JOURNAL OF PUBLIC GOVERNANCE AND POLICY:
LATIN AMERICAN REVIEW

JOURNAL OF PUBLIC GOVERNANCE AND POLICY: LATIN AMERICAN REVIEW Año 03, No.3, Vol. 2, enero-diciembre 2017, es una publicación anual editada por la Universidad de Guadalajara, a través del Instituto de Investigación en Políticas Públicas y Gobierno (IIPPG), División Economía y Sociedad, Centro Universitario de Ciencias Económico Administrativas, CUCEA. Edificio B-202, Periférico Norte No. 799, Núcleo Universitario Los Belenes, C.P. 45100, Zapopan, Jalisco, México. Teléfono: 33-3770-3412 y 33-3770-3300 ext.25876, https://journalofpublicgovernance.cucea.udg.mx/index.php/jpgp/index, journal.iippg@gmail.com Editor Responsable: Julio A. Villalpando Guerrero. Reserva de Derechos al Uso Exclusivo del Título: 04-2015-120712050900-102, ISSN Electrónico: en trámite, otorgados por el Instituto Nacional del Derecho de Autor. Responsable de la última actualización de este número: Instituto de Investigación en Políticas Públicas y Gobierno, División Economía y Sociedad, CUCEA, Alvaro Guevara Castillo. Fecha de la última modificación: 1ero de diciembre, 2017.

JOURNAL OF PUBLIC GOVERNANCE AND POLICY: LATIN AMERICAN REVIEW Year 03, No. 3, Vol. 2, January-December 2017, is an annual publication edited by the University of Guadalajara, through the Institute for Research in Public Policy and Government (IRPPG), Economy and Society Division, University Center for Economic and Administrative Sciences, CUCEA. Building B-202, Periférico Norte No. 799, Núcleo Universitario Los Belenes, C.P. 45100, Zapopan, Jalisco, Mexico. Telephone: 33-3770-3412 and 33-3770-3300 ext.25876, https://journalofpublicgovernance.cucea.udg.mx/index.php/jpgp/index, journal.iippg@gmail.com Editor: Julio A. Villalpando Guerrero. Reservation of Rights to the Exclusive Use of the Title: 04-2015-120712050900-102, eISSN: in process, granted by the Instituto Nacional del Derecho de Autor. Responsible for the last update of this issue: Institute for Research in Public Policy and Government (IRPPG), Economy and Society Division, CUCEA, Alvaro Guevara Castillo. Last modified: December 1st, 2017.

Managing Editor
Julio A. Villalpando Guerrero

Editorial Design
Leticia Parra Lozano

Text Layout
Trauco Editorial
Camino Real a Colima 285-56 St.
Tlaquepaque, México, 45607

Editorial Contact
Instituto de Investigación en Políticas Públicas y Gobierno,
Centro Universitario de Ciencias Económico Administrativas
202-B Tower building
Periférico Norte 799 Av.
Zapopan, México, 45100

http://iippg.cucea.udg.mx
iippg@cucea.udg.mx
journal.iippg@gmail.com

eISSN: En trámite.

Printed in Mexico
Impreso en México

TABLE OF CONTENTS

◆ ARTICLES

◆ CASE STUDIES

◆ REVIEWS

HOW TO FOSTER EMPATHY IN CONTEXTS OF CRIMINAL VIOLENCE? A PRACTICAL EXPERIENCE FROM MEXICO

WORKSHOP FOR VICTIMS, RELATIVES AND ACTIVISTS WORKSHOP FOR PUBLIC OFFICIALS RESPONSIBLE OF DEFENDING VICTIMS

Laura Flamand*
Sinaia Urrusti-Frenk**

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

At the beginning of 2017, Amnesty International documented that, 10 years after the beginning of the 'war on drugs and organized crime' in Mexico, impunity for human rights violations and crimes under international law has persisted in the form of torture and other ill-treatment, forced disappearances, extrajudicial executions and arbitrary detentions (*Amnesty International*, 2017: 250). In general, the *Mexico 2016-2017* report on human rights decries a patent increase in violence:

- 36,056 homicides registered by the authorities up until November 2016 (the highest number since the beginning of the presidency of Peña Nieto in 2012);
- 4,715 torture and other ill-treatment investigation files under revision at the federal level, according to the Special Unit on Torture of the Office of the Federal Attorney General;
- 29,917 people were reported as missing by the government by the end of 2016;
- In addition, for the third consecutive year, the authorities failed to publish the number of people killed or wounded in clashes with the police and military forces.

* Laura Flamand earned a PhD in Political Science at the University of Rochester (NY) and is an associate professor at El Colegio de México in Mexico City. Email: lflamand@colmex.mx
** Sinaia Urrusti-Frenk was granted a PhD in Economics at the University of California, Berkeley and is an assistant professor at El Colegio de México in Mexico City. Email: urrusti@colmex.mx

Several human rights defenders in Mexico have emphatically stated the importance of fostering empathy between victims and authorities as an initial step to design and implement measures that progressively halt the steep increase in criminal violence.

In 2011, for example, in the northern state of Nuevo León, Consuelo Morales (*Sister Consuelo*) managed to sit down at the same table the relatives of victims of forced disappearances and the State General Attorney. The result of this reunion was a series of commitments from the General Attorney to address, specifically, the cases of forced disappearances, in particular, with the implementation of the *Immediate Search Protocol* in the state (Protocolo de Búsqueda Inmediata) (Martínez, 2016).

Another example is the submission to the Senate, in 2012, of the *General Act for the Attention and Protection of Victims* (Ley General de Atención y Protección de Derechos de las Víctimas or Ley Sicilia) as a result of the meetings between social organizations and the federal government. In this case, Javier Sicilia, the head of the *Movement for Peace with Justice and Dignity,* together with other social organizations and representatives of victims from several states, worked on several occasions with President Calderón (2006-2012) and other members of his team to discuss the strategy of the government on criminal violence (Azaola, 2012).

The *Seminar of Violence and Peace of El Colegio de México*, under the leadership of Professor Sergio Aguayo, was created in 2013 with the purpose of understanding the widespread environment of violence in Mexico and the possibilities of peace. The *Seminar* brings together academics, activists, government officials and members of the civil society in a forum to understand and analyze the roots of violence as well as to foster a culture of peace. Up to now, the *Seminar* has organized 31 sessions in which a myriad of topics has been discussed, for example: "Fast and Furious weapons. Lawsuit against the Mexican government", "The human rights crisis in México: What can be done by the international community?", "Ayotzinapa and the Interdisciplinary Group of Independent Experts (GIEI). Balance and lessons".

In addition, the Seminar for Violence and Peace, in collaboration with the National Commission of Human Rights (CNDH), the Office of the General Attorney (PGR) and the Executive Commission for the Care of Victims (CEAV), has organized a broad array of activities such as workshops, special investigations, and other activities for generating and spreading knowledge.

Under the auspices of the National Commission of Human Rights, at the end of 2015, the *Seminar* decided to organize a series of workshops to foster empathy between all the actors affected by criminal violence: direct victims, family members, activists and public officials responsible of protecting victims.

For the design and implementation of the workshops, we adopted a simple definition of empathy: "putting oneself in the place of another" or "imaginatively projecting oneself into the situation of another" (Allport 1937; Buchheimer 1963; Demos 1984; Goldie 1999; Smith 1989). In addition, we also consider that "[...] empathy is the spark of human concern for others, the glue that makes social life possible". (Hoffman, 2000).

This report is organized in four sections. The first section presents a succinct review of the literature on the importance of fostering empathy in the context of criminal violence. The next section is the core of the report and presents the basic framework (objectives, profile of the participants, activities, and evaluation) of the workshops for victims of criminal violence and their defenders, both social and public. The third part discusses the most important results of the workshops and presents an agenda for improvements as we plan for new workshops. Finally, the fourth section concludes.

WHY FOSTER EMPATHY IN THE AFTERMATH OF CRIMINAL VIOLENCE?

The workshops of the *Seminar of Violence and Peace* are part of an effort to understand the causes of criminal violence in Mexico and to develop a "peace culture" that can foster new forms of conflict resolution and human understanding. Within this framework, one of the workshops' main guiding principles is that fostering empathy as the ability to accurately understand another´s affective, cognitive, behavioral, and interactive experience, is an important means for peacebuilding and reparation and is necessary to develop a working alliance among government, civil society organizations (including human rights), and victims.

Indeed, research has documented the key role that empathy plays in enhancing prosocial behavior and various measures of social competence (Eisenberg *et al*., 2006; Graziano *et al*., 2007; Komorosky & O'Neal, 2015; Sallquist *et al*., 2009; Sebanc, 2003; Spinrad & Eisenberg, 2009), and several studies ranging from psychology, to public health, public policy, and criminology, have documented a negative relationship between empathy levels and aggression rates (Batanova & Loukas, 2011; Carrasco *et al*., 2006; Chaux *et al*., 2009; Endresen & Olweus, 2001; Hastings *et al*., 2000; Jagers *et al*., 2007; Jolliffe & Farrington, 2011; LeSure-Lester, 2000; Mehrabian, 1997; Miller & Eisenberg, 1988; Pithers, 1999; Thompson & Gullone, 2003; Wang *et al*., 2012). Empathy skills also help in removing stereotypes and lowering prejudice (Beyond Conflict, El-Hibri Foundation, and Alliance for Peacebuilding, 2015).

With the escalation of criminal violence in Mexico over the last decade, however, we have witnessed that empathy among the various sectors in society affected by this violence is lacking or extremely rare as we illustrated in the introduction. In particular, victims and victims' advocates on the one hand, and government institutions that serve them, on the other, see each other with reticence, at best. Several factors contribute to this animosity. In Mexico, there is a generalized feeling of mistrust, resentment, and disapproval towards the criminal justice system from the organizations and individuals that interact within it. Frequently, the design and implementation of public policies does not take into account crime victims' and vulnerable populations' perspective regarding the justice process, and many victims remain outside the justice system.[1] Victims, on the other hand, may not always be aware of the complex institutional and legal context that many victim service providers and institutions face, including lack of resources, poor service protocols, and scarce training on crisis management, conflict resolution, and resilience skills, among others.

The workshops' goal is to contribute to, on one hand, the professionalization of victim service providers through the knowledge and reflection of their work and, on the other, to the development of empathic abilities both of victims' service providers and of the victims themselves in order to enhance their interpersonal relationships within and outside the institutions and organizations in which they interact. These abilities are important for victims to exercise their rights and defend their cases effectively, and for victims' service providers to care for them in a more comprehensive manner.

Several studies have shown that empathic relationships between victims and their service providers is crucial for both groups. From the perspective of victims, evidence suggests that their feelings of shame, fear of being judged, the perception of revictimization risk, and the view that support services are not able to help are crucial determinants of the likelihood of engagement with support services (Bricknell *et al*., 2014; Bryce *et al*., 2016; Farrell *et al*., 1995; Jaycox *et al*., 2004; Lowe *et al*., 2016; Sims *et al*., 2005). Moreover, the reactions that victims face when offering statements affect law enforcement reporting rates (Hayes *et al*., 2013; Suarez & Gadalla, 2010). Other research has shown that victims often perceive a lack of specialized training in interviewing skills by service providers (Kinney *et al*., 2007), which, in turn, may also affect reporting rates and the ability to deal with the negative consequences of

1 These issues are not unique to Mexico. For example, some studies have found that disapproval and hostility towards the criminal justice system is also a prevalent phenomenon in the United States (Achilles & Zehr, 2001; Zehr, 2005). Similarly, the fact that justice systems do not always consider victims' perspectives on their own assistance needs, protection, and empowerment, has also been discovered in several studies in the United States (Choi *et al*., 2010; OJJDP, 1998; Zehr, 2005).

victimization (Martin *et al*., 2007). Empathy can also foster trust, which has been found to be crucial to facilitate assistance provided to victims (Bryce *et al*., 2016).

Several other studies have emphasized the importance of quality interactions between victims and service providers (Campbell, 2005; Havig, 2008; Martsolf *et al*., 2010; McGregor *et al*., 2006), as well as the importance of professional competence when dealing with victims (Campbell *et al*., 2001; Martsolf *et al*., 2010; McGregor *et al*., 2006). Not surprisingly, restorative justice processes that emphasize interpersonal relationships and problem-solving dialogue (i.e., empathy) have become increasingly popular across many countries and settings (Choi *et al.*, 2013).

From the perspective of victim services' providers, a number of papers have documented the prevalence of burnout, secondary traumatic stress (STS), vicarious trauma, and compassion fatigue (Salston & Figley, 2003; Wagaman *et al*., 2015; Wies & Coy, 2013), and research has found that empathy training lowers significantly the occurrence of these problems (Wagaman *et al*., 2015) and is thus crucial for increasing the work satisfaction levels of service providers. In addition, there is strong evidence showing that numerous service providers, such as trauma therapists, have experienced some type of distressing event, and are effectively victims themselves (Figley, 1995; Pearlman & Saakvitne, 1995). To sum up, research suggests that fostering empathy skills among both victims of crime and their service providers is likely to aid both groups in dealing with the problems we have described.

Although there is still some discussion regarding the definition and biological origin of empathy and, therefore, on the same possibility of fostering it, there have been several studies that have implemented training with successful outcomes for increased levels of empathy (Acton & During, 1992; Clevenger *et al*., 2016; Jagers *et al*., 2007; Pithers, 1999). Moreover, research has shown that empathy is a skill that can be developed beyond childhood (Clevenger *et al*., 2016; Grühn *et al*., 2008; Komorosky & O'Neal, 2015; Wagaman *et al*., 2015), and even in contexts of widespread conflict (Schoenfeld *et al*., 2014). The World Health Organization has also used life skills education to foster, among other abilities, conflict management and empathy to prevent violence from occurring (WHO, 1998, 2009). In short, the literature suggests that empathy is a skill that can be learned and improved, thus supporting the workshops' premise of helping participants develop the knowledge, skills, and mechanisms needed for empathic interactions.

DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE WORKSHOPS

The main purpose of the workshops was to promote empathy, mutual understanding with emphasis on the following questions: How do government officials tend to the legal, psychological and practical needs of victims and their relatives? Do victims realize that government agents are themselves constrained by severe legal and administrative frameworks, as well as scant resources? Is it possible to improve the communication between these two groups as to foster alliances allowing them to devise and implement joint solutions?

In the workshops, we attempted to promote empathy through the following means: psychotherapeutic exercises, guided interactions between the victims and those government or social actors in charge of protecting them, and, finally, readings and sessions with experts on the psychological, economic, social and political dimensions of criminal violence in the Caribbean Rim and the Central American sub region, including Mexico.

The workshops also provided practical tools to the participants. First, to defend a case systematically from documentation, to self-care and legal counsel and, second, to design more effective public interventions, for example, to improve the working conditions of those entrusted with defending victims or, in general, to aid victims with more empathetic programs or policies. Thus, we now present the general objectives of the workshops:

Workshop for victims, relatives and activists

- To empower victims for the full exercise of their human rights by teaching them how to defend their cases with legal, political and communication tools.
- To present to participants the most recent and useful findings of academic studies on violence and peace.

Workshop for public officials responsible of defending victims

- To train public officials such that they are capable of protecting the victims of criminal violence in and effective, timely and empathetic manner within the legal and human rights framework.
- To present to participants the most recent and useful findings of academic studies on violence and peace.

Profile of the participants

The participants were victims of criminal violence, relatives of victims, activists involved in the care of victims or public servants responsible of protecting them. We received applications from individuals in six states form a wide variety of social, educational and economic backgrounds who had endured different types of criminal violence from forced disappearance to homicide or torture.

TABLE 1
PROFILE OF APPLICANTS AND PARTICIPANTS IN THE WORKSHOPS

Workshop	Profile	Number of applicants	Number of candidates accepted	Number of participants concluding the workshop
Workshop for victims, relatives and activists	Victims, or relatives of victims, of torture, homicide or forced disappearance Activists who had at least two years of experience working with victims of criminal violence	36	26 (72.2%)	24 (92.3%)
Workshop for public officials responsible of defending victims	Officials from the National Commission on Human Rights Public officials from other federal or state agencies working directly with victims of criminal violence Private service provides of care to victims of violence or to endangered persons	31	26 (83.9%)	18 (69.2%)

Given that this was the first experience with workshops of this kind at El Colegio, we limited the number of participants to 25 for each group. We created a selection committee with members of the *Seminar of Violence and Peace* at El Colegio (5 participants). The committee reviewed the files of the applicants[2] and selected a final list of 52 participants, most of them were awarded full or partial scholarships from the CNDH or El Colegio (78.6%).

2 For victims or relatives of victims we requested a registration form and a letter of intent. For defenders of victims we requested, in addition to those documents, a curriculum vitae and proof of their experience working with victims.

Profile of the workshop and the instructors

The workshop included 48 hours of in-class work and there were three types of sessions and instructors: (a) *psychotherapeutic sessions* led by therapists from the Latin-American Institute for the Study of Families (ILEF),[3] (b) *violence and peace sessions* taught by faculty from El Colegio de México or other universities with expertise on violence and peace, and (c) *practical sessions* guided by facilitators who are correspondingly members of social organizations with experience on the integral defense of cases or specialists on public policy analysis.

TABLE 2
TWO WORKSHOPS AND THREE TYPES OF SESSIONS

Workshop (Apr 5- Jun 25, 2016)	**Psychotherapeutic sessions**	**Violence and peace sessions**	**Practical sessions**
Workshop for victims, relatives and activists	1. Empowerment 2. Emotional and physical self-care	1. Criminal violence (determinants and perpetrators) 2. Human rights, culture of peace and attention to victims 3. The demands of the victims of criminal violence and the responses of the State	Mixed teams of randomly selected victims and public officials (5-6 members) developed one the following exercises/ documents with the support of a facilitator *(a) Public policy analysis* *(b) Comprehensive defense of a case*
Workshop for public officials responsible of defending victims	1. What is a public servant for? 2. Self-care of public servants 3. Personal and institutional protection 4. Challenging cases		
48 hours in total	12 hours	24 hours	12 hours

Experiential journal. The experiential diary is a light notebook that the therapists delivered to each participant during the first session of the workshop requesting from them to write in it every day or as frequently as they desired with the purpose of answering "how and where have the ideas presented in the workshop moved you?" This is an instrument developed to register and evaluate how the participants change their perceptions towards the others (victims or public officials) throughout the workshop. In particular, participants were asked to write down reflections, feelings or emotions awakened by the subjects discussed in the sessions. In the final analysis of the experiential diaries, we preserved the anonymity and confidentiality of participants.

3 In particular, from the Center for the Care of Victims of Violence (Cavida) at ILEF.

Evaluation and accreditation of the workshops

We considered three aspects to evaluate participants in the workshops: regular attendance, assessment of the final report of a team assignment (a public policy analysis or an integral strategy for the defense of a case), and the submission of the experiential diary.

Regarding the team assignment, we randomly created 11 teams mixing victims or their relatives with public officials that developed either a public policy analysis of a real policy problem identified by participants (6 teams) or an integral strategy for the defense or an authentic case of criminal violence. We decided to assemble mixed groups of victims and public officials to craft an additional space of interaction, knowledge and, thus, empathy. We had the fortune of recruiting six talented leaders for the sessions dedicated to prepare these assignments,[4] thus, each leader was in charge of two teams at the most. The counseling took two forms: face-to-face on three two-hour workshops, and virtual through the submission of interim reports and feedback by email or phone.

Regarding the experiential journal, as mentioned earlier, participants had to keep, throughout the course, a diary to register emotions, thoughts and notes derived from the sessions. This diary was submitted at the end of the course, along with the final written report of the team assignment.

INITIAL FINDINGS AND IMPROVEMENTS TO THE WORKSHOPS

We decided not to keep any visual or audio recording of the sessions due to the sensible nature of the information discussed (especially the interventions of the participants describing their experiences during or in the aftermath of the violent crime). In order to keep a constant record of the development of the workshops as well as to give testimony of how the participants related with the subjects discussed, written minutes of every session of the workshops were kept by an expert in oral history, that is to say, a record of everything that happened. Technical information of each session was included in each minute (such as general subject, name of the speaker, place, participants), as well as the report of what happened during the session and the observations derived from relevant interactions and the reactions of participants.[5]

4 The public policy analysis teams were guided by three full-time professors from El Colegio de México; the integral strategies for the defense of cases were counseled by a full-time professor from CIDE and two activists with ample experience in cases of forced disappearance, homicide and torture.

5 In order to maintain confidentiality, in the minutes, the names of the course members were replaced by a letter and an identification mark, depending on the workshop to which they were assigned, for example: Participant A (defender), Participant B (victim), Participant C (official).

Main findings of the analysis of the minutes

The systematization of experiences recorded in rapporteurs enabled us to map how participants interacted throughout the courses. We found that, at the beginning of the courses, each group was differentiated as "participants from the group of public officials" and "participants from the group of victims, relatives and activists". At the end, although this distinction continued formally, the participants started to find common ground across groups, collaborated enthusiastically in the various exercises and asked for additional sessions in which both groups interacted. This identification was gradual, but no less interesting and valuable: on one hand, we observed that public officials recognized that they could be vulnerable when dealing with victims of violence, and that they were not "less strong" because of that (on the contrary, they identified the need of self-care tools to feel better and to improve their performance as public officials); on the other, victims of violence, relatives and activists recognized the emotions of public officials and expressed their awareness that they should, as far as possible, take responsibility for their pain and understand that officials were not to be blamed for it.

On several occasions during the course, instructors, facilitators, therapists and participants were willing to create an adequate environment for moments of recognition among victims, relatives, activists and public officials. One example is when public officials pointed out that the system was not conducive to empathize with victims of violence and when victims realized that officials were also treated cruelly or unfairly within the bureaucratic system. Another example is when participants, in the closing session, presented, through graphic work, what they had learned, their cases and what they had experienced in the sessions. Overall, they realized they shared a common goal, and that they were not antagonists.

Another highlight about the development of the sessions is that participants showed interest and participated in discussing diverse perspectives about violence (violence in Mexico, peace culture, international human rights agenda, national public policies, implementation of human rights protections in Mexico, the perception of citizens regarding violence, etc.). The interventions of participants were based on their own experiences, on what they or their communities had suffered, their work with civil society organizations, the tracking of cases and their work experience. They were also eager to participate when there were discussions regarding how to transform methodology and theoretical concepts or approaches into useful tools for public officials and activists, or interested in becoming involved in the public arena given the relevance of the testimonies of victims and their relatives in the process of halting criminal violence.

Main findings of the analysis of the experiential journals

The report elaborated by the team of psychotherapists form the Latin American Institute for the Study of Families (ILEF), based on the experiential journals, shows that the participants were able to record the emotions that emerged during the sessions, for example, compassion for the experiences of victims, impotence or annoyance from public officials because at the beginning they felt judged, disappointment with institutions, despair regarding the crushing data and cases presented regarding violence in Mexico, and hope for being able to relate with other people in similar situations who are committed to making a difference.

The report also recorded the conclusions that participants reached from the different exercises and activities during the sessions and their daily life. For example, that there is a need to rethink and re-signify the concept of victim, that the pain suffered by victims must be recognized socially, and that public officials should listen to the experiences of victims in an open manner. Participants concluded that it is key not to give false hopes to the victims about their cases and not to presume what they need but to ask them directly and in a compassionate manner. Another relevant finding was that both victims and public officials associate low trust in governmental institutions with the unwillingness to work together, but they also suggested that bridges needed to be built to comprehend "the other", and to try to stand in each other shoes.

The ILEF team evaluated the diaries and concluded that the interaction between the two groups was a highly enriching experience and that the courses helped to raise awareness towards the issue of violence in general, but also towards the manner in which each group (public officials, victims, relatives and activists) experiences it. The therapists also emphasized the frequent use of specific words by participants in their experiential journals as evidence of their most important emotional learnings: healing, recognition, gratitude, empathy and compassion.

CONCLUSIONS

Now, we have introduced five major changes to the workshops since these first pilots were carried out in the first semester of 2016. To conclude this report, we briefly discuss each one in what follows.

1. More experience-oriented content

Studies have shown that Active Learning (AL) is an effective strategy to foster victim empathy among students (Clevenger *et al*., 2016). As a result, in the

new versions of the workshops we have incorporated more practical and case-based materials (including audiovisual material and case documentation) to be used in each of the topics/sessions taught, in addition to the necessary content on relevant academic concepts and findings. The idea is to give participants a more "hands-on" learning experience through the use of case studies and concrete examples.

