as a paradigmatic Latin American

case of low social trust and high corruption, with Denmark as a contrasting

extreme. Drawing on institutional theory, social capital theory, and historical

institutionalism, we develop a dynamic feedback model in which institutional

quality, corruption incentives, social trust, and collective action co-evolve in

either vicious or virtuous equilibria. Using theory-guided process tracing and

descriptive indicators, we show how weak enforcement, patrimonial legacies,

and recent populist institutional reversals in Mexico have undermined trust

and entrenched corruption, while early meritocratic reforms and sustained

bureaucratic professionalism in Denmark generated durable high-trust

institutions. The article contributes to Latin American debates on governance

by demonstrating why formal reforms alone are insufficient without credible

enforcement and trust-building. Policy implications highlight enforcement

sequencing, bureaucratic incentives, and institutional resilience as prerequisites

for sustainable anti-corruption reform.

Journal of Public Governance and Policy: Latin American Review