El papel del Servicio Profesional de Carrera en la consolidación de la corrupción: análisis comparado de dos gobiernos municipales

Abstract

Does the Professional Career Service (SPC) prevent the consolidation of corruption in municipal governments? In 2001, as part of a reform to the Municipal Code of C State in Mexico, a population threshold was established from which municipal governments are required to implement an SPC. This allows us to perform a comparative analysis between two contiguous municipal governments that share a wide variety of similar attributes, with the exception that one of them has an SPC as a result of an external institutional design. Using a dataset obtained from 16 interviews and a documentary analysis, corruption in both municipal governments is compared using the ‘Corruption Consolidation Framework’. Empirical evidence shows that the SPC does not prevent the consolidation of corruption in municipal governments, but only marginally modifies the way it is consolidated by generating simulated transparency. This happens because municipal patronage networks capture the implementation of the SPC. The main contribution of this research is to present the first evidence of the effect of the SPC on the consolidation of corruption in municipal governments.