2. Change in grouping categories

In the pilot workshops, participants were divided into two groups: (1) victims of criminal violence (including family members) and civil society advocates, and (2) government or private officials providing services for victims (i.e., human rights government officials). Most of the sessions were carried out separately for each group. In the new versions of the workshops, we are going to organize groups in the following way: (1) victims (including family members), and (2) service providers for victims, both from government and non-government organizations. This new setting emphasizes the view that all those who care for victims of violent crimes belong to the same group of people and, thus, share a common purpose and work towards the same goal. This is a commonly overlooked fact in the Mexican context, as many non-government victim advocates see themselves as counterparts of government service providers. The new group setting will not only aid in fostering empathy between government and non-government victim advocates, but it will also permit to tailor sessions more adequately according to the needs of each group, as the challenges faced by victims are clearly different from those of their service providers (see section *I. Why foster empathy in the aftermath of criminal violence*).

3. Greater interaction between groups

From the experience and evaluations derived from these pilots of the workshops, we learned that one of the most crucial aspects that made those experiments relatively successful was the interaction between both groups. As a result, we redesigned the format of the workshops to include a greater number of sessions with both groups interacting. A few would still be conducted separately, but these are to be entirely focused on teaching participants the knowledge and skills that are relevant for their own specific needs.

4. Implementation of additional evaluations

The evaluation of the impact of the workshops on the levels of empathy of participants is clearly essential. In the pilot workshops, we implemented qualitative evaluations that showed a positive impact of the workshops

on knowledge and empathy. In order for us to evaluate the efficacy of the workshops more robustly, we have introduced a compulsory confidential test that incorporates standard measures of empathy used in the literature, such as the Basic Empathy Scale (BES) and the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI), which have been validated in Spanish (Salas-Wright *et al*., 2012; Mestre Escrivá *et al*., 2004). The test has been designed and will be assessed by expert neuroscientists in Mexico and will yield a quantitative impact evaluation that complements the existing qualitative ones.

5. *Advice from institutional or sector experts*

In order to better tailor the workshops to the specific need of each agency (the Office of the Attorney General, the Federal Police, the National Commission of Human Rights), we have partnered with institutional experts. The inside knowledge and advice of these experts has been fundamental for the particular focus and design of each workshop, and has enhanced our understanding of the main organizational challenges faced by each agency. Our belief is that this change, along with the rest of the improvements discussed, will improve the targeting of our interventions and, therefore, will brand them more effective.

REFERENCES

Achilles, M. & Zehr, H. (2001). Restorative Justice for Crime Victims: The Promise and the Challenge. In G. Bazemore & M. Schiff (Eds.), *Restorative Community Justice: Repairing Harm and Transforming Communities* (pp. 87-100). Cincinnati, OH: Anderson Publishing.

Acton, R. G., & During, S. M. (1992). Preliminary results of aggression management training for aggressive parents. *Journal of Interpersonal Violence*, 7, 410-417.

Amnesty International. (2017). *Amnesty International Report 2016/17. The State of the World's Human Rights.* Retrieved on March 28, 2017 from https://www.amnesty.org/es/countries/americas/mexico/report-mexico/.

Azaola, Elena. (2012). El Movimiento por la Paz con Justicia y Dignidad. Desacatos, (40), 143-156. Retrieved on March 29, 2017 from http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S1405-92742012000300011&lng=es&tlng=es.

Batanova, M. D., & Loukas, A. (2011). Social anxiety and aggression in early adolescents: Examining the moderating roles of empathic concern and perspective taking. *Journal of Youth and Adolescence*, 40, 1534-1543.

Beyond Conflict, El-Hibri Foundation, and Alliance for Peacebuilding. (2015). Neuroscience and Peacebuilding: Reframing How We Think about Conflict and Prejudice. Retrieved from http://www.beyondconflictint.org/2014/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Neuroscience-and-Peacebuilding_v1.pdf.

Bricknell, S., Boxall, H., & Andrevski, H. (2014). Male Victims of Non-sexual and Non-domestic Violence: Service Needs and Experiences in Court. *Research and Public Policy Series,* 126, 1-50.

Bryce, J., Brooks, M., Robinson, P., Stokes, R., Irving, M., Graham-Kevan, N., Willan, V. J., Khan, R., Karwacka, M., & Lowe, M. (2016). A Qualitative Examination of Engagement with Support Services by Victims of Violent Crime. *International Review of Victimology*, 22(3), 239-255.

Campbell, R. (2005). What Really Happened? A Validation Study of Rape Survivors' Help-seeking Experiences with Legal and Medical Systems. *Violence and Victims,* 20(1), 55-68.

Campbell, R., Wasco, S. M., Ahrens, C. E., Sefl, T., & Barnes, H. E. (2001). Preventing the "Second Rape": Rape Survivors' Experiences with Community Service Providers. *Journal of Interpersonal Violence*, 16, 1239-1259.

Carrasco, M., Barker, E. D., Tremblay, R. E., & Vitaro, F. (2006). Eysenck's Personality Dimensions as Predictors of Male Adolescent Trajectories of Physical Aggression, Theft and Vandalism. *Personality and Individual Differences,* 41, 1309–1320.

Chaux, E., Molano, A., & Podlesky, P. (2009). Socio-economic, Socio-political and Socio-emotional Variables Explaining School Bullying: A Country-wide Multilevel Analysis. *Aggressive Behavior,* 35, 520-529.

Choi, J. J., Gilbert, M. J., & Green, D. L. (2013). Patterns of Victim Marginalization in Victim-offender Mediation: Some Lessons Learned. *Crime, Law and Social Change,* 59(1), 113-132.

Choi, J. J., Green, D. L., & Kapp, S. A. (2010). Victimization, Victims' Needs, and Empowerment in Victim Offender Mediation. *International Review of Victimology*, 17(3), 267-290.

Clevenger, S., Navarro, J. N., & Gregory, L. K. (2016). Seeing Life in their Shoes: Fostering Empathy Toward Victims of Interpersonal Violence through Five Active Learning Activities. *Journal of Criminal Justice Education,* 1-18.

Eisenberg, N., Fabes, R. A., & Spinrad, T. L. (2006). Prosocial Behavior. In N. Eisenberg (Vol. Ed.) and W. Damon & R. M.Lerner (Series Eds.), *Handbook of Child Psychology: Vol. 3. Social, Emotional, and Personality Development* (6th ed., pp. 646-718). New York, NY: Wiley.

Endresen, I. M., & Olweus, D. (2001). Self-reported Empathy in Norwegian Adolescents: Sex Differences, Age Trends, and Relationship to Bullying. In A. C. Bohart & D. J. Stipek (Eds.), *Constructive & Destructive Behaviors: Implications for Family, School, & Society* (pp. 147-165). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.

Farrell, G., Phillips, C., & Pease, K. (1995). Like taking candy: Why does repeat victimisation occur? *British Journal of Criminology*, 35, 384-399.

Figley, C. R. (1995). Compassion Fatigue as Secondary Traumatic Stress Disorder: An Overview. In C. R. Figley (Ed.), *Compassion Fatigue: Coping with Secondary Traumatic Stress Disorder* (pp. 1-20). New York: Brunner/Mazel.

Gil, José. (2011, June 20). "El jueves, diálogo público de Sicilia con Calderón en Antropología", *Proceso,* Retrieved

on March 28, 2017 from http://www.proceso.com.mx/273342/el-jueves-dialgo-publico-de-sicilia-con-calderon-en-antropologia

Graziano, P. A., Keane, S. P., & Calkins, S. D. (2007). Cardiac Vagal Regulation and Early Peer Status. *Child Development,* 78, 264-278.

Grühn, D., Rebucal, K., Diehl, M., Lumley, M., & Labouvie-Vief, G. (2008). Empathy Across the Adult Lifespan: Longitudinal and Experience Sampling Findings. *Emotion*, 8, 753-765.

Hastings, P. D., Zahn-Waxler, C., Robinson, J., Usher, B., & Bridges, D. (2000). The Development of Concern for Others in Children with Behavior Problems. *Developmental Psychology,* 36, 531-546.

Havig, K. (2008). The Health Care Experiences of Adult Survivors of Child Sexual Abuse: A Systematic Review of Evidence on Sensitive Practice. *Trauma, Violence, & Abuse*, 9(1), 19-33.

Hayes, R. M., Lorenz, K., & Bell, K. B. (2013). Victim Blaming Others: Rape Myth Acceptance and the Just World Belief. *Feminist Criminology*, 8, 202-220.

Jagers, R. J., Morgan-Lopez, A. A., Howard, T.-L., Browne, D. C., Flay, B. R., & Aban Aya Coinvestigators. (2007). Mediators of the Development and Prevention of Violent Behavior. *Prevention Science,* 8(3), 171-179.

Jaycox, L. H., Marshall, G. N., & Schell, T. (2004). Use of Mental Health Services by Men Injured Through Community Violence. *Psychiatric Services*, 55, 415-420.

Jolliffe, D. & Farrington, D. P. (2011). Is Low Empathy Related to Bullying after Controlling for Individual and Social Background Variables? *Journal of Adolescence,* 34, 59-71.

Kinney, L. M., Bruns, E. J., Bradley, P., Dantzler, J., & Weist, M. D. (2007). Sexual Assault Training of Law Enforcement Officers: Results of a Statewide Survey. *Women & Criminal Justice,* 18 (3), 81-100.

Komorosky, D., & O'Neal, K. K. (2015). The Development of Empathy and Prosocial Behavior through Humane Education, Restorative Justice, and Animal-assisted Programs. *Contemporary Justice Review,* 18(4), 395-406.

LeSure-Lester, G. E. (2000). Relation between Empathy and Aggression and Behavior Compliance Among Abused Group Home Youth. *Child Psychiatry & Human Development*, 31(2), 153-161.

Lowe, M., Willan, V. J., Khan, R., Brooks, M., Robinson, P., Graham-Kevan, N., Stokes, R., Irving, M., Karwacka, M., & Bryce, J. (2016). Predictors of engagement with support services in a sample of UK victims of violent crime. *British Journal of Community Justice,* 13(3), 21.

Martin, S. L., Young, S. K., Billings, D. L., & Bross, C. C. (2007). Health Care-based Interventions for Women Who Have Experienced Sexual Violence: A Review of the Literature. *Trauma, Violence, & Abuse,* 8(1), 3-18.

Martínez, Marta. (2016, February 21). "El método de la hermana Consuelo", *Reforma,* Retrieved on March 28, 2017 from http://www.reforma.com/aplicacioneslibre/articulo/default.

aspx?id=771411&md5=e572624f722172809bc40322108b7971&ta=0dfdbac11765226904c16cb9ad1b 2efe.

Martsolf, D. S., Draucker, C. B., Cook, C. B., Ross, R., Stidham, A. W., & Mweemba, P. (2010). A Meta-Summary of Qualitative Findings about Professional Services for Survivors of Sexual Violence. *The Qualitative Report,* 15 (3), 489-506).

McGregor, K., Thomas, D. R., & Read, J. (2006). Therapy for Child Sexual Abuse: Women Talk About Helpful and Unhelpful Therapy Experiences. *Journal of Child Sexual Abuse*, 15(4), 35-59.

Mehrabian, A. (1997). Relations Among Personality Scales of Aggression, Violence, and Empathy: Validational Evidence Bearing on the Risk of Eruptive Violence Scale. *Aggressive Behavior,* 23(6), 433-445.

Mestre Escrivá, V., Frías Navarro, M. D., & Samper García, P. (2004). La medida de la empatía: análisis del Interpersonal Reactivity Index. *Psicothema*, 16(2), 255-260.

Miller, P., & Eisenberg, N. (1988). The Relation of Empathy to Aggressive and Externalizing/Antisocial Behavior. *Psychological Bulletin*, 103, 324–344.

Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention. (1998). *Guide for Implementing the Balanced and Restorative Justice Model.* U.S. Department of Justice; Washington, DC.

Pearlman, L. A., & Saakvitne, K. W. (1995). Treating therapists with Vicarious Traumatization and Secondary Traumatic Stress Disorders. In C. R. Figley (Ed.), *Compassion fatigue* (pp. 150-177). New York: Brunner/Mazel.

Pithers, W. D. (1999). Empathy: Definition, Enhancement, and Relevance to the Treatment of Sexual Abusers. *Journal of Interpersonal Violence,* 14(3), 257-284.

Richardson, D.R., Hammock, G.S., Smith, S.M., Gardner, W. (1994). Empathy as a Cognitive Inhibitor of Interpersonal Aggression. *Aggressive Behavior,* 20, 275-289.

Salas-Wright, C. P., Olate, R., & Vaughn, M. G. (2013). Assessing Empathy in Salvadoran High-Risk and Gang-Involved Adolescents and Young Adults: A Spanish Validation of the Basic Empathy Scale. *International Journal of Offender Therapy and Comparative Criminology,* 57(11), 1393-1416.

Sallquist, J., Eisenberg, N., Spinrad, T. L., Eggum, N. D., & Gaertner, B. M. (2009). Assessment of Preschoolers' Positive Empathy: Concurrent and Longitudinal Relations with Positive Emotion, Social Competence, and Sympathy. *The Journal of Positive Psychology,* 4, 223–233.

Salston, M., & Figley, C. R. (2003). Secondary Traumatic Stress Effects of Working with Survivors of Criminal Victimization. Journal of Traumatic Stress, 16(2), 167-174.

Schoenfeld, S., Zohar, A., Alleson, I., Suleiman, O., & Sipos-Randor, G. (2014). A place of empathy in a fragile contentious landscape: Environmental peacebuilding in the eastern Mediterranean. In Megoran, N., McConnell, F., & Williams, P. (Eds.), *The Geographies of Peace: New Approaches to Boundaries,*

Diplomacy and Conflict (pp. 171-193). London, UK: I.B. Tauris.

Sebanc, A. M. (2003). The Friendship Features of Preschool Children: Links with Prosocial Behavior and Aggression. *Social Development,* 12, 249-268.

Sims, B., Yost, B., & Abbott, C. (2005). Use and Nonuse of Victim Services Programs: Implications from a Statewide Survey of Crime Victims. *Criminology and Public Policy,* 4, 361-384.

Spinrad, T. L., & Eisenberg, N. (2009). Empathy, Prosocial Behavior, and Positive Development in Schools. In R. Gilman, E. S. Huebner, & M. J. Furlong (Eds.), *Handbook of Positive Psychology in Schools* (pp. 119-129). New York, NY: Routledge.

Suarez, E., & Gadalla, T. M. (2010). Stop Blaming the Victim: A Meta-analysis on Rape Myths. *Journal of Interpersonal Violence,* 25, 2010–2035.

Thompson, K. L., & Gullone, E. (2003). Promotion of empathy and prosocial behaviour in children through humane education. *Australian Psychologist,* 38, 175-182.

Wagaman, M. A., Geiger, J. M., Shockley, C., & Segal, E. A. (2015). The Role of Empathy in Burnout, Compassion Satisfaction, and Secondary Traumatic Stress among *Social Workers.* Social Work, 60(3), 201-209.

Wang, F. M., Chen, J. Q., Xiao, W. Q., Ma, Y. T., & Zhang, M. (2012). Peer Physical Aggression and its Association with Aggressive Beliefs, Empathy, Self-control, and Cooperation Skills among Students in a Rural town of China. *Journal of interpersonal violence,* 27(16), 3252-3267.

Wies, J. R., & Coy, K. (2013). Measuring Violence: Vicarious Trauma among Sexual Assault Nurse Examiners. *Human Organization,* 72(1), 23-30.

World Health Organization. (1998). *WHO Information Series on School Health (document three): Violence prevention: An important element of a health promoting school* (WHO/HPR/HEP/98.2). Geneva, Switzerland: Author.

_____. (2009). *Preventing violence by developing life skills in children and adolescents* (Series of briefings on violence prevention: The evidence; NLM classification: HV 6625). Geneva, Switzerland: Author.

Zehr, H. (2001). *Transcending: Reflections of Crime Victims.* Intercourse, PA: GoodBooks.

_____. (2005). *Changing Lenses: A New Focus on Crime and Justice* (3rd ed.). Scottdale, PA: Herald Press.

MASS MEDIA AS KEY ACTORS IN PUBLIC POLICY: "AN ANALYSIS OF THE JOURNALISTIC DISCOURSE OF "EL PAÍS", A CALI NEWSPAPER, REGARDING FORCIBLY DISPLACED PEOPLE"[1]

Carmen Jimena Holguín*
Hernando Uribe Castro**
Germán Ayala Osorio***

ABSTRACT: This text presents a follow-up of the journalistic management that El País, a regional newspaper from Cali, Colombia, gave to forced displacement events that took place in Colombia from 1994 to 2005. This was presented in the context of a research project about "The social representations that university students construct of forcibly displaced people in Cali (2012-2014)". This text aims to identify the elements that characterized the journalistic management given by the Cali newspaper El País to forcibly displaced people, with the objective of reflecting on how do media represent themselves as key actors in the construction of public problems.

KEYWORDS: Mass media, forced displacement, social representations, public policies.

1 A first version of this article was presented as a paper at the 8th International Colloquium on Public Policy that took place at the Bogotá venue of the Universidad Nacional de Colombia, on October 5-7, 2017.

* She is a social worker and has a Master's Degree on Public Policy by Universidad del Valle. She is a student working on a thesis for the Master's on Society, Gender and Politics FLACSO Argentina. She is a full time professor at Universidad Autónoma de Occidente Cali, and a member of its Research Group on Conflicts and Organizations. Email: cjholguin@uao.edu.co

** Social Sciences Graduate, Master's Degree on Sociology and Doctor on Environmental Sciences by Universidad del Valle. Full time professor at Universidad Autónoma de Occidente de Cali and a coordinator of its Research Group on Conflicts and Organizations. Email: huribe@uao.edu.co

*** Journalist and Social Communicator by Universidad Autónoma de Occidente. Political Scientist by the Universidad Javeriana de Cali and a student of the Doctorate in Sustainable Regions of Universidad Autónoma de Occidente de Cali (UAO). Full time professor at UAO and and a member of its Research Group on Conflicts and Organizations. Email: gayala@uao.edu.co

PRESENTATION

This text presents a follow-up of the journalistic management that El País, a regional newspaper from Cali, Colombia, gave to forced displacement events that took place in Colombia from 1994 to 2005. This was presented in the context of a research project about "The social representation that university students construct of people in forced displacement situations in Cali".[2] The record and analysis of news and editorial information carried out month by month, from 1994 to 2005, totals 771 news articles.[3] The news articles on which the three designed analysis categories would be applied –positive, negative and neutral objectification– had to refer, directly or indirectly, to the terms "forced displacement" and "displaced people". Within this categorization for the entire research's universe, 62 news articles were classified in the following way: 21 under positive objectification, 19 under negative objectification and 22 under neutral objectification. The other 709 either shared several terms or couldn't fit at all on some of them.

The research stems from the idea that *a printed medium like El País plays a key role as a socializing agent in the kind of social representations that society, information sources, experts, other media, and other socializing agents as well, such as family, the catholic church and the State itself (including its public policies), among many others, build around forced displacement and forcibly displaced people.*

In this context, this text aims to account for the elements that characterized the journalistic management given by *El País*[4] to forcibly displaced people, in order to reflect on how do mass media become key actors in the construction of public problems and affairs through its journalistic discourse and the representations they generate of any given phenomenon. In this sense, mass media are social agents that build discourses that can have an impact "on the diverse stages of development of a public policy, not only as an information tool, but as a factor that contributes explain *a)* why is it that certain topics are adopted as public problems and become part of the governmental agenda, *b)* how is it that the discourse related to any given problem defines the chosen solutions for it, *c)* how are discourses built to convince of and legitimize

2 The research was done between 2012 and 2014. The results presented in this document had a specific goal concerning the role of socializing agents –in this case mass media– in the construction of social representations.

3 Totaling 771 from 1994 to 2004 and a news article from January, 2005. In 1994, 47 articles were recorded from October onwards. The years that show the largest news records are: 1995 with 96; 1996 with 87 and 1997 with 84. Thus, 2001 and 2002 each showed a record of 78 news articles; 1998 showed 70 news articles; 2000, 66; 2003, 61; 1999, 53; and 2004, 51. Finally, in 2005, only one news article was revised. All this can be seen in detail on Table 1 (see annex).

4 *El País* newspaper is a a regional Colombian publication distributed in Cali. It was founded by Álvaro Lloreda Caicedo in the 1950s.

decisions, and *d)* how do discourse also affects the implementation and assessment of policy processes" (Cejudo, 2008, p. 2).

To account for all the aforementioned, this text is structured as follows: in the first section, as an introduction, we will define the phenomenon of forced displacement and the place it occupies in the news and editorial discourse. In the second section, we will account for the characterization given to the journalistic management that *El País* newspaper gave to forcibly displaced people. In the third section, we will reflect on the role of mass media as discourse building agents that affect the way in which public policies are implemented and designed. In the fourth section, we will condense all final considerations as a conclusion.

AS AN INTRODUCTION, A GLANCE AT FORCED DISPLACEMENT AND ITS PLACE ON THE NEWS AND EDITORIAL DISCOURSE

Forced displacement –FD from hereon–, in the context of the internal armed conflict[5] developing in Colombia since the 1960s, carries the adjacent character with which the country, certain sectors of urban society and even the State as institution regard and understand the development of this war. FD is a social fact, a political and public affair, as well as a humanitarian drama, of large scale and implications. From this standpoint, internal FD should be taken care of by the State, in favor of reaching integral solutions for the impoverished lives of the victims of this phenomenon and to avoid that it ever happens again.

At the same time, the FD phenomenon is an indirect consequence of certain political, social and economical models that, hoisted by specific armed actors –as well as entrepreneurial companies–, define indigenous people, Afro-Colombian and peasants and lower-class colonists as victims –all of whom today form the poverty belts of major cities like Cali (the capital of the Department of

5 The dictionary *Para desarmar la palabra*, of Corporación Medios para la Paz, explains the legal nature of an Internal Armed Conflict or Non-International Armed Conflict as follows: "War situation that, at least, presents a violence intensity that surpasses internal tensions or disturbances such as riots, isolated actions or sporadic violence. a) The one which, from within the territory of a certain State, presents itself among its armed forces and dissident armed forces. b) Among the armed forces and organized groups that, under the guidance of one responsible command, exert control over a part of said territory, thus allowing them to carry out sustained and concerted military operations, and apply the 1949 Geneva Agreements' additional Protocol II of 1977. CORPORACIÓN MEDIOS PARA LA PAZ. "Para desarmar la palabra", Diccionario de Términos del Conflicto y la Paz. Bogotá D.C.: Corporación Medios para la Paz, 1999. p. 63.

* The synchronous cut in the 1960s is explained and justified by the birth of the ELN and FARC guerrillas, in 1963 and 1964 respectively, and by contextual circumstances, both endogenous and exogenous, that affected the development of the internal armed conflict in several ways. For local case, it is important to remember partisan and bipartisan violence; and in the international realm, the triumph of the Cuban Revolution in 1959.

Valle del Cauca)–, one of the Colombian cities that receives forcibly displaced population (FDP from hereon). According to information from the Counsel for Peace of the Mayor's Office of Santiago de Cali, "the displacement towards Cali mostly comes from the Pacific coast of Nariño (Tumaco) and the Pacific coast of Cauca (Guapi) and, more recently, from indigenous communities (Embera-Katíos) in Pueblo Rico (Risaralda), bordering the Chocó. This is coupled with the territorial dispute and the strategic interest that different actors have on Buenaventura's economical and territorial dynamics (both urban and rural), which have humanitarian consequences that directly affect the municipality of Cali, where the deterioration of the situation has generated migration flows (displacements)".[6]

Beyond the legal and political recognition of the phenomenon through 1997's Law 387, and the efforts of the Colombian Constitutional Court to give the phenomenon a special place in the state's institutions –for example, through Sentence T 025–, FD in Colombia has a place in the discourse of public policy –PP henceforth–, even if the concept hasn't penetrated the everyday social and political life of a country that is still going through the harshness of a demoted internal war that still generates several expressions of stigmatization among its victim population.[7] The finger-pointing to which FDP are victims, is the common expression of a profoundly unequal urban context, where undeclared class wars take place through the establishment of invisible borders, dangerous city streets, gray areas with no rule of law and where civilizing processes, backed by citizen self-control, usually are non-existent and inefficient for coexistence, respect and a democratic life (Ayala, Holguín and Uribe, 2017). That is why, the record of violent events in daily newspapers favors the *stakeholders*[8] that follow and use the big newspapers –and even the local State itself– to recognize dangerous zones and to assign the mechanisms that provide safety to some, and define others as marginal zones.

