https://journalofpublicgovernance.cucea.udg.mx/index.php/jpgp <div class="parrafoMain">^{<strong>Journal of Public Governance and Policy: Latin American Review</strong>, es una publicación anual del <a href="http://iippg.cucea.udg.mx/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Instituto de Investigación en Políticas Públicas y Gobierno</a>. Bajo un modelo de acceso abierto, su principal objetivo es aportar elementos conceptuales, metodológicos y empíricos cuya relevancia posibilite la generación de teoría, la transdisciplinariedad y el conocimiento empírico de procesos de gobierno y solución de problemas públicos.<br /><br /><br />}</div> Universidad de Guadalajara es-ES Journal of Public Governance and Policy: Latin American Review 2448-7066 https://journalofpublicgovernance.cucea.udg.mx/index.php/jpgp/article/view/8026 <p class="p1">Why do corruption and social trust levels differ so drastically between</p> <p class="p1">Mexico and Denmark, despite both being OECD members? This article</p> <p class="p1">compares Mexico-first, positioning it as a paradigmatic Latin American</p> <p class="p1">case of low social trust and high corruption, with Denmark as a contrasting</p> <p class="p1">extreme. Drawing on institutional theory, social capital theory, and historical</p> <p class="p1">institutionalism, we develop a dynamic feedback model in which institutional</p> <p class="p1">quality, corruption incentives, social trust, and collective action co-evolve in</p> <p class="p1">either vicious or virtuous equilibria. Using theory-guided process tracing and</p> <p class="p1">descriptive indicators, we show how weak enforcement, patrimonial legacies,</p> <p class="p1">and recent populist institutional reversals in Mexico have undermined trust</p> <p class="p1">and entrenched corruption, while early meritocratic reforms and sustained</p> <p class="p1">bureaucratic professionalism in Denmark generated durable high-trust</p> <p class="p1">institutions. The article contributes to Latin American debates on governance</p> <p class="p1">by demonstrating why formal reforms alone are insufficient without credible</p> <p class="p1">enforcement and trust-building. Policy implications highlight enforcement</p> <p class="p1">sequencing, bureaucratic incentives, and institutional resilience as prerequisites</p> <p class="p1">for sustainable anti-corruption reform.</p> David Gómez_Álvarez Gert Tinggaard Svendsen Derechos de autor 2026 2026-09-24 2026-09-24 12 1 25