The State could respond to this problem through the legitimate use of force or social investments (through social public policies) as a formula to reach an acceptable level of coexistence; to minimize the social uncertainty that

6 Counsel for Peace of the Municipality of Santiago de Cali. Territorial Action Plan for Attention to Victims of the Armed Conflict in the Municipality of Santiago de Cali, Departament of Valle del Cauca 2012-2015. Retrieved from: http://www.cali.gov.co/dagma/descargar.php?idFile=8916.

7 In spite of the advances made up to this point in the negotiation process between Juan Manuel Santos's government and the FARC's guerrillas. Ever since October 2017, both parts have signed an agreement to end the conflict (December, 2016) and are currently moving to agreements on the topics of land, political participation, illegal crops, among others. Before the end of 2016, the Final Agreement (II) was signed at the Colón theater at the country's capital, thus ending the armed conflict between the State and Colombia's largest guerrilla group: FARC-Ep. Up until now, the only group that remains at war is the subversive National Liberation Army (ELN), with whom the government of José Manuel Santos Calderón is currently on conversations and dialogues for peace at the city of Quto (Ecuador).

8 The term "stakeholders" refers to any individual or group that can interfere in the achievment of the goals of certain public policies.

urban citizens in poverty share with those that abandoned their land, fleeing the dynamic of death of the internal armed conflict. That is how the invisibility and the cultural elimination of the displacement victim is guaranteed, whether he/she is a peasant, an African descendant or and indigene –who are traditionally considered as obstacles for the development of large-scale– agricultural activities (agribusiness projects to produce biofuels), large-scale strip mining or as disagreeing social expressions and, therefore, uncomfortable for certain social sectors that represent several forms of power within cities (Ayala *et al.*).

This way, FD and its victims, the FDP, surface as a complicated phenomenon to grapple with, since the State's mere consideration doesn't seem enough for society in general, civilians in particular and successive governments to size the huge social, political, cultural (identity) and economical problem behind the alienation that millions of Colombians surviving in urban spaces, streets and avenues in cities and towns that are profoundly dysfunctional, to which an additional problem can be added up: displaced people have a negative connotation in the places that 'accept' them, denying them access to opportunities for "a better life" and excluding them from the possibilities that a social rule of law offers, at least from a rhetorical perspective (Ayala, *et al.*).

The real presence of FDP –the result of a social diaspora that involves the entire country– generates communication encounters based upon the deconstructed identities of millions of peasants, farmers, indigenous and Afro-Colombians, thus creating "new" subjects whose social identities are in crisis, fragmented and beaten by the violent displacement to which they have been subjected. The citizenships, identities and life projects of these "new" subjects have been restricted, deprived and obstructed by the new contextual circumstances in which they must go on with their lives. Under such vulnerable and weakened circumstances, these "new" subjects wander city streets and avenues, visit the State's entities, with the clear purpose of finding a decent environment in which to go on with their lives, knowing that going back to their lands is an option that the State could hardly guarantee them (Ayala, *et al.*).

Thus, the phenomenon of forced displacement constitutes a human drama in which the invisibility of this collective and individual tragedy becomes a decisive factor. "Invisibility acquires sense in the lives of displaced people. As long as they do not feel protected, they protest that the State doesn't recognize them as actor-citizens. Consequently, the lives of displaced people go by in anonymity and in the underground. In that way, they are stigmatized by an insensitive society, thus becoming the expression of the internal armed conflict that Colombia is going through" (Correa de Andreís, 2005, p. 90).

That is how multiple discourses come up, not only as an effort to expose and warn about the phenomenon of FD, but through which social representations

–SR henceforth– around the victims of territorial disputes in the context of internal armed conflict between its diverse actors, both legal and illegal, become enthroned. The news discourse is only one of many that conceive, represent and deconstruct the SR with which audiences, readers, public servants and students, among others, understand and account for a social, political, cultural, economical and identity problem such as FD. The discourses that flow through mass media and everyday social encounters, whether part of the institutional discourse or not, can be quite definitive when the time comes to recognize or not, hide or not, minimize or not the displacement phenomenon and the precarious living conditions of FDP. Thus, FD as a public problem is possible thanks to the characterization and meaning that specific social actors –both public and private– have given it, assigning it with negative characteristics through a discourse that identifies FD with social values (dignity, equality, respect, freedom) that they have forsaken.

CHARACTERIZING THE JOURNALISTIC MANAGEMENT GIVEN BY *EL PAÍS* NEWSPAPER TO FORCIBLY DISPLACED PEOPLE

The mass media news and editorial discourse is a key variable in the way that the phenomenon of FDP is represented socially and other representational forms in Colombia –particularly by people that follow the news on printed media and TV–. Following this line of analysis, in this section, we present the characterization that resulted from the follow-up and analysis of the news and editorial events that were accepted and presented by *El País* newspaper, in relation to FDP in specific historical moments during several administrations: Samper Pizano, Pastrana Arango and Uribe Vélez.

This exercise is supported by an interpretative approach that, under the umbrella of the qualitative method and, particularly, the qualitative analysis of texts (Isaza Espinosa, 2017), allowed us to identify certain ideas, meanings and discourses around FDP. For the development of these characterization and analysis exercises, we laid out three analytical categories, from the standpoint of the SR discourse (Moscovici)[9]:

9 SR are eminently social, since they take place and revitalize themselves within interrelation among individuals in their everyday contexts and during a very specific historical moment, which is why they can be modified according to social processes and dynamics that, at a social, political, economical or cultural level, take place during the signification and re-signification of lived history. The SR allow to circumscribe the ways in which we conceive the world, situations, social processes and subjects from the ways in which we perceive certain realities given to us, from our very own experience and because of our interrelation with other agents and social institutions.

a) *Positive objectification.* It includes information, data and discourses inclined or directed towards raising awareness among its audience of the contextual conditions in which FDP survive. An example of this kind of objectification can be identified in a news article from March 25, 1998, with the headline The armed conflict is the cause. The article includes a complaint made by the representative of an international organization that denounces the existence of a State policy that is given to reinforcing paramilitary groups in certain Colombian regions, with disastrous consequences for the civilian population. This article is characteristic of a type of positive objectification since it contributes to the construction of a solid, contextualized and ample social representation of displacement and its victims:

> In Colombia, there is a State policy that allows paramilitary groups –which act against the civilian population without any punishment– to strengthen and supply themselves with armament, denounced this country's representative of the International Franciscan Organization. Omar Fernández declared that a policy of leveling among the civilian population is taking place and that, presently, forcibly displaced people are the most intense problem (EL PAÍS. March 25, 1998. sec. C. p. 10).

b) *Neutral Objectification.* It circumscribes data, facts and discourses that accounted for the existence of the displacement phenomenon and FDP in statistical terms, but under such a media management and exposition that wouldn't have much effect on consumer audiences. An example of this form of objectification can be identified on a news article published on October 16, 1994, under the headline "Without a promised land", which gathers the results of an investigation by the Colombian Episcopal Conference, stating that, between 1985 and 1994, 586, 261 people, belonging to 108, 301 families, were forcibly displaced within the national territory because of violent reasons. The content of this article and its journalistic management can be considered within this category, since they present a series of background details around academic studies and social research on the phenomenon backed by quantitative information:

> In the 1960s, there were some norms and several support actions were advanced for people displaced from their regions, but the subject was never discussed again, says Jorge Rojas, researcher for the Episcopal Conference's section for human mobilization. Then, the profoundest study on the subject, by expert Paul Oquis, assured that, in five years, from 1948 to 1953, about two million people were displaced during the period commonly known as The Violence (EL PAÍS. October 16, 1994. sec. B. p. 5).

c) *Negative objectification.* It mixed notes, texts, textual types, discourses and information that, clearly, offered and exhibited a negative motivation to create antagonism, grief and similar expressions and emotions, as well as the consolidation of the social processes of stigmatization that society, the State and mass media set in motion some time ago, to name the identity destruction that accompanies those recognized as displacement victims or FDP. One example of this form of objectification was put forward on Wednesday, September 20, 1995, where the objectification around the phenomenon of forced displacement was negative. The article's title was "The drama reaches Montería" (sic) and its header below read: "displaced people are a mess, a setback, a problem…". The header's message is clear and direct: "This city has no means to face the displaced people mess…" (sic). Medium, reporter and official source join to build a negative and harmful representation of people victimized by internal displacement:

> Army of fear (caption): At Montería, very few are interested in that silent army that has arrived to our outskirts. Displaced people, at least for our Mayor, "are a group of poor people that have arrived in peace to our city to build their shacks". (EL PAÍS. September 20, 1995. p. 3).

These three examples of types of objectification[10] were configured in El País's management of the phenomenon and represent a journalistic exercise subject to news production routines that don't allow for conceptual discussions or for the permanent revision of the past or the news events themselves, as recorded on the very same pages of this Colombian newspaper, in order to improve the management and analyze the representational chaining that is set in motion each time an event is elevated to the status of news (Ayala, *et al.*).

This sequence of SR comes into play at the precise moment in which the news reporter (from his/her own biases, motivations, voids and prejudices) considers that an event is newsworthy. It continues once the journalist accepts, more or less "naturally" –many times without arguing, evaluating or contrasting– the SR that his/her interviewees present them during the meeting of reporter and source –which, in some cases, can be asymmetrical–, if the source or sources exert some kind of "domain" or "convincing power" over the reporter. The representational circle that surrounds a news event is completed with the SR that the newspaper's Chief Editor or Chief of Section "imposes" over the reporter, while revising the article's text, or even, before the reporting process, through insinuations, recommendations, opinions and estimations (Ayala, *et al.*).

10 Some more detailed examples of the three types of objectification can bee seen on Table 1 (see annex 1).

It is important to point out that in 1997, when Colombia recognized forced displacement legally and politically, through Law 387, the event was barely covered by *El País*. In a negative note, we must mention that, from 1997 on, *El País* began a journalistic process of "identity fusion", sustained through the common usage of categories such as "peasants" and "expelled" to name the population victimized by forced displacement, formed by members of the Afro-Colombian and indigenous ethnic groups. Some examples of this kind of representation by the mass media can be seen on the following headlines:

> "Downpour affects peasants' shelter" *(sic)*.
>
> "200 expelled in the last ten years"
>
> "Peasant displacement from Putumayo"
>
> "Massacre leaves 13 dead"

The term "expelled" is added to others such as "refugees", "eradicated" and expressions such as "people that flee" and "massive exodus". When the journalistic exercise uses a group of synonyms to name FDP, it can favor the incomprehension of the phenomenon of forced displacement and/or the invisibility, not only of a crime against humanity, but also of hiding the identities of the victims of the displacement phenomenon. Thus, the press makes it easier on themselves, by covering the facts related to forced displacement, using universal terms such as "peasant" which clearly renders the Afro-Colombian and indigenous people displacement invisible, as well as the resulting loss of cultural identity that comes with the abandonment of their ancestral lands and their collective life practices.

The discontinuity in recognizing displaced people as victims, in the majority of cases, came at the expense of official sources, constantly consulted by the reporters of this Colombian newspaper; in using the category of refugees; in the legal vacuums shown throughout this follow-up and the fusing of the displaced indigenous and Afro-Colombian identities under the category of "peasants". Because of all of this –together with the journalistic and representational judgments achieved in several news articles–, the follow-up and analysis allowed us to characterize the news management of *El País* in this regards as discontinuous. Without a doubt, this can play a key role in the cognitive processes of audiences that incessantly consumed and consume the information provided regarding this phenomenon by the cited communication medium.

El País agreed to recognize the displaced population as victims, exclusively, as soon as the official sources did so. In this way, the newspaper excluded or trivialized the importance of the legal variable to explain the legal and political

nature of displacement. The representational exercises produced through published news and editorials facilitated the construction of a partial knowledge of the phenomenon of forced displacement and its victims. It is possible that before the legal existence of the category of "displaced", journalism, like that of *El País*, circumscribed their task to inform to repeat whatever their sources said; sources which, at that moment in history, were studying and following the phenomenon of displacement; or sources that, coincidentally, were dealing with facts and humanitarian crisis related to the phenomenon of forced displacement, like the Episcopal Conference, the Red Cross, the "Defensoría del Pueblo" (the "People's Defense"), academic research and the Codher, among others. By limiting its informative task to specific sources, and without any legal framework acknowledging displacements and FDP, media like *El País* newspaper from Cali ended up minimizing a complicated phenomenon of multiple aspects, turning it into a very difficult issue to grasp. Even worse, these facts were subject to criteria such as newsworthy (values/news), which validity is not only relative, but arguable[11] (Ayala, *et al.*).

Representational exercises, held in the three kinds of presented objectifications (positive, neutral and negative) allowed the detection of a discontinued journalistic management that, from the planted and suggested SR standpoint, is a product of and/or follow a journalistic routine coverage that is hardly favorable to cover a phenomenon so hard to grasp and explain. That is why, before the dimension of a complex social and humanitarian phenomenon like FD, there is a need to reconsider the values/news that elevated the events published on the pages of *El País* to the level of newsworthy, given the consequence that mass media discourses usually have on audiences that take as a principle of reality whatever the media offers them.

To fuse the identities of displaced people has been a resource that has condensed through the years in some instruments of PP to address the displaced population. However, the so-called differentiated approaches[12] in PP are gradually trying to correct this matter whenever it is recognized that FDP

11 In the editorial of April 19, 1996, the newspaper from Valle del Cauca itself recognized the place it had given the phenomenon of forced displacement in its editorials and news articles. In the newspaper's words, it admitted that "the dimension of the violence in Colombia is valued by the number of deads". We pay very little attention to the growing army of displaced people that the armed conflict is creating in our country. In Colombia, there is not enough acknowledgement that forced displacement is a flagrant violation of Human Rights. That is why we are constant subjects of complaints before the Human Rights Comission. The drama of displacement has become another formal argument for a "special narrator" for Colombia, to investigate, control and supervise all topics related to Human Rights in our country.

12 To assume a differential approach as course for public policy, implies the recognition to a certain extent of the historical debt that the Colombian State has in attention and protection programs inasmuch that, for more than two decades recognizing the phenomenon of forced displacement, there have existed and will continue existing governmental programs with serious limitations in terms of formulation, coverage and possibilities from an economical and social standpoint, added to a semi-absence of considerations regarding gender (Holguín, 2017).

is diverse in age terms, by gender, sexual diversity, among others, and that the public authorities should consider these differentiated needs. In this context, communication media can become key gauges to define public problems as well as to question and guide the course that a PP can take.

THE ROLE OF MASS MEDIA AS AGENTS TO CONSTRUCT DISCOURSES THAT AFFECT THE DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION OF PUBLIC POLICIES

Mass media are social and political actors that hasn't been recognized yet (Ayala, 2006), in spite of their penetration power and their high incidence in the way audiences assume what's public, understand and comprehend phenomena and the relations between the State and society. Bourdieu considers that, in the world of media, "journalists play a central role because, of all discourse producers, they are the ones with the most potent media to distribute and impose them. Thus, they occupy a privileged position in the symbolic struggle to make see and make believe" (2002, p. 65). Not for nothing, mass media have an important place in the configuration of behaviors, attitudes and even thoughts that revolve around diverse realms of society.

The journalistic and advertising discourses are key in the generation of states in the public opinion and the consolidation of representational exercises affected by the moralizing gaze that mass media place over events to elevate them to the status of news, from the standpoint of some argued and arguable values/news and/or newsworthy criteria.

The news discourse is one of many that produces, reproduces and deconstructs the SR with which audiences, readers, public servants and students, among others, account for a social, political, cultural, economical, identity problem such as ID.

The discourse forms that circulate through mass media and during everyday social encounters, institutional or not, can be quite definitive when the time comes to recognize or not, hide or not, minimize or not, the phenomenon of displacement and the precarious life conditions of FDP. In fact, on several occasions, "those who know something about the social world would like to say something about it, but clash with those who control the access to mass media and select the contents for massive broadcasting" (Bourdieu, 2002, p. 65).

The journalistic and editorial discourse of mass media thus becomes a key variable in the way in which Colombians –particularly the audiences that follow the news on printed media, radio and TV– create their social representations of the displacement phenomenon and the formal representations around FDP.

This way, media companies, as political and social actors, use their power to inform, restricted by their conditions and circumstances as part of important economical conglomerates. Journalism, as expressed by Bourdieu, "ends up dominating all political, scientific and intellectual life" (Bourdieu, 2002, p. 69). That is why information acquires an economical and political value used to pressure decisions, hide facts and problems and minimize public affairs –like FD–, which was recognized by society and the State itself so late.

It is possible that audiences, and people in general, do not realize the direct interference of mass media in the way in which they create an image of the news events that they, consciously or unconsciously, "consume" through journalistic discourses. This can be true since the low consumption or exposition to media messages is countered with the discussion of those events that are and were news, in spaces shared by citizens, either within the private dynamics of families, as well as within academic and other social activities. Either way, there is no way to run from the influence of mass media inasmuch their discourses are reproduced, not only by themselves (radio, printed news, television, Internet), but by people close to citizen's lives.

Even though mass media are recognized for three fundamental functions –to educate, to entertain and to inform–, this doesn't mean that citizens reflect on the importance of those functions and suggest other functions or a deepening of the aforementioned.

Mass media usually are strategic actors for positioning a discourse, an idea, a phenomenon or a problem in the government's public agenda, as long as the direction given to a news event allows it to remain visible before the interest of diverse social agents or, on the contrary, pass into the background. It's not for nothing that *mediatization* is one of the models to subscribe a problem in the public agenda,[13] by airing the deliberations of different actors in mass media (Cuervo, 2007). That is how mass media become representatives and key agents in legitimizing a problem that can later be recognized and thus elevated to be a PP that –just like the FDP PP– guarantees the construction of a discourse which is validated, not only by how the forced displacement phenomenon is understood and the attention and the compensation strategies of their infringed rights, but also by the type of models of State, society, audience and social change that each leader, in turn, tries to elevate as the ideals or rallying cry of his/her government. In this sense, mass media, through their discourses, narratives and representations, influence, directly and indirectly, in the different stages of a PP's cycle. That is why, as Ayala (2007) affirms it, "Colombian

13 By public agenda (according to Padioleau, 1982, p. 25), we refer to "the group of perceived problems that require a public debate, or even the (active) intervention of the legitimate public authorities" (Roth, 2014, p. 122). For Aguilar Villanueva, "by government agenda, literature usually understands the group of problems, demands, matters and affairs that governments have selected and ordered as subjects of action and, more properly, as objects over which they have decided what must be acted upon or have considered the need to act" (1993, p. 29).

media have passed from the action of informing and guiding public opinion, to direct political action, that is: they exert political and informative control over the government's actions".

FINAL CONSIDERATION

- ***El País before the phenomenon of displacement and FDP***

Inside the representation that a mass medium such as Cali's *El País* gave the phenomenon of displacement and FDP, we identified that this medium assumed, as a general idea, that displaced people were peasants which, without a doubt, showed an exercise of cultural homogenization through fusing the identities of indigenes, peasants and Afro-Colombians that were victims of FD. By unifying the identities of these three identity groups in the sole category of "peasants", *El País* favored the construction of a partial and mistaken SR (which can affect the construction of public problems).

Besides the fact that *El País* is a mass medium anchored in the consumption logic of a major city like Cali, and read by the urban sector of the population, in spite of the symbolic and representational charge that such conditions carries, the informed and fused, from an identity standpoint, ended up favoring the emptying the sense out of the lives of FDP. As Correa de Andreis expressed it so clearly, a sociologist that worked with the victimized FDP to help the State and society to recognize them as subjects of law: "Our displaced citizens are not empty vessels, nor disoriented beings, nor lesser people than the rest of the population, like the hegemonic cultural makes them look. On the contrary, they are carriers of cultural heritages and, of course, of a culture" (2005. p. 56).

This identity fusion (commonly made to indigene and Afro-descendant FDP) under the sole notion of "peasants" denies the cultural diversity, the historical processes of people, social differences and the trajectory of all human groups that inhabitant the Colombian territory. It even shows a censorship of the diversity of identities and their real nature as specific and particular groups. From a rational perspective, it is known that these notions and their social usage are not naïve. In some ways, this expresses forms of symbolic violence perpetrated from the bases of denial and invisibility; from a westernized Colombian society, whitened and discriminatory; from a way to encompass all cultural, ethnic and racial particularities under the word "peasant", so that these are not recognized for what they truly are. This turns all these differences into an identity cliché: the "peasant society", a posture that even clashes with what is established in our constitution. This is a truly deceptive illusion of Colombian reality that turns the comprehension of social processes into convoluted and ill-defined debates.

All of this also contributes to making the risk and persecution factors that gravitates towards the lives of indigenes and Afro-Colombians invisible. From a social, economical, cultural and political standpoint, these people are looked upon as inconvenient citizens to the modernization project that has driven Colombia to dissimilar mining, agribusiness (single-crop farming of palm oil and rubber), livestock projects, among others, that have been set in motion close or within the territories of collective properties where indigenous, peasant and Afro-descendant communities survive (Ayala, *et al.*).

It is clear, then, that the social exclusion of displaced people begins from the process itself of abandoning their lands or plots. This process continues when it is represented by mass media that reduce its complexity to a news event, under the logic of a journalistic language that is hardly adequate to socialize and distribute the knowledge that, regarding FD, news reporters gather from their consulted sources. This process of exclusion continues with the social stigmatization reproduced by social, economical, and urban actors that end up defending their city and spaces from the "invasion" of hundreds of thousand of FDP that not only "ruins and worries" a city like Cali, but disturb its inhabitants, who live in relative comfort (Ayala, *et al.*).

Social, political and economical exclusion persists when the State, weak and uncertain, is unable to undertake the identity custody and recovery of FDP or of those who survive in such conditions. The delivery of aid, the construction of improvised and definitive shelters, the accompaniment of communities that try to return to their territories, the offering of industrial projects based on administrative logics unknown to the victims, and alert statements because of food shortage or the growth of the displaced population, are all part of what, in this document, we call "the catalogue of responses and contextual circumstances of forced displacement", recorded every day by *El País*, and the major press in general, without further discussions (Ayala, *et al.*). In this sense, the role of the State's responses, through the agency of PP, gains importance in the proportion that, among other *stakeholders*, mass media become key agents in the way in which a public affair is represented, but also in the way that, as political actors, they can contribute to expose how does the State carry out, or not, its constitutional responsibilities to the public opinion, when the time comes to address and compensate the rights of the victimized population.

In this way, going back to Cejudo (2008) once more, let us remember that mass media are social agents that, by constructing discourses and representations around social phenomena, can contribute to explain: why certain topics are adopted as public problems and enter the government's agenda; in which way can a discourse related to a problem affect whatever solutions are chosen for it; how are discourses constructed to convince and legitimize decisions; and how do discourses also affect the implementation and assessment processes of PP.

Following the analysis categories we set forward (positive objectification, neutral objectification, negative objectification) to follow up El País's journalistic discourse and practice, we can conclude that:

Among the found journalistic practices is quantizing the phenomenon. This avoids describing and analyzing the social, economical, political, environmental and cultural impacts of FDP. Reducing the complexity of a phenomenon to a statistical fact, favors the construction of restricted SR and the consolidation of cognitive processes among readers and audiences in general, that lead to erroneous conceptualizations of what the FD phenomenon and its victims actually are. Thus, displacement is objectified as a cold statistical data (neutral objectification). This discourse is usually legitimized in the way in which certain official sources defend the results of PP, generally based on a homogenous fact, instead of revealing the impacts and effects that certain public programs have had over any given social phenomenon. This tendency is repeated when referencing PP that usually privilege quantitative diagnostics as a way to explain the phenomena of society.

Another identified practice on the research exercise is related to the use of melodramatic epithets over the phenomenon and its victims, which doesn't guarantee a human and respectful treatment of those individuals that, for several reasons, are forced or decide by themselves, to abandon their territories and lives, fleeing the confrontation of public forces and groups outside the law (negative objectification). These epithets work as signs and usually reproduced in the discourses that hide behind certain PP or of the public servants that set them in motion themselves. One only needs to follow news where some menacing discourses come into play, regarding FDP, like "displaced people are a mess, an inconvenience, a problem", for example.

Lastly, our analytical exercise exposed evidence that the social, cultural and identity effects of a phenomenon such as displacement, are viewed as a sterile collateral effect of adverse situations in public order than as a systematic process of human rights violation by armed actors including, of course, public forces that represent the State (positive objectification).[14]

- ***About mass media as social agents that construct discourses that can affect "in the diverse stages of the development of public policies"***

Mass media become fundamental mechanisms that guide and drive the order of public debate about the most diverse aspects of social life; the aforementio-

14 It is important to warn that the penetration and impact power of EL PAÍS is relative if we discuss a direct impact upon audiences. Instead, we are facing the exercise of power through indirect impacts since, as Bourdieu would say, in information distribution, what is said by the Cali newspaper is reproduced by other media (radio, TV, social networks) that, little by little, shape a SR that, in this case, allows audiences that represent the internal displacement by themselves to do so from all the common tropes, from the minimal or wrong readings of a press engrossed in its own journalistic discourse which, besides being unhistorical, reveals to be quite moralizing.

ned is a result, not only of the power that mass media have as agents to impose discussion and debate topics into the public opinion, but because, above everything else, they have the necessary resources (technological, economical and symbolic) to spread, make "believe" and ingrain affairs that belong in the political realm into the imaginary of citizens. It is not for nothing that these agents have been attributed functions such as providing contextualized infor-mation to different audiences, stimulating the insertion of key social topics into the public agenda, thus supervising the actions or inactions of the political agents of certain societies. Thereby, present day mass media, besides gaining an advertising and commercial importance, also gain a political one as mediators in the articulation of social life; as agents that affect the construction of reality, particularly, in a context where politics is replaced by the forces of globalized markets which, by exacerbating individualism, implies that political borders and the limits between what's public and private are less and less defined (Ayala, 2015), thus complicating the possibility to materialize the projects that, in the long and medium terms, are planned by public agents.

Mass media as social agents and increasingly more political actors,[15] put the discussion and distribution of the fundamental rights of citizens into perspective, as well as the accountability mechanisms that these demand for their materialization. The advancement of the right for reliable and timely information is not only an obligation of the State, but of these society agents as well. Given the nature of their actions, mass media must work for citizens to exercise their rights, from a dual responsibility perspective. The above is mentioned considering their penetrating power in society.

Mass media can promote the active participation of those groups that directly or indirectly are or can be affected by matters of public character in the several phases of a PP . In this sense, as social and socializing agents, they contribute to the public deliberation, the dialogue and exchange of information that allow decision makers to comprehend public affairs from real facts and not only from a technical and administrative rationality of public agents that, in many cases, is far from the reality of those social actors whose rights haven been violated, just like the case of FDP, who await the State's effective action in the process of their restitution. All of this, without a doubt, has an effect in the conception of PP not only as a matter for experts, but as something binding, as a kind of bridge to improve the relations between State and a society that erects herself as democratic.

15 The concentration of media enterprises in economical conglomerates turns them into parts of a political machinery where political power ends up dominating politics. That is why information companies in present day Colombia are political actors and appendixes to economical powers with clear political interests, like keeping what is known as "savage capitalism" in motion. For example, EL TIEMPO, a newspaper of national circulation, belongs to Carlos Sarmiento Aguilar, a banker; *El País* newspaper belongs to the Lloreda family that owns several other companies.

Finally, mass media help to communicate, hide, or even censor, the real interests behind public action. That is why, as mediators, the can put citizens in tune with the actions of public authorities, or even question the decisions made in the course of action of a PP (contract assignment, subsidies, diversion of resources, procedures and paperwork for the effective exercise of rights). In the same way, the communicative and informative action of mass media is key for citizens, and the State's control organisms as well, to follow-up the agreements between authorities and PP operators. That is why media are required not to practice self-censorship as way to protect the interests of groups in power or when the time comes to question the public authorities' lack of action in complying their responsibilities.

Judging by the assessment on the journalistic management of FDP in Colombia, maybe El País's reporters overlooked that "the main function of journalists is to challenge those versions promulgated and privileged from the corridors of power, and divulge alternative versions, declaring its epistemological status, that is, in relation to interpretations, conclusions and hypothesis that are more or less likely, as well as verified and contrasting truths" (Javier del Rey Morato, 1989. p. 35).

It is also probable that within the team of journalists, actions were taken to confront the (State) official versions, but by being subsumed by entrepreneurial logic, editorial policies and the moralizing news discourse, journalists had a choice in taking the unobstructed route imposed by the fusion of identities because, ultimately, it is about people in displacement, a condition that moves them away from their status as citizens and subjects of law.

REFERENCES

Aguilar Villanueva, Luis Fernando. (1993). *Problemas Públicos y Agenda de Gobierno.* México: Grupo Editorial Miguel Ángel Porrúa.

Alcaldía de Santiago de Cali. Asesoría de Paz. *Plan de Acción Territorial para la Atención a Víctimas del Conflicto Armado en el Municipio de Santiago de Cali,* Departamento del Valle del Cauca 2012-2015. Online:http://www.cali.gov.co/dagma/descargar.php?idFile= 8916.

Ayala Osorio, Germán; Holguín, Carmen Jimena, & Uribe Castro, Hernando. (2017). *El desplazamiento forzoso en el diario El País. Cali*: Programa Editorial Universidad Autónoma de Occidente.

Ayala Osorio, Germán. (2015). *Disquisiciones en torno a la democracia y los medios de comunicación en Colombia.* in: Uribe Castro, Hernando, Ayala Osorio, Germán, Hurtado Vera, Guido & Holguín, Carmen Jimena. Una Experiencia de Investigación Acción Educativa: Reflexiones desde el Aula. Colombia. Programa Editorial de la Universidad Autónoma de Occidente.

_____. (2007). "Medios de Comunicación en Colombia: de la acción informativa a la acción política", *La Otra*

Tribuna, 2007. Online: http://laotratribuna1.blogspot.com.co/2007/05/medios-de-comunicacin-en-colombia-de-la.html

Ayala Osorio, Germán; Duque, Óscar; y Hurtado, Guido. (2006). Medios de comunicación y seguridad democrática: De la democracia radical al unanimismo ideológico. Cali, Colombia: Universidad Autónoma de Occidente.

Alcaldía de Santiago de Cali. Asesoría de Paz. Plan de Acción Territorial para la Atención a Víctimas del Conflicto Armado en el Municipio de Santiago de Cali, Departamento del Valle del Cauca 2012-2015 Online: http://www.cali.gov.co/dagma/descargar.php?idFile=8916.

Bourdieu, Pierre. (2002). Pensamiento y Acción. Buenos Aires: Libros del Zorzal.

Castillo Esparcia, Antonio. (2011). Los medios de comunicación como actores sociales y políticos. Poder, Medios de Comunicación y Sociedad, *Razón y Palabra* N. 75.

Cejudo M., Guillermo. (2008). Discurso y políticas públicas: enfoque constructivista. México: CIDE, work paper N. 205.

Corporación Medios para la Paz. (1999). Para desarmar la palabra. Diccionario de Términos del Conflicto y la Paz. Bogotá D.C. Corporación Medios para la Paz.

Correa de Andreis Alfredo. (2005). *Pistas para un Nuevo Rumbo: Patrimonios y personalidad jurídica de los desplazados del distrito de Barranquilla.* Observatorio de Derechos Humanos y Derecho Humanitario.

Cuervo Restrepo Jorge Iván. (2007). La definición del problema y la elaboración de la agenda. In: *Ensayos sobre Políticas Públicas*. Universidad Externado de Colombia.

Del Rey Morato, Javier. (1989). La Comunicación Política. Madrid, España: Editorial Eudema Universidad Complutense.

El País. Urabá, ¿hay cómo parar el desangre? Cali. September 3, 1995. sec. A. p. 5.

_____. Tras la raíz Embera Chamí. Cali. February 4, 1996. sec. C. p. 2

_____. Un pueblo perdido en la ciudad. Cali. July 6, 2003. sec. A. p. 4.

_____. Urabá, ¿hay cómo parar el desangre? Cali. September 3, 1995. sec. A. p. 5.

_____. 123 mil desplazados. Cali. September 26, 1999. sec. A. p. 7.

_____. Desplazados, sin salida. Cali. November 18, 2002. sec. A. p. 3.

_____. El drama va a Montería. Cali. September 20, 1995. p. 3.

_____. Éxodo indígena en Cali. Cali. June 23, 1999. sec. B. p. 1.

_____. El Valle 'observará' el desplazamiento. Cali. June 4, 2004. sec. B. p. 4.

_____. Sin tierra prometida. Cali. Octuber 16, 1994. sec. B. p. 5.

_____. "El conflicto armado es la causa". Cali. March 25, 1998. sec. C. p. 10.

Isaza Espinosa, Carolina (2017). El análisis de textos gubernamentales en el estudio de las políticas públicas (análisis de contenido, de discurso y narrativo). In: Análisis de Políticas Públicas: perspectivas pragmáticas, interpretativas, de redes y de innovación pública. Bogotá, Colombia: André-Nöel Roth Deubel (editor), Universidad Nacional de Colombia.

Roth Deubel, André Nöel. (2014). Políticas públicas: formulación, implementación y evaluación. Bogotá: Ediciones Aurora, Décima edición.

ANNEX 1

Examples of the types of objectification identified

Type of Objectification	Headline	Date	Observations
Positive	'Displacement violates Human Rights' The news article mentions "Six hundred and five people murdered, 101 massacres in 14 years, hundreds of widows and orphaned children and more than 15,000 displaced families are the cruel statistics that generalized violence has left in the area of Urabá Antioquia, according to the numbers given by the Permanent Committee for Human Rights Defense".	September 3, 1995. Sec. A. p. 5. (Samper government)	What the newspaper is doing is picking up on what was expressed by Jaime Córdoba Treviño, Defender of the People, who explained: "whoever becomes a victim of forced displacement can –through the action of tutelage– claim the protection of their right not to be forced to migrate because of illegal or arbitrary decisions before judges". The Defender of the People's intervention comes from the presidential proposal to protect the lives and wellbeing of civil population, through evacuations caused by security reasons and problems of public order, in zones where guerrillas attack public forces.
	Looking for the roots of the Embera Chamí. The news article mentions: "Internal conflicts and political violence drove them out of the Chocó and Risaralda, spreading them all over the country. Today, they intend to create a new haven at Qundío, in order to stop their culture from disappearing… This search has gone on for more than five decades since, together with other internal armed conflicts, the end of the 1940s' political violence forced them to displace from Chocó and Risaralda, the Eastern Valleys, Caldas and Caquetá in search of a better life… For the Embera Chamí that dwell the Quindío, the need for shelter is a priority. It is a question of having a territory where they can exert their autonomy, live their traditions and develop their own government".	February 4, 1996. Sec. C. p. 2. (Samper government)	The social, cultural and identity effects of a phenomenon such as displacement are clearly explained, thanks to an exercise in positive objectification; a phenomenon which is often viewed as an aseptic collateral effect of adverse situations of public order, rather than a systematic process of human rights violation carried out by armed actors, obviously including public forces, representing the State.

Type of Objectification	Headline	Date	Observations
Positive	'A people lost in the city…' Un pueblo perdido en la ciudad The news article mentions: "… In Cali, we are going through a humanitarian catastrophe", said Alba Luz Pantoja, Peace Adviser… "A situation that can be seen at every streetlight, in our 91 abnormal settlements, in the slopes of our city and at the offices of Desepaz and the Social Solidarity Network, where this new citizens go for help. Those who arrive at Cali believing that they have reached paradise ignore that the city has a deficiency of 150,000 students, 110,000 dwelling solutions and more than 100,000 people living without any social security".	July 6, 2003. Sec. A. p. 4. (Uribe government)	The use of categories like "displaced" and "rootless" keeps repeating, but terms like "refugees" and "victims" are not used at all. In this extensive piece of journalistic writing, there is a systemic view on the phenomenon of displacement that allows to it put into context of difficult budgetary circumstances and Cali's uncontrolled growth, made worse by the massive presence of hundreds of Colombians that run from the actions of armed actors. Some of its sections include opinions and representations, directly related to displaced people, that certain official sources make out of these facts.

Type of Objectification	Headline	Date	Observations
Neutral	The news article mentions "Six hundred and five people murdered, 101 massacres in 14 years, hundreds of widows and orphaned children and more than 15,000 displaced families are the cruel statistics that generalized violence has left in the area of Urabá Antioquia, according to the numbers given by the Permanent Committee for Human Rights Defense".	September 3, 1995. Sec. A. p. 5. (Samper government)	The phenomenon is referenced barely as mere information, as data to be delivered, although the possibility could be opened for a negative lecture since it mentions massacres and displaced families that, together, are a cruel statistic.
	123 thousand displaced people (sic), as the headline reads. The reference to cold stastistics in the news article is given in these terms: "During the first six months of the year, at least 123 thousand Colombians became part of the list of people who were displaced because of the war".	September 26, 1999. Sec. A. p. 7. (Pastrana government)	It refers to a list that seems to remain open 24 hours a day to include those who, although displaced, are not recognized as such in it. The article's statistical sense goes on like this: "26 of the country's secretaries and 356 departments have been affected this year by forced displacement".

Type of Objectification	Headline	Date	Observations
Neutral	Displaced people with no way out The news article's sub-head reads: About a thousand Colombians abandon their homes every day (sic). Its summary states that "between last January and March, 42 people were displaced from their homes every hour". Below, the article's body text reads "the phenomenon affects 321 municipalities in 31 departments –excluding San Andrés y Providencia–. In most localities, the arrival of displaced people became an indefinite social problem, since the Red de Solidaridad's resources turned out to be insufficient".	November 18, 2002. Sec. A. p. 3 (Uribe government).	It shows a representational exercise based exclusively on exposing the phenomenon of displacement from a statistical standpoint. The news article refers to normative frameworks, but it doesn't specify laws or decrees. Thus, it infers that the representational exercise is omitting facts or is based on certain type of neutral objectification.

Type of Objectification	Headline	Date	Observations
Negative	The drama goes to Montería (sic), displaced people are a mess, an eventuality, a problem… The sub-head is clear and direct: This city lacks the means to face the forced displacement mess. The body text reads: "Six hundred and five people murdered, 101 massacres in 14 years, hundreds of widows and orphaned children and more than 15,000 displaced families are the cruel statistics that generalized violence has left in the area of Urabá Antioquia, according to the numbers given by the Committee...".	September 20, 1995. P. 3. (Samper government)	Media, journalist and official source come together to construct a negative and damaging representation of people victimized by forced displacement. A section of the article reads "Fear army" (subtitle): In Montería, very few people are interested in that silent army that has come to our city's outskirts. Displaced people, at least for our mayor are 'poor people that have come in peace to our city to build their shacks'. With this harmful description of the phenomenon, a human and respectful treatment is not guaranteed for those individuals that, for several reasons, abandoned their territories and their lives, forced or by their own choice, running from the clashes between public forces and groups outside the law.

Type of Objectification	Headline	Date	Observations
Negative	More than 150 people displaced by violence have arrived to the city (sic). Indigenous exodus in Cali The body text reads: "they left their territories in the north of Cauca to beg in the streets… Today, Carmen and María Caecé, two indigenous women that carry their children on cloth parcels, wander around Southeastern Highway and Calle 17, where they take advantage of red lights to beg the drivers who, moved by amazement and pity, give them some coins…"	June 23, 1999. Sec. B. p.1 (Pastrana Government).	The piece includes expressions that evidence a journalistic language that contributes to the consolidation of negative social representations of displaced people that enthrone processes of stigmatization and social exclusion in violent environments and urban environments.
	El Valle 'will observe' forced displacement The article reads: "…Yesterday, La Oficina de Paz del Valle presented the Observatory of Conflict and Displacement for developing action plans in coordination with the community, thus focusing efforts to face this set of problems. The Observatory will use an information network to be constituted in municipalities and fed by representatives of the government's ministries, the Umatas and citizens".	June 4, 2004. Sec. B. p. 4. (Uribe Government)	The creation of a Forced Displacement Observatory was presented as if it was a project or an idea of the department's Oficina de Paz. The article's sub-head reads that the Oficina de Paz presented a project to control massive exodus. In the journalistic text there are no references or explanations of whether this Observatory accounts for or is the very same mentioned in 1997's Law 387. Law 387 states: "Article 13º: About the Observatory of Internal Displacement Because of Violence. The National Government will create an Observatory of Internal Displacement Because of Violence which will produce biannual reports on the magnitudes and tendencies…" This type of representational exercises barely contribute to the understanding of the phenomenon of forced displacement, since they omit the legal factor, which is key to explain and contextualize the State's responsibilities before the population victimized by forced displacement. Thus, the negative objectifications that serve as base for the social representations offered by EL PAÍS.

THE SOCIAL RIGHT TO MOBILITY AS PUBLIC POLICY: THE CASE OF MEXICO'S GUADALAJARA METROPOLITAN AREA

Mario Córdova España*

ABSTRACT: The scattered urban expansion and the proliferation of private automobiles in the Guadalajara Metropolitan Area (GMA) have created several landscapes of profound inequality. The possibilities to access the city and its services have decreased for people with lesser resources. It is necessary to implement public policies that address mobility as a Social Right, through better urban planning and improving public transport systems. Currently, at state level, several projects are being developed in favor of public transportation and non-motorized mobility. These projects make a considerable contribution to the development of a city that is more accessible and equal for all. However, there is still much to be done in consolidating a change of vision from a mobility model based on automobiles, to one based on the mobility of people.

KEYWORDS: Social Right to Mobility, Public Transport, Accessibility.

A MORE URBAN WORLD

More than half of the world population currently lives in urban areas. According to the United Nations (UN), this number will grow to almost 70% by 2050. In 1990, there were 10 megacities[1] in the world. In 2014, there were already 28 which, altogether, reached a population of 453 inhabitants (ONU HABITAT, 2014).

Up until 2014, the Latin American and Caribbean region concentrated 13% of the world urban population and harbored 4 of the world's 28 megacities: the Valley of Mexico Metropolitan Area (VMMA), Sao Paulo, Buenos Aires and

* PhD in Cities, Territories and Sustainability by the Universidad de Guadalajara. He has an extensive academic and professional career in architecture, urbanism, mobility, metropolis and sustainability. He is a professor at the master's degree and doctorate studies in Urban Mobility, Transport and Territory in Universidad de Guadalajara. Email: mcordova920@me.com

1 According to UN-Habitat, a "megacity" is an urban area with a population of 20 million or more. Fromhttp://www.un.org/spanish/waterforlifedecade/water_cities.shtml

Río de Janeiro (ONU HABITAT, 2014). Because of this, Latin America has earned the title as the most urbanized region of the planet.

In the case of Mexico, up until 1950, only 43% of its population lived in urban areas. But for the year 2010, this number grew up to 78%. (INEGI, 2010). According to Mexico's National Program of Urban Development, the country's urbanization process would grow steadily and, for 2030, 83% of its population will live in urban areas (SEDATU, 2014).

Then phenomenon of global urbanization can be seen in the Guadalajara Metropolitan Area (GMA),[2] considered to be the second most important metropolis in Mexico –only preceded by the VMMA–. It concentrates the largest population in the State of Jalisco. The GMA population grew steadily from 1980 to 2010 and, even though its growth rates are inferior to the ones of the 1960s and 1980s, each decade since then has shown an average growth of 700 thousands inhabitants (Gobierno del Estado de Jalisco & COEPO, 2010).

Thanks to the growing housing market, which began an accelerated growth in the 1980s, the population in suburban municipalities grew rapidly in a relatively short period of time. GMA's territorial growth process, like for all other Latin American metropolis, has surpassed its population growth, thanks to a serious problem of expansion and peripheral urban dispersion. Municipalities such as Tlajomulco de Zúñiga and Ixtlahuacán de los Membrillos, both located south from GMA, showed some the country's largest expansions during 2010 (SEDESOL, CONAPO & INEGI, 2010). Meanwhile, the state's central city (the municipality of Guadalajara) decreased its population little by little, going from concentrating more than 76% of the GMA's population in the 1970s, to just about 30% in 2015.

However, these accelerated processes of urbanization and migration –but not population– in the largest cities have been accompanied by important challenges related to resource management and satisfying the inhabitants' needs from a sustainability standpoint, including urban mobility –which is closely related to the intelligent distribution of territories and public transport for people, goods and services–.

The weak response that government agencies have given to such needs has resulted in complex processes of exclusion and inequality; precarious scenarios where people's access to the city, and the services it offers, has been limited.

2 The GMA is currently comprised by 9 municipalities: Guadalajara, El Salto, Juanacatlán, Ixtlahuacán de los Membrillos, Tlajomulco de Zúñiga, Tonalá, Tlaquepaque, Zapopan and Zapotlanejo.

THE TRAFFIC COLLAPSE OF LATIN AMERICAN CITIES

In recent decades, Latin American cities, in their disproportionate effort to becar-oriented, have reached a state of recurring traffic collapse with negative social, economical and environmental consequences. Lewis Mumford's premonitory quote about our city's motorized obesity, and their structural and technological placebos, has become a reality, barely two decades into the 21st Century, since no matter how many avenues, beltways, new automobile technologies, alternative energy sources and intelligent management systems come our way, the fundamental problem will persist and threaten to stay if we do not interrupt the high consumption of time and space of the individual motorization model.

From 2002 to 2007, Latin America increased its level of motorization by almost 50% –the most important increase worldwide–, even surpassing Asia-Pacific region's 20% increase. In Europe, the increase was of 2,6% and in North America, it was of 2,9%. It is noteworthy that more than 80% of motor vehicles in Latin America are concentrated in México, Brazil, Argentina and Colombia (Covarrubias, 2013, pág. 24).

This excessive accumulation of private automobiles is one of the most determining factors of these cities' traffic collapses, as well as of their atmospheric and auditory pollution, all of which have very serious public health consequences and, of course, in the social and economical urban life as well. Bogotá, Sao Paulo, Mexico City and Río de Janeiro are ranked among the 25 cities with the highest average of lost hours in traffic in 2016[3] with 80, 77, 62 and 51 hours per capita respectively (this ranking is headed by Los Angeles, California, with an average of 104 lost hours *per capita* (Cookson & Pishue, 2017).

In 2000, the motorization rate in Mexico was of 104 private vehicles for every 1,000 inhabitants. In 2015, this number reached 227. In absolute numbers, the country went from owning 10.2 million private vehicles to a little over 27 million (INEGI, 2015).

The most important metropolis in the country: VMMA, GMA and the Monterrey Metropolitan Area (MMA) tend to replicate the mobility model based on individual motorization, thus increasing their motorization rate each day.

For 2015, the GMA had 290 automobiles for every 1,000 in habitants, which places this metropolis above the MMA and the national motorization rate. The difference between the motorization between the GAMA and the VMMA is not large enough, considering that the VMMA has more than 23 million inhabitants and the GMA is close to only 5 million (see Table 1).

3 The study analyzed 1,064 cities in total.

TABLE 1. 2015 MOTORIZATION RATES IN THE MAIN MEXICAN METROPOLIS

	Mexico (country)	Valley of Mexico Metropolitan Area	Monterrey Metropolitan Area	Guadalajara Metropolitan Area
Motorization rates (private cars per each 1000 inhabitants)	227	414	274	290

Source: Personal elaboration based on INEGI, 2015.

In some ways, the high growth in number of vehicles resulted from the combination of diverse factors such as: the subsidy of gasoline, the rent increment per capita, the regularization of used foreign vehicles, accessible credits for car purchases, the increasing public investment in road infrastructure, the dispersed urban expansion and the progressive precariousness of public transport systems, among others.

To the motorization level, that is already suffocating cities, we should add the terrible public transport service that predominates in Latin America. Even though there are cities like Santiago de Chile or Bogotá, that have taken very important steps to improve urban transport, most of them seem to be stuck in providing outdated and decadent services.

Public transport in Mexican cities is not attractive for current or potential users of private transport. Only low-income population remains captive to public transport –with its predominating low quality and Bus-Man operating model[4]–, and only until their salaries allow them to purchase a private car.

Thus, the everyday scenario in Mexican cities is formed by traffic jams caused by large numbers of automobiles and the city's expansive model; a public transport service that, more than a efficient choice, is the only means of transport for those who can't afford a private vehicle, but wish to do so; and insufficient infrastructure for those who choose to use alternative transport such as bicycles and end up doing so, but in a context of insecurity and hostility.

The economical, social and environmental consequences for cities where automobiles are at the center of everyday mobility are obvious: traffic jams, air pollution, hours of social and productive value wasted in large distances from homes to work locations, high energetic consumption and traffic accidents, among others.

4 The "Bus-Man" model is an individual operation model in which each dealer manages and controls his unit within an established route, with major problems of lack of coordination, and internal and external competition, producing low quality of service and high accident rate.

THE URGENCY TO CHANGE THE PARADIGM: THE SOCIAL RIGHT TO MOBILITY

In the Latin American context, the acquisition of a vehicle is possible only for certain sectors of the population, while the large majority uses public transport with a very low quality service. Cities are still being planned for automobiles with greater and greater negative consequences.

People with the lowest incomes are the ones who pay the largest price, since they have limited access to services such as supply centers, medical and educational centers and work opportunities, due to the long distances they must travel to reach them, with high costs of money, time and effort. These trips are few and generally limited for the heads of family that must work to provide for their homes. This situation reduces the rest of the family's opportunities for development and attention. All of these, in the long term, generate more inequality, which could be perpetrated for generations to come.

In Latin America, from 1995 to 2010, the lowest-income population used a higher percentage of their total income in transportation, going from 6% to 9%, while the highest-income people reduced it from 20% to 13% (ONU Hábitat, 2014).

In the government sector, public policy tasked with solving the mobility problem exacerbated the inequality conditions in Latin American cities by deploying actions that favored the use of private automobiles, stimulating dispersed urban growth and underestimating the improvement of public transport systems. These kind of decisions, ill-advised on time and space, have driven cities to serious social, economical and environmental crisis.

The GMA is a clear example of the aforementioned. The city's Metropolitan Fund[5] has mainly been used in traffic infrastructure for automobiles, in the construction of beltways, viaducts, paving, meek road expansions and parking lot construction. It wasn't until 2013 when investment in non-motorized mobility infrastructure and public transport gained importance in the public agenda, and there were investments in programs that became very important in the years to come like the Public Bicycle Sharing System "Mibici", the Metropolitan Program for Bicycle Roads "Provici", "Zonas 30" and other infrastructure for public transport.

This change of perspective allowed to set the basis for planning and implementing an Integrated Transport System (ITS) that, in the future, will generate even better equality conditions among the city's inhabitants, offering

5 The Metropolitan Fund is a federal fund of economical resources destined for infrastructure works and metropolitan priority equipment that the municipalities that form it decide in conjunction with the federal government for the following venues: urban development, territorial order, public service provision and environmental equipment (SHCP, 2015).

them better accessibility conditions through decent public transport and other alternatives to private vehicles.

According to the World Letter for City Rights, published in 2004 by UN-Habitat, cities must guarantee the right to mobility through public transport systems that are accessible to all and under a sustainable project (ONU Hábitat, 2004). In this way, the gap between forms of transport would be reduced, thus generating conditions for equality and increasing the wellbeing of those that lack the most.

The access to a city and its services is essential for the wellbeing of its inhabitants. Such access generates development opportunities that, in turn bring greater equality. This cycle sums up the Social Right to Mobility (Ilustración 1 the instability of which creates marginalization and lack of wellbeing.

The constitutional recognition to the Social Right to Urban Mobility and Accessibility has become an imperative of major public transcendence, one that is basic for designing policies capable of pressing public actions towards the new paradigm that stems from Sustainable Urban Mobility. The social right to mobility is:

> […] the right of every person and community to rely on a quality integral mobility system that is acceptable, sufficient and accessible, and allows the effective displacement of every person within a territory, in conditions of equality and sustainability, to satisfy their needs and their full development. (CDHD, ITDP, CIADH, 2013, pág. 34).

ILLUSTRATION 1. SOCIAL RIGHT TO MOBILITY CYCLE



Source: Personal elaboration.

We need to remember the primordial function of cities as purveyors of goods and services at short distance and as a large source of opportunities for a better life. The goal should be to create dense and compact cities, with efficient public transport services that bring citizens near.

To adopt public policies for Urban Sustainable Mobility, we need political leadership committed to long and medium-term transforming actions and significant reductions of public spending in infrastructure and equipment for private transports.

We also need legal, normative and regulation frameworks consistent with the Social Right to Mobility and Urban Accessibility, in order to achieve cities with livable and sustainable environments of greater social, economical and environmental interaction.

THE CASE OF THE GUADALAJARA METROPOLITAN AREA

In the case of the GMA, since 2014, public administration has advanced specific programs to improve public transport and to create more options for everyday mobility. However, political and cultural obstacles remain and these programs have to negotiate them in order to advance further and be consolidated.

Public policies –in the framework of the new paradigm of Sustainable Urban Mobility– were designed basically based on five strategies –three of which have already been converted into programs, and two that remain without concretion–. (Illustration 2).

ILLUSTRATION 2. SUSTAINABLE URBAN MOBILITY STRATEGIES



Source: Personal Elaboration

Institutional, Legal and Normative Strengthening

The purpose of this program has been to modify institutions by adapting them to the new demands and approaches of Sustainable Urban Mobility. The program has also aimed toachieve a profound legal and normative reform that gives a new direction to the prevailing inertia towards a mode of mobility that is less dependant on cars.

Although there is still much to be done, in 2013, first steps were taken and the state governments' organisms in charge of mobility and transport were reconfigured from a responsibility standpoint. Thus, the former Ministry of Mobility and Transport became the Ministry of Mobility as head of its sector.

With the objective of strengthening technical and normative functions,and giving them a new direction towards a sustainable urban mobilitythat takesall the aforementioned into account, the Institute of Mobility and Transport of the State of Jalisco (IMTJ) was created, with the task of planning, projecting, designing, researching and deciding all matters related to mobility and transport.

The publication of the Law of Mobility and Transport of the State of Jalisco was one of the most significant advances regarding mobility. Its aim is to turn the current priority given to vehicles above people, prioritizing age, condition or limitation of mobility and accessibility; to press for the integration of public transport systems; and to improve the management and coordination between institutions, governments and their services.

Also published were the general technical standards of public transportation regarding vehicles, interoperable charging systems, public image, user information and quality of service were also published. The correct implementation of these will guarantee the correct development of the integrated systems of public transport and the transformation of the prevailing and outdated Bus-Man model towards an integrated model of high quality service.

In relation to non-motorized mobility, in 2016, the Urban Cycling Manual was published, in conjunction with civilian cyclist associations. Also, the General Technical Standard is about to be published. It deals with the design of routes for pedestrians and cyclist alike.

General Public Transport Program

For decades, public transport services have been characterized by its inefficiency and low quality. It wasn't until the state government's current administration (2013-2018) that the issue was resumed with the necessary technical and institutional seriousness to transform it.

With the purpose of pressing for an Integrated System of Metropolitan Public Transport (ISMPT), the "General Transport Program of the State of Jalisco" was designed and published at a metropolitan and state level, postulating a new structure for the SMPT, whose current functions are to modify and integrate the new network of intermodal public transport.

The ISMPT is basically being configured based on two subsystems: one for mass public transport, integrated up to now by three subway lines (the first one of which is being expanded and the third one is still under construction), and two BRT lines[6] (the first one of which is already operational, while the

6 *Bus Rapid Transit* (BRT) refers to the kind of public transport whose infrastructure is designed with the vehicles that form it as priority.

second one is at project stage with the name Peribús),[7] aside from the two bus and one trolley bus routes that extend the service as an inter-mode of the first two subway lines.

For its part, the bus collective transport subsystem is going through a transformation process, based on a network that modifies and optimizes the present one and on the mass transport subsystem, with the purpose of opening the way for a gradual process of physical, operative and quote integration, an essential characteristic of any integrated system.

At first, the network would be comprised by 18 core routes, their respective feeds, and more than 100 complementary routes. According to their future demand, some of these core routes could be scaled in hierarchy to become a BRT or a subway line (Map 1 and Map 2).

MAP 1. MASS PUBLIC TRANSPORT SUBSYSTEM



Source: IMTJ, 2017

The change represents an enormous challenge and, undoubtedly, the negotiation of several pitfalls, resistance and obstacles, mainly within the public transportation subsystem, where a mixture of interests of very diverse natures and the present rejection of current drivers that, for more than 50 years, have operated through archaic schemes of organization and administration, besides self-imposed restraints of the corporate kind which, for a long time, have prevented its growth.

7 One of the projects that currently is at planning stage is that of the operation of a BRT circuit through the beltway overpass, which has a present traffic demand close to 400,000 commuters per day. In spite that this project was registered in the Mexican Ministry of Finance, it won't be carried out by the state's government present administration.

MAP 2. COLLECTIVE PUBLIC TRANSPORT SUBSYSTEM.



Source: IMTJ, 2017.

The phenomenon of accelerated urban growth and dispersion has brought serious problems of urban mobility in the municipalities that form the GMA's urban outskirts. The deficient traffic accessibility and connectivity, together with the scarce availability of public transport systems, have become decisive factors in the emergence of new and illegal ones, from "three-wheeler taxi" to "pirate taxi cabs" and "community vans", covertly permitted because of the institutional incapability to replace them with different options. All of these options offer precarious services of dire insecurity for its users, without any tariff or schedule regulations.

For the purpose of containing this problem, and addressing the specific mobility needs of the urban outskirts, after several studies, the state's government, in coordination with other municipal governments that suffer the very same problem, have planned the implementation of a substitute transport service as part of the "Law" and the "Regulations of Transport and Mobility of the State of Jalisco" as well as in the "General Technical Standards that specifies the vehicle characteristics for the service of public transport". It will basically consist of a legal and ordered form of transport service, with the purpose of inner urban interconnection and of being a service feed for the core and complementary transport routes of the Bus Public Transport Subsystem. Small or medium size companies in previously demarcated urban areas could operate it. Presently, the first "Service Area" is in its implementation process.

It will be located in the metropolitan municipality of Tlajomulco de Zúñiga (Map 3).

MAP 3. SERVICE "AREAS".



Source: IMTJ, 2017.

NON-MOTORIZED MOBILITY PROGRAM

Public Bicycle Program

At a metropolitan level, a Public Bicycle Sharing System (PBSS) was implemented. It was called "Mibici" and operated under international standards similar to the ones in Montreal, New York and London. This PBSS was planned and implemented by the Government of the State of Jalisco, with the technological aide of a Canadian company, aiming to offer a non-motorized mobility alternative that was safe, efficient and intermodal with other transport forms."Mibici" has grown consistently and, three years since beginning its operation, it has accumulated more than 3.8 million trips through 2,000 bicycles based in a network of 236 stations distributed in an area of 2,430 hectares that reaches three GMA municipalities.

Recently, a group of more than 40 citizen organizations has requested support from the state's Congress and Executive for doubling its capacity on the short-term, with the purpose of consolidating "Mibici" as one of the most important individual non-motorized means of public transport among metropolis and Latin American cities (Map 4).

MAP 4. MIBICI NETWORK



Source: IMTJ, 2017.

Metropolitan Program of Bikeways

Through the IMTJ, the state's government designed the Metropolitan Program of Bikeways. It was named "Provici" and had the purpose of configuring a network of cyclist roads with exclusive lanes for the GMA. According to previous specialized studies, this network aims to link important origin and destination places related to the PBSS and the mass and collective public transport stations.

This program hasn't received sufficient support, has endured the battering of several actors, and it isn't likely that at least 32 of the 200 kilometers that were originally planned will be concluded. (Map 5).

The opposition to bikeways can only be understood from a car-oriented culture and its political passivity to change. In spite of all of this, about 100 kilometers of bikeways have been accumulated through the efforts of the municipality and the state, including what was accomplished in other administrations and more than 135 kilometers of streets with priority for cyclists, which is closely related to Mibici's service areas –a situation that could be substantially increased by doubling this system.

Zones of Preferential Access

The nicknamed "Calles 30" and "Zonas 30", are tranquil areas for motorized traffic that benefit the preferred mobility for people that walk, use their bicycles or public transport. Aside for moderating the traffic's speed, these areas also

recover the social value of public spaces, facilitating preferential mobility and universal accessibility.

The existing preferential accessibility areas in the GMA can be found in the historical parts of downtown metropolitan municipalities like Guadalajara, Zapopan and Tlaquepaque, in two neighborhoods of the municipality of Guadalajara and in a street of mixed uses (Map 6).

MAP 5. PROVICI NETWORK



Source: IMTJ, 2017.

MAP 6. PREFERENTIAL ACCESS AREAS AND STREETS



Source: IMTJ, 2017.

Urban interventions related to the subway's Line 3 will be quite relevant to public space, whether spaces below the line's elevated train segments as well as where it will go underground, since this will open the door to the extension of sidewalks and the construction of bikeways, as well as the very important rescue of Av. Alcalde-16 de Septiembre, named as "Paseo Fray Antonio Alcalde". Currently, more than 100,000 cars use it to commute everyday. Now, more than 200,000 pedestrians per day will use it.

In the planning and design of this esplanade, the IMTJ considered five essential strategies of urban mobility and transport:

1. Traffic sorting through a new plan of circulation to solve the flow of passing vehicles;
2. Public transport sorting through core and complementary networks of bus public transport which, interconnected with mass public transport, will facilitate interconnection and transference, improving urban mobility within the zone of influence;
3. Creating a liaison circuit of public transport in the central area to decrease the incidence and saturation of complementary collective public transport routes;
4. Implementing a non-motorized mobility infrastructure, through a pedestrian and cyclist network, as well as the extension of the "Mibici" Public Bicycle Sharing System; and
5. Time-space sorting and regulation of loading and unloading parking lots, as well as municipal incentives for creating parking lots for related users or near the routes of massive and collective public transports.

Goods and Services Logistical Strategy
(Without concretion in specific programs)

In spite of the relevance that this represents for the metropolis's productive and commercial competitiveness, it remains a pending subject –and a highly prone one to political improvisations–. Due to the great problem of the city's highway access and the lack of urban regulation, a saturation of a mixture of urban and regional traffic is being generated, with a high propensity for traffic jams and accidents.

There exist growing public and private pressures to solve this problem but, unfortunately, there is no knowledge of the needs of the origin and the destination of the metropolitan and regional shipments, as well as of their relation with the intermediate and final logistical supply chain of goods and services, since the last research studies date from ten years ago.

Intelligent Mobility Management Strategy
(Without concretion in specific programs)

To address the dynamic demand for transport, technological advances have developed adaptive and responsive systems. In spite of this, the latest integral actions in the GMA were carried out 25 years ago, with the implementation of the Computerized Traffic Signaling Center in what today is the state's Ministry for Mobility. Ever since then, technological and computer advancement has accelerated and, on occasions, dramatically so, in comparison with the outdated innovations cited above.

In this sense, the resources from the United States Trade and Development Agency (USTDA), the state's government, through the IMTJ, and specialized consultants from the US carried out pertinent studies to modernize and update the metropolis in its use of intelligent systems for managing traffic. However, the amount of investment and the lack of financial resource management so far, haven't taken care of the necessary implementation of this important and essential project.

THE UNFINISHED URBAN AGENDA

The constitutional recognition of the Social Right to Mobility is urgent, as well as the design of public policies that favor the gradual change from car-oriented cities to wellbeing-oriented cities. The recognition of this right is essential to change the conditions of inequity and inequality in urban mobility and accessibility that reproduce our urban model centered on capital accumulation, real estate speculation and individual motorization.

Cities –and metropolis in particular– face an enormous challenge to achieve these changes, after six decades of pursuing a failed project of modernity. The change cannot always come instantaneously, but it can come gradually, if and when the social and participatory commitment is there and is able to surpass the instability and confusion reversals of political leaderships that cannot fully understand the pressing need for these changes.

In the future, very little can be done if there's persistence on speculative and expansive urban development plans and on promoting cars as symbols of modernity and social wellbeing. In spite of the fragmentation and the evasion of the political discourse, through the sectioning and globalization of the market and its problems, the consequences of cities jam-packed with cars, even if they are electrical or aerial, will be the city of congestion and the waste of time, for automobility, finally, is a problem of space and time.

Very little can be done if doubts remain in making walking cities a priority; cities that can be traveled by bike; cities of short distances; cities working towards sustainable public transport –the one that is capable of replacing the automobile through offering larger social, economical and environmental benefits and the inherent virtue of being able to sustain itself and keep growing, adapting through time and space to different urban socioeconomic dynamics–.

The false debates about what system or subsystem is best must be surpassed by invoking the transport principles of classic economics: complementarity, transferability and competiveness. The principle of complementarity designs integrated systems of public transport; the principle of transferability guarantees transport accessibility and intermodality; and the principle of competitiveness guarantees the service's quality through organizational forms, operative models and efficient and effective technologies.

The sustainable public transport agenda cannot wait any longer. The city's needs have overwhelmed the institutional capacity to respond and action must be taken, with promptness and through accurate and forceful integral solutions.

In the case of the GMA, here is a list of matters that are still pending:

- The mass transport subsystem requires a more intelligent investment so that its network can grow more rapidly, promoting the subway and BRT lines complementarily and gradually. The BRT systems, according to its runner's demands, are an intermediate mass public transport strategy that requires a lesser investment and that can evolve through time into a subway line, just like it happened on the current line 1.
- In the case of the subsystem of collective transport, it is necessary to keep up the expansion rhythm of the Company-per-route model so that this can become a reality all over the metropolis, without losing any detail in its organizational, administrative, operative, technical and infrastructural aspects, or else, it could become another conventional bus route with the difference of new buses. Dialogue and management with bus drivers is vital for this change and these should be sustained until the new model is consolidated.
- The integration of mass and collective public transport should open the door for a STIM, whose physical, operative and tariff attributes can offer greater opportunities for commuting and benefits for its users in terms of accessibility, comfort, speed and prices.
- Non-motorized mobility still faces serious resistance, both publicly and privately –a situation that hasn't improved the city for pedestrians or helped the growth of its cyclist infrastructure–. In order to change this, a greater social participation will be very important in the momentum and monitoring

of actions on sidewalks, safe pedestrian crossings and bikeways, as well as the encouragement for a new traffic culture.

- Three years since it began operations, the Public Bicycle Sharing System (PBSS) "Mibici" has become one of the Latin American systems with better operating indicators and the best qualified for its users. However, in order to be consolidated, it must be expanded to double its capacity. With this, it could quintuplicate its trips and the possibility to find a sponsor to sustain its operative costs.
- Even though the course of mobility and transport must be changed, the GMA is at the brink of traffic collapse. The last intervention made to its traffic intelligent systems was made in 1992, when motorized vehicles didn't exceed half a million units. 25 years later, the city has expanded, quadrupling its number of motorized vehicles with a very meek traffic infrastructure, without expanding or updating its intelligent systems for traffic management. The implementation of an intelligent traffic management system –that uses the latest technology already in usage in other cities– at a metropolitan scale is urgent and unavoidable in the short-term. The studies carried out with USTDA represent a great advance for the GMA to acquire the proper management components of an intelligent city.
- The logistical sorting of goods and services is vital for the city both in the regional and the metropolitan contexts. In order to achieve an adequate logistical design, it will be necessary to consider the origin and destination of goods and services in the context of commercial and productive processes. The schedule regulation as well as the first and last "mile" –as it is commonly referred to are important, as well as the equipment–, the infrastructure and the innovating technology for its management.

  The uncontrolled urban expansion in the city's highway accesses have complicated the problem even more, which is why its solution is now urgent, without forgetting all the logistical and technical requirements aforementioned.

The Social Right to the City and Mobility is the ethical and aspiration axes that articulate the sociospatial processes of urban transformation in favor of equity and equality. This process demands a cross-generational and long-term commitment that will only be possible in a context of governance and governability willing to take on and face the greatest challenges.

REFERENCES

AMAI. (2017). *Niveles Socioeconómicos*. Recovered on Sepetmber 11, from NSE:http://nse.amai.org

CDHD, ITDP, CIADH. (2013). *Informe especial sobre el derecho a la movilidad en el Distrito Federal.* México: CDHDF.

CEJ & LAC. (2013). *Costos económicos y ambientales de los autos en el Área Metropolitana de Guadalajara.* Guadalajara: Latin American Capital y Colectivo Ecologista Jalisco. A.C.

Cookson, G., & Pishue, B. (2017). INRIX Global Traffic Scorecard. WA: INRIX.

Cordova España, M. (2016). Management of urban mobility and transport in the Metropolitan Area of Guadalajara. *Journal of Public Governance and Policy: Latin América Review,* 1(3), 60-85, June.

Covarrubias, A. (2013). Motorización tardía y ciudades dispersas en América Latina. *Cuadernos de vivienda y urbanismo,* 6, 12-43, January-June.

Gobierno del Estado de Jalisco & COEPO. (2010). *Diez problemas de la población de Jalisco: una perspectiva sociodemográfica.* Guadalajara.

INEGI. *INEGI.* Recovered on September 28, 2017, from Cuentame INEGI: http://cuentame.inegi.org.mx/poblacion/rur_urb.aspx?tema=P

_____. *Vehículos de motor registrados en circulación.* Recovered on August 12, 2017, from Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía: http://www.inegi.org.mx

López Romo, H. (2009). *Los niveles socioeconómicos y la distribución del gasto.* México: Instituto de Investigaciones Sociales S.C.

ONU Hábitat. *Carta Mundial de Derecho a la Ciudad.* Recovered on September 18, 2017, from ONU Hábitat: http://www.onuhabitat.org

_____. *Construcción de ciudades más equitativas. Políticas públicas para la inclusión en América Latina.* Colombia: ONU Hábitat, CAF, AVINA, 2014.

_____. (July 10, 2014). *Naciones Unidas.* Recovered from United Nations: http://www.un.org/es/development/desa/news/population/world-urbanization-prospects-2014.html

_____. *Reporte Nacional de Movilidad Urbana en México.* México: Senado de la República, Grupo Mexicano de Parlamentarios para el habitat, 2015.

SEDATU. (April 30, 2014). Programa Nacional de Desarrollo Urbano. *Diario Oficial de la Federación.*

SEDESOL, CONAPO & INEGI. (2010). *Delimitación de las Zonas Metropolitanas de México,* 2010. México: INEGI.

SHCP. (2017). *Reglas de operación del Fondo Metropolitano.* Recovered on October 11, from Diario Oficial de la Federación : http://www.dof.gob.mx

GREEN CITIES AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: METROPOLITAN SUSTAINABILITY INDICATORS IN LATIN AMERICA

Marco Antonio Berger García*

INTRODUCTION

Today, urban sustainability indicators have an increasing influence over territorial and environmental planning and management of cities in Latin America. Global initiatives such as the UN Millennium Development Goals, UN-Habitat and the Post-2015 Agenda for Sustainable Development Goals (SDG), among many others, have encouraged metropolitan governments to adopt or develop sustainability indexes. Concurrently, an abundant literature regarding applied public policy, filed under terms like *sustainable cities* (Rees & Wackernagel, 2007), *intelligent cities* (Marsal-Llacuna, *et al*., 2015; Valentine & Spangenberg, 2000) and *resilient cities* (Milman & Short, 2008; Brand, 2009), incorporate sustainability indicators as part of their reference frameworks –all of these focused on a city's sustainable management–. Furthermore, international initiatives like UN-Habitat recommend the inclusion of sustainability indicators in different intervention instruments such as Urban Observatories and the City Prosperity Index (UN-Habitat, 2013).

The more structured way to incorporate a set of sustainability indexes into the process of public policy is through a monitoring and assessment system adapted to the environmental problems of metropolitan areas (Shahidur & Koolwal, 2010). In spite of the global expansion of sustainability indicators and monitoring and assessment systems –like methodological and management instruments, potentially effective and sustainable for metropolitan areas–, not much has been explored in specialized literature regarding the process for selecting indicators itself and the properties of a good monitoring and assessment system should function like an urban observatory, with a better influence

* He is an economist by Universidad de Guadalajara. He specialized in environmental policy and attainded a PhD in Policy Studies by Clemson University. Email: maberger76@yahoo.com

over the environmental policies of a metropolitan area –which sustainability problems are more complex–.

The present article examines the international tendencies in the process for selecting environmental indicators for metropolitan areas. First, based on the existing literature on the subject, it presents an examination of global good practices, criteria selection and sustainability indicators for metropolitan areas, emphasizing the design problems of public policy. In this section, and all through the article, the importance of environmental indicators is underlined as one of the three basic axes for sustainability (the other two being the social and the economical), under the context of metropolitan governance in Latin America. The discussion in the second section examines the main findings on selecting sustainability indicators, underlining ecological indicators and their context in relation to the more recurrent environmental problems among the metropolitan areas of Latin America. That is why the diagnoses and problems of the environmental situation of 12 Latin American cities with similar characteristics are exposed, using the Green City index, developed by *The Economist Intelligence Unit* in 2012, as reference.

The third section analyzes the specific environmental problematic in Mexico's Guadalajara Metropolitan Area (GMA), as well as the convenience of developing and selecting a group of sustainability indicators at a metropolitan scale, through instituting Urban Observatories as a platform for deliberating towards environmental governance, as suggested by UN-Habitat. A study of the GMA is developed, including a suggestion of sustainability indicators, based on international good practices on the matter, emphasizing the alignment with the Post-2015 Agenda and UN-Habitat (*Sustainable Development Solutions Network,* 2015; UN-Habitat, 2015). And lastly, in the fourth section, there is a draft for public policy alternatives for the possibility of introducing sustainability indicators, based on the prior definition of a government's strategic objectives, under the premise that the existence of indicators "in a vacuum", without considering a government's strategic objectives, will never become public policy. This article focuses on the environmental indicators that form an essential part of the triple dividend broader paradigm that also encompasses the economical and social aspects (Sachs, 2015).

Sustainability Indicators in Metropolitan Areas

How can you improve the sustainable development/environmental performance within metropolitan areas of Latin America, such as Guadalajara and Mexico City, through sustainability indicators? What are the adequate criteria for selecting and developing such indicators? And what tensions exist in the selection of management indicators and environmental performance in present

day cities? These are the three fundamental questions that must be answered when designing and implementing a sustainability index at a metropolitan scale.

A first precaution for using sustainability indicators in metropolitan areas is the use of internationally accepted ones, such as the Green City Index. Global experiences show preference in using sustainability indexes to measure environmental performance in an integrated manner at any given metropolitan area. Unlike other sustainability indicators, an index integrates the deliberation of multiple variables to measure sustainability in cities, in matters related to specific public policy objectives like prosperity, development, equity or resilience. In spite of the methodological advantages that indexes present, they do not capture the local diversity and heterogeneous nature that can be found on their level. Mori & Christodolou (2014) examined 14 international indexes for measuring sustainability in cities, concluding that the omissions that can be made in terms of sustainability and integration, under the triple dividend approach –environmental, social and economical– are significant.

The second aspect to assess preliminarily during the design stage is the bias on the creation of sustainability metropolitan indexes for contexts within developed countries, whether in their development or in their relative importance. One of the main reasons that explains such biases is the correlation between the income level and some variables related to environmental performance like, for example, education, deforestation or the emission of certain polluters.[1] Additionally, the economy's informal sector and its interactions within the social and environmental arena also play an important part in the causal map of sustainability indicators in the context of emerging or developing countries[2]. Kemmler and Spreng (2007) summarized this bias by pointing that, while developing countries center this discussion on environmental subjects, countries in transition give equal importance to equity and poverty topics. In fact, "topics related to sustainability have been attacked differently in different parts of the world, depending of the environmental and public policy priorities of cities and countries" (UN-Habitat, 2006). Because of these selection biases, there is a need to incorporate a barrage of indicators/indexes that control –or at least consider– the context differences between different types of countries.

1 In essence, Kuznet's curve expresses an inverted U-form that reflects the increment in the levels of pollution and/or environmental deterioration –measured through a standardized variable like, for example, the carbon dioxide emissions in relation to the increments in the levels of economic growth, which are usually measured through the GDP–. There is a turning point –that must be empirically estimated by country and by time period–, after which, according to this Russian economist, the inequity in income distribution, or the levels of environmental deterioration or pollution begin to fall. During the past decade, diverse articles have taken the task of proving the empirical validity of Kuznets's curve in spite of the skepticism that the relation between the inverted U stated on text books could an empirical reality (Stern, 2004).

2 For example, brick factories and burnt tires are a significant source of Greenhouse Gas emissions in metropolitan areas like Guadalajara and Mexico (SEMADET, 2015).

Finally, the third preliminary aspect to be considered when designing a system of sustainability indicators at a metropolitan scale is the source of *expertise input* that goes into the development of the indexes and indicators. In this realm, the debate is torn between *models guided by experts* vs. *models integrated by citizens*. Turcu (2012) suggests that the integration of both models would lead to establishing several levels of knowledge around the notion of sustainability, therefore implying a better way to assess it. If the model is completely "top-down", guided by experts and with very little social inclusion in its design and assessment, it can lead to implementation problems and not very effective results. On the other hand, the "bottom-up" approach –in some countries known as "the urban sustainability model"– is characterized by initiatives rooted in communities. Generally, once you have the urban sustainability indexes, a natural "top down" bias, they are ideally complemented with the population's perceptions regarding their immediate environmental surrounding, particularly when passing from a global to a local scale. However, Turcu (2012), analyzes 5 lists of urban sustainability indicators at a communal level, focused mainly on the United Kingdom and the United States, where the most accurate indexes are obtained –but not necessarily because they include local participation, which is why they must be constantly calibrated in their essence–.[3]

INTEGRATION OF INDICATOR SYSTEMS AND SELECTION CRITERIA

Most initiatives for metropolitan indicator systems foster adjusting a universe to a sample of indicators of convenient handling. But, in order for this process to be effective, one just doesn't take an indicator sample from the wide array of existing options, but a careful confection with a systematic approach. As Turcu points out, "the challenge lies not in the absence of indicators, but on the existence of so many of them and the question of how to achieve the better adjustment that is cost-effective in its handling, methodologically robust and socially inclusive in its perception and design to cover all the local differences that reflect the problematic at hand". Munier (2011) points that there is a practical difficulty in working with large number metrics. The goal is to achieve a manageable group of basic indicators that attack several different

3 *Securing the Future* is a list of 39 indicators for sustainable communities; the *Egan* list with 46 indicators for sustainable communities; *Housing Corporation Toolkit* a barrage of 49 indicators; *Four Capital's* a list of 18 indicators and the *Sustainable Seattle's* list of sustainability indicators. The sole definition of a better system of indicators is a matter of context and based on a "top down" model. However, this article holds that a selection of comparable indexes developed within the global discussion around the environmental problem within cities is a good complement, though not a substitue, for the local and participatory approach based on the context.

topic areas. Eventually, as long as the available information becomes more complete –which usually is not very realistic in the Latin American context, like we will see below–, a transition must be made, not only towards a selection of indicators, but towards the development of base lines, thresholds, values, goals and deliberation. Zvadskas *et al.* (2007) include the criterion of cost-efficiency in the selection of indicators. In a sense, the exercise of selecting sustainability indicators for a metropolitan area implies a cost-benefit logic, placing the marginal value of information above all, in order to reflect a specific environmental problematic.

Under the international comparative approach, the selection of the sustainability indicators, suggested by different initiatives, usually is also a problem. Tanguay *et al.* carried out a meta-evaluation of 17 validated and globally accepted studies with a total of 188 indicators of sustainable development to suggest a strategy for selecting sustainable development indicators under the *parsimony principle*, aiming to cover the sustainable development components and the categories that constitute them as widely as possible, while the number of retained indicators is minimized. The authors use the relative sustainability indicator frequencies that repeat the most in all 17 studies. This repetition is grouped in three categories that define sustainable development: economical, social and environmental. Subsequently, these are sub-classified in the integrated sub-dimensions of those three axes, though Venn diagrams.



Source: Tanguay, *et al.*, 2010[4]

4 As a starting point, with certain level of arbitrariness, to emphasize the indicators aforementioned falls on the environmental aspect of the diagram, looking for the intersection with the sustainable area. Naturally, any design intention in public policy sends a value judgment over which of the three groups –social, environmental or economical– must be left out, considering other variables such as local context or public election. However, for conceptual purposes, any of the three starting points accomplishes the goal for exposition purposes.

The main areas of intersection were on the "sustainable" (21.7%) and "fair" (30.4%) interfaces of the cases. The identification of frequencies in this field is not trivial if used as a resource for designing environmental public policies, since the concentration in the diagram could very well be an additional preliminary indicator regarding the marginalized sectors of socioeconomic and environmental politics that require greater attention.[5] All three categories –environmental, social and economic–, seen independently, offer scarce added value to the design of environmental public policy, since they leave out the effects of interaction, displacements, overlapping and synergy. That is why, under Targuay's grouping approach, the "optimal" amount of sustainability indicators was reduced from 188 to 17 sustainability indicators. On the other hand, Shen examined 9 processes or practices for selecting sustainability indicators for decision-making at a metropolitan scale, based on a joint selec-tion of 9 cities in developed and developing countries. This selection took the urban sustainability indicator database, known as the *International Urban Sustainability Indicator List* (IUSIL), as a reference universe –or pool–. From it, two main lessons were reached regarding the selection criterion for a barrage of indicators: i) the comparative method is essential to guide the discussion on the adequate selection of indicators at a local scale and to avoid any endogenous effects[6] and ii) the addition of environmental governance as a category is relevant within the analysis of the triple dividend approach (economical, social and environmental) (Shen *et al.*, 2011).

System Indicators Effectiveness

The *cost-benefit analysis* and *the calculation of the ecological footprint* have been the two methods to measure the return of sustainability indicators, even if this is not always possible. The risk of developing a sustainability indicator system –without any methodological justification or adequate selection criteria– is the development of *ad hoc* verification lists. In other words: "to measure what's measureable instead of what is important" (incorporate quote). A second risk is to develop an indicator system that is methodologically justified at a base-year level, but without the adaptive mechanisms, the flexibility or the feedback chains sufficient to evolve through time with the problems of the object in question's sustainable development –in this case, the metropolitan area being analyzed–. Some international experiences have followed this approach. Following Zeijl-Rozema and Martens, frameworks for adaptive indicators were developed in Holland, or regional sustainable indicator ranges.

5 Of course this is not a sufficient criterion for designing public policy –however, it is one criterion more for deciding, for example, the cost-benefit analysis.

6 The first lesson implies the need to differentiate local sustainability indicators through methods of communal participation with global indicators with a greater level of generalization and duplication.

In fact, *the Post-2015 Agenda*, unlike the *Millennium Development Goals*, sees the national and regional scales as the most important ones in the development of sustainable development indicators, using international tendencies as reference, but only as parameters (Zeijl-Rozema & Martens, 2011, *Op. cit.*).

The cost-effectiveness criterion is useful to maximize the optimal number of indicators to be considered as an objective function subject to budgetary restrictions. Under this logic, some empirical estimations have been developed at international scale through applying linear programming methods to estimate "the reduced number of indicators that represent the greatest quantity of possible areas, while providing the greatest amount of information from the original database" (Munier, 2011). The use of this kind of analysis provides important elements for prioritizing in the cases of establishing a system of sustainability indicators when the public budget is limited. As an example, Munier used focus groups in a US city to evaluate a group of 16 variables, 7 criteria and 7 topic areas related with the sustainability indicators' possible universe. After the process, it selected 8 indicators that basically reflected the same environmental information. This process took place through 13 decision stages to obtain an optimal level of environmental variables. The starting point or status quo were the environmental public policy and its objectives, which differ from the intervention of committee of experts.

Selection criteria for indicators in metropolitan environments

Considering the use meant for sustainability indicators, there is no exclusive frame of reference for applying all the environmental topics or issues. One of the main problems of selecting indicators is that there is no consensus over each environmental topic regarding the minimal sufficient amount of indicators needed for its measurements to be representative, given the complexity and multidimensionality of its nature.[7] Two of the main criteria used internationally in most sustainability indicator systems in urban areas –either explicitly or implicitly– are: i) the concept of strong sustainability and ii) the triple dividend approach (social, economical and environmental).[8] The international evidence shows that both criteria, although desirable, imply a tension or *trade-off* by including them on the design. That is why none of the environmental international indexes in urban areas were assessed for

7 Let's take air quality for example. At an international level, the most frequent air quality indicator for comparison purposes is the PPM at 2.5. However, there are many air quality indicators, relevant for analysis but left out of monitoring and assessment systems in many parts of the world for reasons of practicality, communication and diffusion for groups of large populations.

8 The concept of strong sustainability places the natural capital at a higher hierarchy and deliberation level in relation to other forms of human, physical and technological capital that, in turn, explain economic growth. In this sense, it gives a higher relative importance to natural capital in comparison with the concept of Earth used by David Ricardo and the classic school of thought in economics.

complying to strong sustainability and triple dividend criteria simultaneously (Mori & Christodoulou, 2012). Furthermore, half of the indexes do not include any of the abovementioned criteria (strong sustainability). Generally, in international urban sustainability indicators, there is a tendency to use criteria related to the triple dividend approach. The most recurring problem among this type of indexes is the non-inclusion of external possible impacts in each of the sustainability indicators. To affront this limitation, in recent years, criteria have been incorporated; criteria capable of covering the external effects of the main environmental variables related to each urban sustainability indicator, explicitly and methodologically. In this sense, the most important effort is the development of the ecological footprint. That is why, metropolitan approaches tend to consider more and more indexes or indicator systems that take the external effects of public policy into account, in spite of the methodological challenges that this implies.

Theoretically, an environmental sustainability index that is able to capture both criteria simultaneously –strong sustainability and triple dividend– could eliminate all biases and potential omissions, constituting an ideal methodological goal that shouldn't be avoided in the design of an urban sustainability indicator system for cities in Latin America. This article follows the line suggested by Mori & Christodolou (2012) in the sense of aspiring towards a group of indicators or indexes for sustainable cities that is efficient, comparative, cost-effective and that maximizes the capture, as much as possible, given the available information, the triple dividend line, without biases, omissions or leaks at a metropolitan scale. In conclusion, and following all 4 desirable properties for an integrated group of indicators or metropolitan indexes for sustainability according to the revision of the literature on the subject, the following four principles are suggested: 1) It should capture external effects, 2) it should cover all the central aspects of the triple dividend politics, 3) it should be created under the environmental premise at its core –following the strong sustainability concept– and 4) it should include comparable variables –as much as possible– for different contexts: developed countries / developing countries.

Basically, the sustainability criterion holds that natural capital is not simply another explanatory variable of economic growth that can be substituted by other forms of capital, like human, physical or technological. On the contrary, it is the base of all other forms of capital and, therefore, it should be considered as a focal or prevailing point. Likewise, the concept of weak sustainability establishes a perfect situation between different types of capital according to its cost of opportunity and scarcity. Clearly, the concepts of strong and weak sustainability are at the core of the theoretical debate between environmental and ecological economies (Daley & Farley, 2004).

The environmental problem of the Guadalajara Metropolitan Area in the context of Latin America

Guadalajara, economically the second most important city in Mexico, presents a set of complex environmental problems, some of them caused by the loss of natural capital, others by the exponential growth of its urban settlements and population in the last decades. The selected environmental subjects to be analyzed are shown on graph 1. To begin with, the selection of Latin American cities for the development of the Green City Index was carried out due to its similarities in terms of population, size, income level and the relative economical importance for its country (*The Economist Green City Index*, 2010). This index is an extension of the *European Index of Green Cities*, with some minor adaptations made for Latin America. Clearly, the least developed axis is the one for environmental governance at a metropolitan scale. In spite of the considerable growth of literature about environmental governance in recent years, its transformation into indicators is still to be developed. The analysis of the main models of international sustainability indicators –urban and general– indicate that the topic of environmental governance still is the vaguest in terms of measurements, diffusion and –as we will argue– since it is based on a local context, its comparison and treatment are complicated, considering the diversity of institutional frameworks for different countries. In spite of these empirical limitations, the understanding of the dynamics of environmental governance dynamics in cities becomes a necessary condition to comprehend the environmental performance of cities.

In this sense, the Green City Index represents a good exercise in comparison and the establishment of baselines. However, 5 years from its creation, important areas of opportunity have been found for a sustainability indicator system in the GMA (Rockstrom & Klum, 2015), according to the findings within the specialized literature. Particularly –and as a first step for improving the selection of sustainable indicators for the GMA–, a stronger inclusion of the environmental governance axis is suggested. Also suggested is the viability of the axis/topic of climate change as a cross section that could become a catalyst for the rest of the indicator topics. These two modifications are consistent with the observation of preliminary documents of the Post-2015 Agenda (*Sustainable Development Solutions Network,* 2015). From the Green City Index, we take the information about the environmental performance comparison of Guadalajara and other Latin American cities. Table 1 describes the main 6 environmental items evaluated in 2012 for the GMA as well as its comparison with the average of similar Latin American cities: Puebla, Monterrey, Mexico City, Lima, Bogotá, Santiago, Buenos Aires, Curitiba and Sao Paulo (*The Economist,* 2010).

FIGURE 1. SELECTION OF TOPICS AND INDICATORS THAT FORM THE LATIN AMERICA GREEN CITY INDEX



Source: The Economist Intelligence Unit (2010). Latin America Green City Index.

Overall, the environmental assessment showed relatively low results in the GMA in comparison with other cities of Latin America, finishing behind them in most categories –particularly on the topics of water, residues and air quality. On the other hand, there are some comparative advantages in the GMA in relation to other metropolis in the subject of green areas and population density. Recent studies, however, show that the tendency in deforestation and forest service in the GMA, as well as the important increase in the motorization and urbanization indexes, has reduced the natural capital drastically in the municipalities of Guadalajara and Zapopan and increased the pressure environmental indicators (*Jalisco a Futuro*, 2013).

TABLE 1. RADIOGRAPHY OF MAIN SUSTAINABILITY INDICATORS ACCORDING TO THE STUDY BY THE ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, 2010.

Factors	Description	Average	Guadalajara	Year
Energy and CO_2	CO_2 emissions caused by electrical consumption (kg/person)	202.2	332.9 1,e	2008
	Electrical consumption (megajoules for every 1,000 dollars of GDP)	760.7	631.6 2, e	2008
Use of land and buildings	Population density (people/km^2)	4,503.0	1,596.6 3	2009
	Green areas per person (m^2/person)	254.6	423.3 3	2005
Transport	Total extension of public transport networks (km/km^2)	5.0	2.3 3	2009
	Total extension of superior public transport networks (km/km^2)	0.13	0.26 4	2010
	Stock of cars and motorbikes (vehicles/people)	0.30	0.37 4	2010
Waste	Proportion of adequately collected and disposed waste (%)	96.2	100.0 1,e	2008
	Waste generated per person (kg/person/year)	465.0	472.7 5	2008
Water	Water consumption per person (liters per person per day)	264.3	651.2 6,e	2008
	Water system leakage (%)	34.6	37.0 4	2008
	Population with access to drinking water (%)	97.5	89.17	2005
Sanitation	Population with access to sanitary installations (%)	93.7	94.5 8, e	2005
	Amount of treated residual water (%)	51.5	24.7 1, e	2008
Air quality	Annual average of nitrogen dioxide concentration (ug/m^3)	37.8	41.4 3	2008
	Annual average of sulfur dioxide concentration (ug/m^3)	11.4	11.4 3	2008
	Annual average of particle material (ug/m^3)	48.0	41.5 3	2008

Source: The Economist Intelligence Unit (2010). Latin America Green City Index.

According to the analysis in the first section of this article, the environmental assessment of the GMA –summarized in Table I and carried out by *The Economist Intelligence Unit*– is a useful diagnosis to set baselines in specific

indicators such as air quality and water management. They also allow the comparative analysis between similar Latin American cities with common set of problems from the standpoint of a sustainability indicator system previously established an recognized in Europe. In spite of these advantages, the index doesn't include relevant indicators in relation to the environmental agenda for the coming years –specifically, on the topic of environmental governance and climate change adaptation–, two transversal axes whose incorporation explains more and more about the global environmental performance of Latin American cities for the coming years. Given the local contextual nature that implies an increment in the aspect of environmental governance, climate change and resilience to a system of sustainability indicators such as the *Latin American Green City Index*, a lot is won in depth, but lost in comparativeness. That is why, in order to complement the first order information that resulted from the Latin America Green City Index indicators, *ad hoc* methodologies have to be created to capture, for example, the measures of the adaptation to climate change that cities in Latin America are carrying out. Thus, the explicit and detailed incorporation of measures that, in matters of climate change adaptation and environmental governance, are being taken –or not being taken– in metropolis such as the Guadalajara Metropolitan Area, looking towards the environmental agenda of the coming years. Table 2 shows an alternative list of sustainability categories and indicators for the GMA, typically not found on the sustainability boards, but particularly important for the GMA, according to the problems and prioritization of the city's environmental problems.

Although they are useful for diagnostics, the urban sustainability indicators that constitute Table I shouldn't be applied directly with environmental policy purposes. If, for example, one takes the indicator of green areas per capita, one would find a very favorable result for the GMA. Internationally, it is a highly used indicator for the indexes of sustainable cities. However, in order to strengthen this base indicator, additional information should be incorporated to measure the quality of the environmental services that the GMA's tree stock receives. Recent GMA samples show a low level average for forest services in their trees, 30% of which have a plague known as mistletoe (*scientific name*) which, considering recent tendencies, can cause a decrease in the green areas per capita in the coming years, considering the propensity to knock down trees during rain season (Programa de Acción ante el Cambio Climático (PACMUN), Guadalajara 2013). For the purpose of avoiding the effects of displacement from one indicator to the other, currently, indexes are being developed to take this kind of leaks into account. For example, the Singapore Biodiversity Index –which binds together several indicators for environmental

services that provide directly and indirectly to city forests and stems from the Post 2015 Agenda– would be the most adequate to measure the state of green areas in the GMA. Overall, the desirable tendency would be to migrate basic indicators towards a more holistic version of them to include their leaks and possible externalities towards other indicators. Unfortunately, there are no indicator menus available at all times in the specialized literature to face their unintentional consequences. In such cases, these should be designed.

TABLE 2. URBAN SUSTAINABILITY INDICATORS ADAPTED FOR THE POST-2015 AGENDA, EMPHASIZING CLIMATE CHANGE AND ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE.

Topic	Name	Definition	Type	Scale	Source
Environmental Governance	Risk and Climate Change Resilience Management	Implementation of strategies to reduce risks, as well as locally spread and accepted resilience endorsed by international frameworks and protocols (like the Hyogo-2 Protocol).	Qualitative	Metropolitan	Post-2015 Agenda
Environmental Governance	Third Generation Human Rights	Participation in local communities for improving the management of water and salubrity.	Qualitative	Metropolitan	Post-2015 Agenda
Environmental Governance	Environmental Conflict	Conflict growth rate regarding Property Rights in terrains near Urban Natural Areas.	Quantitative	Metropolitan	Post-2015 Agenda
Environmental Governance	Environmental education	Percentage of children that acquire the necessary abilities and values for global citizenship and sustainable development.	Qualitative	Metropolitan	Post-2015 Agenda
Environmental Governance	City's biodiversity index	City's biodiversity index in relation to the Singapore index.	Quantitative	Metropolitan	Post-2015 Agenda
Environmental Governance	Compliance and application of environmental laws and regulations	Institutional Framework Effectiveness Index.		Metropolitan	Post-2015 Agenda

Continuation of table

Topic	Name	Definition	Type	Scale	Source
Environmental Governance	Environmental compliance by private sector	Percentage of companies valued at more than 1 billion whose integrated monitoring system adopts sustainability information as part of its report cycle.	Quantitative	Metropolitan	Post-2015 Agenda
Environmental Governance	Implementation of Assessment Instruments of Environmental Policy	Strategic assessments of environmental and social impact.	Qualitative	Metropolitan	Post-2015 Agenda
Environmental Governance	Institutional Framework for Urban Policy Management	Existence and implementation of public policy frameworks for urban areas and population centers.	Qualitative	Metropolitan	Post-2015 Agenda
Climate Change	Incentives for the generation of low-carbon energy	Implied incentives for the generation of energies with low-carbon emissions in the electrical sector (measured in dollars/ WWh or Dollars per avoided CO^2 ton).	Quantitative	Metropolitan	Post-2015 Agenda
Climate Change	Public Policy Related to Addressing Climate Change	Availability and implementation of a detailed deep strategy for decarbonization, that is consistent with the 2 Celsius Degrees Projection –or less– by the Global Carbon Fund and the GEI's emission goals for 2020, 2030 and 2050.	Qualitative	Metropolitan	Post-2015 Agenda
Climate Change	Sustainable buildings	CO2 intensity in the construction and new construction sector ($kgCO^2/m^2$/year)	Quantitative	Metropolitan	Post-2015 Agenda
Climate Change	Mobility	Percentage of people that live at a distance of 500 meters from a public transport line that runs, at least, every 20 minutes.	Quantitative	Metropolitan	Post-2015 Agenda/ UN-Habitat

Continuation of table

Topic	Name	Definition	Type	Scale	Source
Climate Change	Mortality and morbidity in relation to heat strokes, dengue, acute diarrheal illness or respiratory infection	Deliberation index that measures the affected population by the increment in average temperatures related to climate change.	Quantitative	Metropolitan	OMS/OPS
Land Use	Improvement of illegal settlements or "shacks"	Percentage of total urban population that lives in shacks or informal or irregular urban settlements.	Quantitative	Metropolitan	Post-2015 Agenda/ UN-Habitat
Land Use	Urban Density	Relation between the rates of land use and population growth.	Quantitative	Metropolitan	Post-2015 Agenda/ UN-Habitat
Air Quality	Suspended Particles	Average contamination of urban air due to matter particles (PM10 and PM2.5).	Quantitative	Metropolitan	Post-2015 Agenda

Source: Personal elaboration based on *Indicators and a Monitoring Framework for the Sustainable Development Goals: Launching a Data Revolution*. New York, 2015.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The development of urban sustainability indicators for monitoring and assessment is a growing tendency among the cities of Latin America. In spite of the wide array of sustainability indicators in the international realm, the process for selecting criteria for developing city-scale sustainability indicators requires and patient and careful exercise, since they can have great implications on public policy. On the other hand, the better selection of indicators under solid criteria will not be insufficient if it doesn't include strategic objectives for public policy. The design and assessment of sustainability indicators is not merely a technical exercise, but also about public policy. After reviewing the literature, at a technical level, the concluded and recommended suggestion is to develop indicators as fluxes, not heritage, and to integrate the right balance between qualitative and quantitative indicators. According to the triple dividend approach, the prioritization of the socio-environmental and socioeconomic viability interfaces is also recommended. The sole-sphere indicators, that do not consider leaks, displacements or external factors, although useful as ele-

ments for analysis, are insufficient for the correct design of metropolitan environmental public policies in the context of Latin America.

At a public policy level, the incorporation of sustainability indicators in public policies must be done, firstly, through a prioritizing process of the problem and the public agenda. The aforementioned environmental problems like air quality, bio-diversity, territorial development, climate change and integral water management fit, by definition, in the category of insufficiency and trans-territoriality, which necessarily implies the definition of public policy arenas based on local and regional governance. Literature on these topics is quite extensive and the binding the selection of indicators and their implementation together through public policy is above this article's objective. However, the window of opportunity, and the corresponding environmental public policy subsystem, that could be configured or reconfigured through the existing groups surrounding the international agenda, the Goals for Sustainable Development and UN-Habitat, in their local and regional implementation mechanisms, constitute a new public policy arena in sustainability –urban sustainability in this case– which is already permeating previously existing institutional arrangements on the matter. Historically, the most important influence for sustainability indicators in political arenas has come from public administration, urbanism and environmental sciences studies (Hezri & Dovers, 2006). However, the present "window of opportunity" opening for the consolidation of a subsystem of public policy that implements indicators lies in environmental governance.

By their very nature, internationally speaking, environmental governance indicators are not very comparable, which usually drives to its omission or inclusion, in very broad terms, like the case of the Green City Indexes. Besides, environmental governance indicators usually carry relatively less weight in developed countries than in developing countries, which is cause for one of the more common selection biases, as explained in this article's first section. None of the indexes revised by Mori and Chistodoulou (2014) include a category for environmental governance. Even though many hypotheses could justify the absence of environmental governance indicators among specialized indexes, it is true that these are essential to understand the environmental performance of Latin American cities.

In a very similar way, another selection bias happens among measures for climate change mitigation and adaptation. Generally, due to its natural conditions and its level of economical development, countries such as Mexico present urban settlements that are readier to the adaptation rather than the mitigation of climate change –which doesn't mean that the second aspect is lesser in any way– (Piguerón, 2011). On average, however, the international

sustainability indicator bias towards mitigating measures against climate change is quite clear.

While it's true that the essential sustainability indicators are focused on environmental topics (such as air quality, land use and water management), it is equally important to capture, as a separate and transversal category, the role that institutions –seen as the formal and informal rules that determine social interaction– play in environmental governance and metropolitan management, as well as the adaptation measures to climate change that, in matters of mitigation but particularly adaptation, face the environmental Post-2015 Agenda and the breadth of the Goals in Sustainable Development.

REFERENCES

Brand, F. (2009). Critical natural capital revisited: Ecological resilience and sustainable development. *Ecological Economics*, pp. 605-612.

Hezri, A. A. & Dovers, S. R. (2006). Sustainability indicators, policy and governance. *Ecological Economics,* pp. 86-99.

Marsal-Llacuna, M. L., Colomer-Llinas, J. C. & Meléndez Frigola, J. (2015). Lessons in Urban Monitoring taken from sustainable and livable cities to better address the Smart City Initiative. *Technological Forecasting and Social Change,* Issue 90, pp. 611-622.

Milman, A. & Short, A. (2008). Incorporating Resilience into sustainability indicators: An example for the urban water sector. *Global Environmental Change,* Volumen 18, pp. 758-767.

Mori, K. & Christodoulou, A. (2012). Review of sustainibility indexes and indicators: Towards a new City Sustainability Index (CSI). *Environmental Impact Assessment Review,* pp. 94-106.

Munier, N. (2011). Methodology to select a set of urban sustainability indicators to measure the state of the city, and performance assesment. *Ecological Indicators,* pp. 1020-1026.

Sustainable Development Solutions Network. (2015). *Indicators and a Monitoring Framework for the Sustainable Development Goals,* New York: Columbia Univerrsity.

Rees, W. E. & Wackernagel, M. (2007). Urban-Ecological Footprints: Why Cities Cannot be Sustainable and Why they are a Key to Sustainability. *Environmental Impact Assesment Review*.

Rockstrom, J. & Klum, M. (2015). *Big World, Small Planet.* First ed. New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press.

Sachs, J. (2015). *The Age of Sustainable Development.* First ed. New York: Columbia University Press.

Shahidur, R. K. & Koolwal, G. (2010). *Handbook on Impact Evaluation Quantitative Methods and Practices.* Second

Edition ed. Washington, D. C.: The World Bank.

Shen, L.-Y., Ochoa, J. J., Shah, M. N. & Zhang, X. (2011). The application of urban sustainability indicators: A comparision between various practices. *Habitat International,* Volumen 35, pp. 17-29.

Tanguay, G. A., Rajaonson, J. & Lefebvre, J.-F. a. L. P. (2010). Measuring the sustainability of cities: An analysis of the use of local indicators. *Ecological Indicators,* pp. 407-418.

The Economist Green City Index. (2010). *Índice de Ciudades Verdes de América Latina,* Munich: Siemmens.

Turcu, C. (2013). Re-thinking sustainability indicators: local perspectives of urban sustainability. *Journal of Environmental Planning and Management,* 56(5), pp. 695-719.

ONU-Habitat. (2013). *State of the World´s Cities 2012/2013,* New York: United Nations Human Settlements Programme.

Valentine, A. & Spangenberg, J. H. (2000). A Guide to Community Sustainibility Indicators. *Environmental Impact Assessment Review,* Volumen 20, pp. 381-392.

Zeijl-Rozema, A. & Martens, P. (2011). Integrated Monitoring of Sustainable Development. *Research Solutions,* 4 (4), pp. 199-202, 2011.

NETWORKS AND HIERARCHIES: NOTES ON GOVERNMENT ACTION IN THE ANALYSIS OF PUBLIC POLICY NETWORKS AND GOVERNANCE NETWORKS

Miguel Eduardo Alva Rivera*

ABSTRACT: Government intervention in the public sphere has undergone a great transformation throughout its history. The concept of "governance networks" encompasses one of the latest efforts from political sciences to understand the process of creating and implementing public policies. This document aims to clarify the theoretical and practical implications of the concept of "governance networks" in regards to future research agendas around it. The conceptual debate suggests the need to analyze its democratic implications.

KEYWORDS: Governance networks, public policy networks, public policies, government action.

INTRODUCTION

Government intervention in the public sphere has undergone a great transformation throughout its history. During this process, several theories and approaches to analyze it have taken place in different disciplines, thus developing several analytical frameworks to explain public policy decision-making and its impact on the public and social spheres. Recently, several concepts around this topic have come up from the field of Public Administration, among which the term "governance" stands out. This concept adheres to other analytical approaches that take government action in the public realm as its object of study. It also has been recognized in the academic, social and political spheres for the role it attributes to government during the creation process of public policies.

* Graduate in Public Policy (Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana, Unidad Lerma).
Email: alvaeduardo27@gmail.com

In this way, the concept of "governance" –first coined by the World Bank in reference to the exercise of political power to run a nation's affairs, or to manage economic and social resources in the pursuit of development (Porras, 2017)– has inaugurated an ample debate in the academic world regarding the theoretical implications involved and their significance in broader analytical models for understanding government action in the public realm.

In the studies around the concept of governance, the wide ambiguity in which the term has been used stands out. For example, Bevir (2011) uses the concept of "governance" in its most general sense, as "the theories and matters regarding the social coordination of all the government's patterns" and, more particularly, as "the new government theories and practices, and the dilemmas they involve" (Bevir, 2011, p. 3). Although definitions such as these have largely benefitted the concept's development in, for example, opening lines of research with more specialized approaches,[1] they have also generated certain confusion regarding its implications, since the absence of a general analytical framework to systematize each line of research successfully has generated rather disorganized knowledge.

In short, considering the wide interest the concept has generated, and the relative ambiguity with which it has been defined, there are constant discussion points around it, which have turned it into an "umbrella" concept that, conceptually, has overreached. Because of this, invariably, the concept of "governance" is used to account for diverse social, political and economical phenomena –earning it several criticisms regarding its analytical objectivity–. Particularly noteworthy is the concept's intimate relation with the concept of public policy networks, which is why these two concepts are commonly used indifferently.

Under this perspective, the conceptual overreaching that the indiscriminate use of the term has generated implies a confused use of it and an impediment for its better development in theoretical and methodological terms as well, due to its indefinite object of study. Therefore, it is fundamental to specify the concept's characteristic aspects, while distinguishing its use from other terms in order to favor the concept's further development.

In this sense, the present document aims to analyze, in broad terms, government action through the concepts of "public policy networks" and "governance networks". Although both terms are close, they refer to different government practices and involve a different democratic reach of the public interventions that result from and among its structures.

1 Based on the aforementioned definition, Bevir opens three lines of reasearch on governance studies: 1) governance as theory, 2) governance as a government practice, and 3) governance as a dilemma generator. The object of study of this last line of reasearch are the implications of this concept's practice as a government method, like, for example, the democratic implications in public policy management.

Thus, the present document is divided in three sections: first, a description of the role of networks in order to understand government action in the public sphere; then, the concepts of public policy networks and –mainly– governance networks are analyzed, and their action frameworks and its main characteristics are described; finally, a section is dedicated to analyze some open lines of research around the concept of governance. The document ends with a section for conclusions.

GOVERNMENT ACTION THROUGH NETWORKS

The network theory to analyze the process of building the government's decision-making in the public sphere has a great tradition in Public Administration studies (highlighting Heclo, 1978; Marsh and Rhodes; 1992; Mayntz, 1993; Rhodes; 1997; Klijn; 1998; Evans, 1998). The main premise of this literature is the idea that governments are fragmented in different levels, depending of their institutional design and the environment in which they intervene and interact with other public and private actors.

Towards the end of the past century, several approaches to network theories gathered strength, such as the public policy networks and governance networks approaches –although a large amount of studies on these approaches invariably refer indistinctly to any of them–. In fact, one could say that both literatures are interrelated among them through the same analytical framework that regards networks as objects of study. What holds true is that the governance approach does differentiate from the public policy approach.

Borzel (1998), for example, identifies two schools among public policy network literature. From the perspective of American tradition and British literature, this school analyzes policy networks as intermediation spaces between actors that come up and are structured around certain areas of public policy. On the other hand, the German tradition, led by Maynts (1993), and exceptionally by Rhodes (1997) in Great Britain,[2] view policy networks as a specific form of government and public policy decision-making, i.e. as governance networks.[3]

That is why, here, we state a semantic separation between both concepts:

> Traditionally, the idea of public policy works more as a representation of government action, in which political and administrative authorities hold

2 This statement should be nuanced since Rhodes (1997) does use the concept of policy networks as the American and British traditions do, but he uses it as an instrument to –together with other characteristics– drive the concept of governance towards the style of the German and Dutch schools. Thus, the presence of both types of literatures is quite obvious in most of his work– particularly in *Understanding governance*, his classic study on governance that would set the general bases for discussing the concept in the academic realm–.

3 The Dutch school also adheres to this school of public policy networks as a new way of governing. See Kickert, Klijn, and Koppenjan (1997), cited by Rhodes (2016).

> hegemonic positions when it comes to treating public problems (Vázquez, 2013, p. 21).

While governance, from the perspective of Public Administration studies, alludes to "new government theories and practices" (Bevir, 2011, p. 3) and particularly to a "new modality of collective steering that consists of intersectional coordination to achieve common goals" (Porras, 2016, p. 15). This distinction between both concepts will now be delved into deeper.

PUBLIC POLICY NETWORKS AND GOVERNANCE NETWORKS

In democratic regimes, the representation of public interests through government intervention in the public sphere has led to a continuous adaptation process that answers contingently to the economical, social and political variables it faces. Regarding the networks of actors around public policy topics, we could identify two general ways in which government acts in a network through intermediation.

In the first place, we could describe "policy communities" as networks of restrictive character, often referred to as "iron triangles", in which the relation between actors is strong and organized in an oligarchic manner (Roth, 2002). As an example, we could mention that the corporatism and neo-corporatism phenomenon that took place during the 20th Century in a large amount of Latin American countries defines this type of public intervention. The aforementioned is characterized by the strong ability of the State to completely organize and represent organizations –particularly of the union-kind– that try to influence the public sphere through exchanging resources (economical, political, etc.) (Jordana, 1995) and that, up to that point, were the main spokespeople for citizens before the State (Subirats, 2015).

In contrast, the "issue networks" make up a relatively stable and interdependent horizontal network with actors with operative autonomy, that interact through negotiations and that are able to affect the effectiveness of a public policy or public decision. Among these, the ones that stand out are those with a high technical expertise or professional networks (Rhodes, 1997).

In short, in the literature about policy networks, one can find that the two kinds of aforementioned networks are differentiated from the concept of governance in the following sense. Public policy networks are viewed and analyzed as a kind of political intermediation (Rhodes, 1997), while governance alludes to a coordinated process of public policy decision-making and

implementation by actors from the public and private realms and volunteer associations (Rhodes, 1997).

Public policy networks are viewed and analyzed as a medium level concept that opens the door to understanding the creation of public policy through analyzing the interaction of actors around a public policy (Evans, 1998). While governance, from a Public Administration perspective, alludes to a new method of government, different from the government's hierarchical and market methods (Rhodes, 1997) that involve new collective "steering" mechanisms on the government's side in public affairs (Porras, 2016), recognizing the complexity of the problems it is facing.

In this sense, the concept of governance has been promoted by several social, political and economical phenomena that led to a process of interdependence among actors to achieve individual and collective goals. Among these phenomena are: i) the new public management, which forced governments to retract its executive capacities from the State, due to the streamlining and pursuit of efficiency through a lesser bureaucratic apparatus, ii) the globalization phenomenon, which diminished the association costs between several actors all over the world, and resulted in, iii) regional and supranational integration processes, through which there would be a loss of directionality and political effectiveness of government actions, being conditioned by international agreements and agendas, and bilateral cooperation processes among regions on the margins of their actions, iv) the growing interest of citizens in public affairs, and v) the mayor relevance of sub-national governments (Hirst, 2000; Pierre, 2000b; Rhodes, 2000; Sorensen, 2005).

For all the above reasons, public policies, from a governance standpoint, are a contingent result of the joint interaction, negotiation, and decision-making between a diversity of actors that form a network –not just of the intermediation of specific interest groups that aim to influence public policy decisions before the government.

In this way, network governance is presented as a new structure of government, far from traditional models (hierarchical and market) (Rhodes, 1997; 2000). This new structure is mainly characterized by its capacity to self-regulate, as well as being interdependent and autonomous from other organizations and institutions like the government itself, which is why it is not bound to specific norms, but the ones agreed as game rules by the participants of its network (Rhodes, 2000).[4]

4 That is how the traditional image of government as an almighty entity, with the passage of time, reduced its capacity to make decisions unilaterally and, because of that, when we talk about governance, the idea of governing is reconsidered and, once again, a new window of opportunity is opened to continue analyzing the government's doings inasmuch as compared studies (Peters, 2000), as well as the analysis of individuals in society from the perspective of political ethnicity (Rhodes, 2000).

In spite of conceptual advancements, governance is and has been debated as an umbrella concept largely utilized indiscriminately, due to the sparse clarity and constant debate around its definition (Porras, 2012). With this, I mean that such concept has been studied by diverse disciplines, analytical levels and approaches that have generated some disarray whenever it is used[5].

Specifically, there are two particular approaches that have turned it operational-oriented. The first one did it from a more normative framework that has had a large influence in topics like citizen participation and democratic governability (Porras, 2012). An example of this approach is the concept proposed by the World Bank, an entity that, whenever speaks of "good governance", alludes to certain normative elements of good government, such as indexes of corruption, transparency, accountability, etc. On the other hand, the "German" school (and Rhodes in Great Britain) has placed a special emphasis on the informal interaction processes between society and government that differentiate this concept from traditional methods to govern through the centralization of State or Market (Bevir and Rhodes, 2007). The aforementioned –according to this school of thought– has led to a special form of public action through a network of actors, public as well as private, together under the premise that government has stopped being the only actor with the capacity to make decisions that affect the public sphere and public policy topics.[6]

This document analyzes governance in the second described dimension, since it places "good governance" as a concept more inclined to the field of new public management and democratic governability than to governance networks. In table 1, you can see this difference between approaches, even in comparison with the orthodox approach of traditional policy management.

In this way, "good governance", for example, and governance networks, al-though both allude to fragmented governability processes, they do not share the same substantial characteristics inasmuch the role that each actor –government, market, citizens– plays in public affairs. This difference can be seen on table 2, which shows the characteristics that each actor plays in the two analyzed approaches, stresses that actor capabilities in a governance network are shared in relation to the management of public policy, while each actor has a specific role in "good governance".

5 Rhodes (2000) alludes, at least, refers to 7 types of governance approaches, depending of the study discipline, among which you can find public administration, international relations, organizational affairs, economy, etc.

6 In this sense, it is convenient to stress that these process of incidence of society in the policy processes are given through non-formal representational mechanisms, which is why these processes are excluded from participation through political parties, bureaucracy, congress or executive power. In this sense, governance, aside from analyzing new processes of government action under the inclusion of new actors in the public decision-making, has also awoken the interest of the scientific community in relation to the insufficiency processes of the government's traditional institutions to regulate public affairs (Méndez, 2012).

TABLE 1. PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, NEW PUBLIC MANAGEMENT AND GOVERNANCE

Model / Key Elements	Theoretical Roots	State Tradition	Analysis Unit	Key Approaches	Resource Allocation Mechanisms	Fundamental Beliefs
Public Administration	Political Science and Public Policy	Unitarian/ Federal	Political-Management System	Counseling and Policy Implementation	Hierarchy	Public Sector Ethos
New Public Administration	Rational Election Theory and Management Studies	Regulatory	Organization	Organization Resource and Performance Management	Markets	Efficiency, Competence and Market
Governance	New Institutionalism and Network Theory	Differentiated	Red	Negotiation of values, meanings and relations	Networks	Trust and reciprocity

Source: Rhodes, 2016.

TABLE 2. GOOD GOVERNANCE AND GOVERNANCE

	Government's role	Market's role	Citizens' Roles
Good Governance	- Regulator - Policy maker	- Public goods purveyors	- "Client" - Supervisor
Governance Networks	- Coordinator - Policy maker	- Coordinator - Policy maker	- Coordinator - Policy maker

Source: The author

That is how, in a context of high social, political and economical complexity governance tries to go against the legitimacy and inequality crisis generated by the governing style of State and Market respectively (Subirats, 2015). Considering this, and under a principle of interdependence, the government assumes the need to interact and cooperate with other social agents to govern a society of this kind: complex. Because of this, governance networks are not spaces for the intermediation of interests, as policy networks indeed are, but allude to a decision-making process coordinated by diverse social actors that give more legitimacy to the process of making and implementing public policies, and, at that moment, argue for their greater redistributive capacity (Subirats, 2015).[7]

That is why, the analytical framework provided by governance networks is placed before the need to describe the public decision-making process within a

7 This new structure is mainly characterized by its capacity to self-regulate and interdependence of other organizations and institutions like the government itself, which is why it is not subject to specific norms, but to the ones the networks participants agree as game rules (Rhodes, 2000).

context of high complexity characterized by: i) a high concentration of actors from different sectors and levels of competence in certain territories around a public policy topic, ii) a high decentralization of the necessary resources to carry out a public policy between them; and iii) an active participation of citizens in topics of public interest.

That is how the traditional image of government as an almighty entity, with the passage of time, reduced its capacity to make decisions unilaterally, due to the development of new actors in the public arena like an organized civil society or the private sector –which managed to generate their own resources and to take an important place in the discussion of public affairs, as well as generating logics for action (institutions) that escaped the guidelines imposed by the central government or other governmental authorities–. So when government is not the only actor than can influence public decisions, it becomes a coordinating agent with the main function of getting itself organized with the other social, economical and political actors for the design and implementation of policies. In short, this is a coordinating or interactive State (Rhodes, 2000)[8].

In this way, the concepts of public policy networks and governance, although related, keep a slight difference between them, which answers to each concept's explanatory locus. In the processes to govern through policy networks, the main relevant factor is political intermediation; in governance networks, it is interdependence and the network's stability in time before any given problem. But in spite of the above mentioned, both concepts play a crucial role in the policy analysis process, since they determine the social, political and cultural contexts in which these develop based on the institutions that regulate the behavior of the actors that constitute these networks.

From this perspective, some works like the ones of Pierre and Peters (2000) and Peters and Pierre (2005) have pointed an exaggerated dimension of the reach of governance networks in the public realm, particularly regarding the role that the government plays in them. For these authors, although governance networks do involve a new method of "steering" public problems on the government's side, this practice doesn't necessarily translate into a weakening of the central government *per se*. Even for them, it shows the government's capacity to adapt to new circumstances of greater complexity, which is why its resilience capacity "shines".

In consequence, research around the concept of governance could be placed in a continuous line that goes from authors that believe governance networks

8 In this sense, Kooiman and Van Vliet (1993, p. 64) note that the concept of governance "points towards the creation of a certain structure or order which cannot be imposed from the outside, but is the result of the interaction of a large variety of actors that influence the way to govern".

are managed by the government (Pierre and Peters, 2000), to those who believe that these networks are auto-regulated and that the government doesn't have an important place within them[9] (Rhodes, 1997).

Thus, it is necessary to point, in the first place, that government action through networks in the public realm is part of a single *continuum* that, according to public policy topics, begins with a hierarchical role for the government in public decision-making, and evolves into a shared decision-making structure in which government doesn't have a predominant role. In other words, government and governance are part of one same action process by the government as a network.

For a better understanding of the aforementioned, in terms of network structure, we could argue that this *continuum* can be seen in several types of networks, going through "policy communities" (restrictive), "issue networks" (plural) and "governance networks" (interdependent). The difference between "issue networks" and "governance networks" is the explanatory factor provided by the interdependence between actors when the time comes to structure the joint decision-making[10] (Rhodes, 1997). While the flux of actors that form the "issue network" can be constant, in relation to the stage in the public policy decision-making process, in which there are no other indispensable actors to make decisions besides the government, in the governance networks, the structure stabilizes once it presents itself before a specific set of problems, generating its own logics of action. The actors that form a governance network are vital for the achievement of its objectives and the government does not maintain a prevailing role in its decision-making process (Rhodes, 1997), or it does so, but at least playing the role of coordinator or manager (Pierre and Peters, 2000; Peters and Pierre; 2005)

That is how governance has woken the interest of the scientific community dedicated to the study of government and public policies by offering a new perspective from which to look at government actions in the public sphere through an analytical framework different from the traditional methods of State and the Market. But, how can you analyze governance networks? And how to know if these methods are, in fact, democratic? The next sub-section discusses both questions, while explaining the main challenges that these processes involve.

9 See Rhodes (1997).

10 This characteristic is part of an answer given by Rhodes (1997) to Dowding's critiques of his network models: the Rhodes model. Very often, several works like Evans's (1998) glorify Dowding's critique to Rhodes, weakening the explicative character of his model, but do not offer any reference to the answer they offer about it.

DEMOCRATIC (?) GOVERNANCE NETWORKS

To think of governance in democratic terms is to venture into an area that hasn't been discussed by the academic community that addresses this subject matter, because the main interest around governance processes resides mainly in the new forms of management and implementation of public policies. That is to say that there is a larger interest in the efficiency processes in political management than in discussing whether its processes and results are given in democratic contexts or if they even generate results of this kind.

Up to this point, the literature that addresses this kind of questionings has been scarce, but among it, the work of Sorensen and Torfing (2007a) stands out. Through their collective effort, these authors develop diverse postures to analyze the democratic adjective of governance networks. Among these postures to analyze the term, three principal schools of thought that stand out.

The first proposal is the one developed by Bevir and Rhodes (2007). These authors argue for the need to rethink the concept of governance in relation to contextual mechanisms that disassociate themselves in specific manners from the term's exact definition. They also argue for the need to understand the concept of governance and the governance processes as multidimensional frameworks that encompass diverse ways to understand these processes within the framework of the social and cultural traditions in which they are being discussed. For this goal, the authors point to deep ethnography as a first rate analytical tool, as well as other kind of data recollection tools that allow for the exhaustive knowledge of the phenomenon being studied.

From a different perspective, Sorensen and Torfin (2007, b;c), using the different schools of thought of the new institutionalism, stress the need to analyze the network structuring process, since this is the moment when the network's interpretative framework for action and negotiation among its actors will be established and, possibly, will become part of the institution itself with the passing of time. They also argue for the need to understand and assess governance networks in a different way from the way it is done with organizations, since governance networks do not flourish within organizations, but on relatively institutionalized frameworks that facilitate and compel the relations between network actors, therefore affecting its result production (Sorensen and Torfing, 2007c).[11] That is how, through the institutionalization of rules and procedures, as well as by the recognition of interdependence among actors, it is determined who could be considered a legitimate member of the network and who could also be directly benefitted by it in its "democratic" aspect.

11 This process of institutionalization happens precisely through the creation of "institutions" which we can address as "rules, norms, cognitive models and social imaginary" and are the result of the interaction between the network's participants that regulate its behavior" (Sorensen and Torfing, 2007c, pp. 25).

Finally, Esmark's proposal (2007) stands out. He points towards analyzing governance networks as a mechanism of complementary representation to the traditional areas of democratic representation, under the new post-liberal democratic frameworks, mainly based on the term of "competitive democracy" suggested by Etzioni, which opens the door to relate traditional mechanisms of political and electoral representation with new frameworks for joint decision-making, such as the governance networks. Esmark proposes that the analysis of the democratic reach of governance networks could be carried out based on the network's degree of inclusion, the advertising of the decision being made and the degree of responsiveness of those who represent different group of actors within it.

All three proposals encompass an agenda of rather promising active research to continue with the analysis of the public policy management and implementation processes under a democratic approach. Even if these proposals must be complemented with methodological tools, because of the data analysis and gathering mechanisms similar to its theoretical hypothesis, the line of research remains open to the use of these interpretation frameworks that allow us to dismiss or strengthen these perspectives.

On the other hand, the main challenges that this new research agenda outlines are mainly centered on the temporal challenge of knowing the processes of design and institutional changes within the networks of actors that can be analyzed, as well as the methodological instruments at medium level that allow for comparative studies. In this final instance, new methodologies stand out, such as the Social Network Analysis (SNA) that allows us to comprehend the relations between individuals and the network's structure for a greater understanding of its conformation process and the roles that each of its members has within it (Ramírez, 2016), which is why it is viewed as a rising methodology for analyzing every government action in broad terms, particularly the management of public policy and governance networks.

CONCLUSIONS

Government action has gone through an extensive transformation because of several social, political and economical phenomena that have taken place through time all over the world. This has pushed governments to keep modifying its administrative apparatus and its way of acting and conducting themselves in the public sphere. This situation has been reflected in the continued generation of analytical frameworks that allow a greater understanding of government performance in public affairs and its way of participating in the political management of public policies.

Throughout this document, we have mainly discussed government action through the concepts of public policy networks and governance networks. This journey has shown the constant process of change in relation to the complexity of the problems that government action faces. Also, it has provided the necessary tools to notice how concepts such as governance networks currently dominate academic activity due to the complexity of the public problems that they presently face and press for public policy actions based on the large cooperation between actors from different levels and sectors.

Specifically, it has been noted that the concept of governance networks can be discussed and related to a large variety of other concepts, which has led to a confusing use of the term and all the implications that this implies. Regarding this situation, in this document we have decided to adopt the perspective of analysis that establishes a semantic separation between the concept of public policy networks and the concept of governance for a larger understanding of both terms. Even though the present document has managed to clear several contrasting aspects related to the analysis of the concepts of governance networks, it is necessary to continue analyzing the concept in the field, in order to keep dismissing or exploring all the factors that can invigorate its empirical success, so that, to a larger extent, we can award it with the adjective "democratic".

REFERENCES

Bevir, M. (2011). "Governance as theory, practice and dilemma". In *Bevir* (Ed.) The SAGE Handbook of governance. London: SAGE publication.

Bevir, M.; Rhodes R.A.W. (2007). "Decentred theory, change and network governance". In *Sorensen and Torfing* (Ed.) Theories of democratic network governance. NY: Palgrave Macmillan.

BM. (s/f.). "What is governance?" From: http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/MENAEXT/EXTMNAREGTOPGOVERNANCE/0,,contentMDK:20513159~pagePK:34004173~piPK:34003707~theSitePK:497024,00.html

Borzel, T. (1998). "Organizing Babylon: On the different conceptions of policy networks". *Public Administration.* 76 (2), pp. 253-276.

Esmark, A. (2007). Democratic Accountability and Network Governance problems and potentials, in Sorensen and Torfing, *Theories of democratic networks governance,* NY: Palgrave, pp. 274-296.

Evans, Mark. Análisis de Redes de Políticas Públicas: una perspectiva Británica, in Gestión y Política Pública, vol. VII, No. 2.pp. 229-266, 1998.

Heclo, H. (1978). "Issue networks and the executive establisbment". In King (ed.) The new American Political System. Washington, D.C.

Hirst, P. (2000). Democracy and Governance. In Jon Pierre (Ed.) *Debating Governance: Authority, Steering, and Democracy,* Oxford University Press, pp. 13-36.

Jordana, J. (1995). "El análisis de los Policy Networks: una nueva perspectiva sobre la relación entre políticas públicas y Estado", *Gestión y Análisis de Políticas Públicas,* 3, 77-89, May-August.

Klijn, E. (1998). "Policy networks and overview". In Kickert and Koppenjan (Ed.) *Managing complex networks.* Sage: London.

Kooiman, J. and Van Vliet, M. (1993). Governance and public management. In Eliassen and Kooiman (Eds.) *Managing public organization: London*: Sage.

Marsh, D. and R.A.W. Rhodes. (1992). 'Policy Communities and Issue Networks. Beyond Typology'. In Marsh, David and R.A.W. Rhodes (eds.). 1992. 249-268.

Mayntz, R. (1993). Modernization and the logic of interorganizational net-works. in Child, Crozier and Mayntz (Eds.) *Change between markets and organization.* Aldershot: Avebury. pp. 3-18.

Méndez, I. (2012). Democracia, gobernanza y redes: una aproximación al papel de las instituciones de representación en México. In Porras (Coord.) *Gobernanza y redes de política pública en espacios locales de México.* Instituto Mora. pp. 119-155.

Peters B. Guy. (2000). Governance and comparative politics. In Jon Pierre (Ed.) *Debating Governance: Authority, Steering, and Democracy,* Oxford University Press, pp. 36-54.

Peters and Pierre. (2005). *Governance, government and state.* The state theories and issues. Palgrave Macmillan, Nov. 19.

Pierre, J. (2000). "Introduction: understanding governance". In Jon Pierre (Ed.) *Debating Governance: Authority, Steering, and Democracy,* Oxford University Press, pp. 1-10.

Pierre, J. and Peters, G. (2000). *Governance, Politics and State.* UK: Macmillan.

Porras, F. (2007). Teorías de la gobernanza y estudios regionales. In *Secuencia, revista de historia y ciencias sociales.* No. 69, pp. 161-185.

_____. (2012). "Introducción. Gobernanza y redes de política pública en México". In Porras (Coord.) *Gobernanza y redes de política pública en espacios locales de México.* Instituto Mora. pp. 9-25.

_____. (2016). *Gobernanza: Propuestas, Límites y Enfoques.* Ciudad de México: Instituto Mora.

Ramírez, E., (2016). "Introducción". In Edgar Ramírez (Editor) *Análisis de redes sociales para el estudio de la gobernanza y las políticas públicas,* Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas, pp. 13-22.

Roth A. (2002). La implementación de las decisiones. *Políticas públicas: formulación, implementación y evaluación.* Bogota: Aura ediciones.

Rhodes, R. A. W. (1997). *Understanding governance: policy networks, governance, reflexivity, and accountability.* Buckingham Philadelphia: Open University Press.

_____. (2000). Governance and Public Administration. In Jon Pierre (Ed.) *Debating Governance: Authority, Steering, and Democracy,* Oxford University Press, pp. 54-90.

_____. (2016). "Recovering the craft of public administration". In *Public Administration Review,* 76 (4), pp. 638-647.

Sorensen and Torfin (ed.). (2007a). *Theories of democratic network governance*. NY: Palgrave.

_____. (2007b). "Introduction: governance network research: towards a second generation". In Sorensen and Torfing Theories of democratic networks governance, NY: Palgrave, pp. 1-21.

_____. (2007c). "Theoretical approaches to governance networks dynamics". In Sorensen y Torfing *Theories of democratic networks governance,* NY: Palgrave, (pp. 25-42).

Sorensen. (2005). The transformation of the state. In Hay, Lister and Marsh (edts.) *The state theories and issues.* Palgrave Macmillan, Nov 19.

Subirats, J., (2015). "Nociones conceptuales de gobernanza, política y administración pública". In FES-ILDIS *El rol del Estado: contribuciones al debate,* Quito: Senplades/FES-ILDIS, pp. 121-156.

Vázquez, C. (2013). Redes de acción pública. Una sistematización de sus propiedades estructurales. Mexico: INAP.

STRENGTHENING THE GOVERNANCE FRAMEWORK: THE PARTNERSHIP OF GOVERNMENT AND ACADEMIA IN THE STATE OF ZACATECAS

Carlos Alberto Arellano-Esparza*
Marco Torres Inguanzo**

ABSTRACT: This paper reviews the collaborative experience between government and academia in the state of Zacatecas, Mexico, as a means to strengthen the governance framework. The partnership between the two parties entailed efforts to constitute a public policy evaluation body, in addition to setting up an academic programme with the same orientation. The first section of this paper examines the nature of the concept of governance and its relevance in public policy framework; it also introduces the concept of collaborative governance and its success variables as a more adequate concept to construe or perform case studies. The second section reviews how the agreements between the parties were reached and details the partial outcomes of said partnership. The third section analyses the lessons learned through this experience, as well as its most pressing challenges and pitfalls, through the lens of critical success variables of collaborative governance, adding two more variables to this explanatory framework. We argue that this sort of experience can be a useful tool in fostering the governance framework, particularly at a subnational level, further interweaving the links between the public sector and academia, allowing for a greater knowledge transfer and an improvement of the policy framework.

KEYWORDS: Governance, public policy, collaborative governance, evaluation, subnational, Zacatecas.

* Independent researcher. Currently at the Programa de Estudios e Intervención para el Desarrollo Alternativo (Universidad Autónoma de Zacatecas). Previously at University of Leeds and the Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik. Email: caae@gmx.co.uk
** Lecturer and researcher at Programa de Estudios e Intervención para el Desarrollo Alternativo (Universidad Autónoma de Zacatecas). Email: marco.torres@uaz.edu.mx

The complexity of problems in modern societies is a compelling reason for exploring alternative ways in which these can be addressed in a more inclusive and comprehensive fashion; ways in which governments and non-state actors can collaborate towards that end –hence the relevance of governance and its implications in the process of governing–.

This paper reviews a collaborative experience between government and academia in the Mexican state of Zacatecas. This collaboration, we argue, contributes to the broadening of the governance framework, since it brought different actors to form a partnership for improving a given process or processes. In this particular case, the collaboration was formed to enhance policy processes (the foundation of government activity) through developing capabilities and performing evaluations.

The first section of this paper addresses the nature of the concept of governance, as well as some of its fundamental tenets and its implications. The concept of collaborative governance is then introduced as a narrower and more useful notion to construe our experience collaborating. The second section reviews how the collaborative experience was formed as well as its most salient features. The third section analyses the experience of Zacatecas through the lens of critical success variables of collaborative governance in the form of lessons, challenges and pitfalls. We believe the lessons drawn from this experience constitute a solid background to explore the formation of partnerships for influencing the policy process, particularly at a subnational level.

THE NATURE OF GOVERNANCE AND ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH PUBLIC POLICY

The interactions and dynamics between the different actors in a given society have been widely acknowledged as a key factor in the formation and enlargement of the governance systems over the last 20 years (Fukuyama, 2014; Kjaer, 2004; Rose-Ackerman, 2017).

The traditional conception of the State as a top-down, authoritative manager of public interests has gradually morphed into its conception as another stakeholder in a larger framework of stakeholders that coexist in an environment rife with tensions stemming from within and without their geographical and political domains. Given the exhaustion of the traditional managerial modes, the role of the State has evolved into a more horizontal and flexible model to manage the different interests –public or private– that exist in modern societies, in a more efficient and functional fashion (Aguilar Villanueva, 2016).

The transit to this model goes hand in hand with the reconfiguration of the State's functions associated to the neoliberal era and its crisis in terms of legitimacy (in the eyes of the electorate), in terms of efficiency (the alleged fiscal imprudence and the inability to deliver public services efficiently) (Bevir, 2013; Campbell & Pedersen, 2001; Harvey, 2005), as well as for the ensuing and growing fragmentation in the delivery of public services imposed by the neoliberal dictum (McMichael, 2008; Mkandawire, 2005).

Among many different things, this narrative fed on assumptions that split state action into two different phases: a 'steering' phase that entails processes of decision-making, regulation and coordination; and a 'rowing' phase that includes the actual delivery of public services (Osborne & Gaebler, 1992). This line of argumentation underlines the State's necessary involvement in the 'steering' phase and underscores its inherent inefficiency in the 'rowing' phase, both in terms of poor management of resources and poor achievements. Therefore, it is suggested that the State must introduce incentives that stimulate private entities to compete –through privatisations, outsourcing– in its regulated markets in order to improve efficiency.

These changes were supplemented by the administrative reforms advocated by the "New Public Management". These focused on efficiency and performance assessment, as well as achieving concrete goals and the topics of providing incentives to public parties in order to foster competition between them (Bevir, Rhodes, & Weller, 2003; Hood, 1991). Simultaneously, international organisms such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, adopted the concept of 'good governance' as a basic criterion for granting loans and development aid to developing countries. The problems of development –it was argued– were associated to the poor quality and low legitimacy of poltical institutions (Leftwich, 1994; Williams & Young, 1994; World Bank, 1989). Since economic efficiency was the main goal assumed by such organisms, 'good governance' was related to the quality of the institutions that were supposed to act as an enabling mechanism of the market economy, but also as a means to curb the endemic corruption associated to developing countries. In other words, governance was conceived as a tool that could contribute to the economic liberalisation dictum and the parallel replacement of hierarchic bureaucracies by the growing use of markets and networks, particularly in the delivery of public services.

The transit to more horizontal decision-making models in the public sphere has occurred in such context: on the one hand, from the perspective of economic liberalisation as a precondition for a robust and optimal economic performance and the need to have a reliable institutional framework in place; and on the other, the larger participation of different stakeholders in defining

the public agenda. These perspectives have allowed the gradual replacement of a vertical and bureaucratic decision-making process with a model that, even if it can't be considered as completely horizontal, can be thought of as a network of different stakeholders actively seeking to influence the policy process, producing comprehensive solutions to complex problems (Kooiman, 1993; Messner, 1997) under the assumption that not even the traditional vertical model of the State with maximum capacities (Aguilar Villanueva, 2006), nor the minimalist version of the State, can produce comprehensive answers.

This emergence of broader patterns of social participation helped to spread the notion that in order for the State to have and maintain an adequate performance, there needs to be a broad, inclusive framework guaranteeing that all stakeholders (and their interests) are represented in the policy process (Bevir, 2010; Salamon, 2002). Also, there needs to be a functional management system able to process converging and diverging –and even opposing– interests. Said features modify the ways in which the public interest is defined. Within this broad conception, the larger participation of society members in the decision-making process and the interactions amongst different networks sideline –to a certain extent– the State's participation to perform, almost exclusively, the roles of coordination and regulation (Pierre, 2000).

Hence, governance highlights the growing relevance that civil society and non-state actors have in the definition and implementation of government models with higher levels of management and decentralisation capable of performing the traditional functions of centralised governments. Governance, then, focuses more on processes and interactions linking the State to civil society, and less on the traditional State institutions (Bevir, 2010). In general terms, governance refers to the relations and processes through which the diverse interests and resources that coexist in different environments are managed from a multilevel perspective (Ackerman, 2004; Bache & Flinders, 2004; Liesbet & Marks, 2003; Stephenson, 2013).

Since the initial deliberations on the concept of governance (Kooiman, 1993), it has been adapted to different conceptual environments with different applications, given its plural and multilevel nature. Nowadays, we talk about global governance in diverse aspects (Dingwerth & Pattberg, 2006; Messner & Nuscheler, 2003; Rosenau, 1999), corporate governance, economic governance, environmental governance and even internet governance, just to name a few.[1]

However, the conceptions addressed above usually are envisaged as antagonistic versions of the role of the State and the ways in which complex social problems should be tackled in increasingly problematic environments. On the one hand, governance is conceived as the logical consequence of institutional

1 See Bevir (2007, 2011) and Kooiman (1999) for different applications and definitions of the concept.

evolution towards more inclusive decision-making frameworks; on the other, it is thought of as an assault on traditional government institutions to undermine them, giving way to decision-making frameworks capable of protecting and promoting the expansion of corporative transnational interests. In other words, the otherwise natural tensions between State and non-State actors are downplayed or exacerbated, respectively. These interpretations, however, may lead to a biased, hence distorted, interpretation of the concept of governance, obscuring its unquestionable underlying observations: a) the inability of State institutions to address the plethora of existing problems, and b) the increasing importance and relevance of the role of non-state actors.

An alternative way of interpreting the two positions abovementioned is through a narrower concept like collaborative governance.[2] It refers to the synergic process of formal interaction between different actors to obtain any given outcome. Although this concept does not remove the underlying tension abovementioned, it does provide a more adequate explanatory framework for determined collaborations between State and non-State actors, in a context of collective action that takes the nature of different multilevel actors into account with the explicit purpose of influencing public policy within a formal process of governance. In other words, this process of broadening the governance framework entails setting the conditions under which the formal collaboration and the sharing of knowledge and experiences between actors is possible.

In that sense, public policy, as the main instrument of governing, shares the same elements of governance, namely: its multilevel nature, the involvement of a growing number of actors, the coexistence of different perceptions about public problems, as well as the multiple strategies and instruments involved in its implementation (Bressers & Kuks, 2003; O'Toole, 2000). From the perspective of the coexistence of multiple stakeholders and the interactions amongst different levels, together with the rising complexity of the challenges modern societies face, cross-sector collaborations play a critical role (Agranoff & McGuire, 2004; Bryson, Crosby, & Stone, 2006; Goldsmith & Eggers, 2005; Rethemeyer, 2005; Schuppert, 2011).

The analysis of multiple experiences of collaborative governance suggests that any successful collaboration is grounded on five key variables: a) history of conflict/cooperation between actors (which may foster/hinder the collaboration), b) incentives for stakeholders to participate (expectations and outcomes), c) power and resource imbalances (proneness to manipulation by stronger actors), d) leadership (facilitating the collaborative process), e) ins-

2 In spite of the concept's potential theoretical breadth, collaborative governance has been explored in greater detail through specific collaborative experiences (Ansell & Gash, 2008). For more details about the concept see Fung & Wright (2001), Gray (1989), and Susskind & Cruikshank (1987).

titutional design (protocols and rules for collaboration). It is argued that these variables contribute to the development of a virtuous cycle grounded in the 'small wins' of the collaboration, which in turn, deepen the trust, commitment and shared understanding between its stakeholders (Ansell & Gash, 2008).

The conceptual reflections above described, in addition to the variables mentioned above, will orientate the analysis of a collaborative governance experience between the government and academia in the state of Zacatecas, Mexico. We will return to these variables in the third section.

THE COLLABORATION BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT AND ACADEMIA IN ZACATECAS

A longstanding cross-sector collaboration, even symbiotic at times, exists between governments and academia. These two sectors have collaborated in a number of issues. However, its most prominent collaboration in recent times focuses on Research and Development (R&D), as well as innovation processes in the realms of agriculture, healthcare, and information technology. These collaborations have managed to impact the quality of life for human beings in most regions of the planet in a profound and decisive way. The importance of this partnership is reflected in the fact that, for instance, 60% of the funding in basic research in the United States of America comes from the federal government. Furthermore, up to 70% of the funding of key institutions in the field of innovation –like the Massachusetts Institute of Technology– is provided by the federal government (Katz, 2014).

Even though the collaborations between academia and public policy are also frequent, they are not as prominent –at least in terms of funding– as is the case of R&D. Mostly, this owes to the fact that public policy is often approached not as a practical field, but more like an object of study. However, this situation has taken a turn over the last two decades with an increasing involvement of academia in the experimental design and implementation of different policies.[3]

Another strand of cross-sector collaboration in which different sectors and levels of civil society have been involved, and in which academia has played a key role, relates to demands of transparency and accountability of governments, not only in terms of processes and resource management, but also their actual performance (Behn, 2001; De Leon, 1998), putting to good use the old saying about the ability –and we add, the moral obligation– of

3 For instance, see the works on behavioural economics and its relationship with public policy by Thaler and Sunstein (2008), Congdon, Kling, and Mullainathan (2011), Banerjee and Duflo (2012), Chetty et al (2014), and List and Gneezy (2014).

policy analysts to 'speak truth to power' (Wildavsky, 1979), also playing a vital role in a system of checks and balances.

Collaborations between universities and governments in Mexico are not something new and have had some relevance over the years owing to practical, even political reasons.[4] These partnerships have focused on developing capabilities and improving processes within the public sector through tackling social problems, but they have also played a role in expanding the financial capabilities of public universities. To a certain extent, the association between these two sectors stems from the need to provide comprehensive solutions to complex social problems and to generate knowledge that is only attainable through this sort of ventures and the integration of different visions. Additionally, through these type of partnerships, universities are able to fulfil their social role and commit to the actual solution of problems (Castro Martínez & Vega Jurado, 2009; Gibbons *et al.,* 1994).

In that sense, collaboration agreements between academia and governments, whether municipal, state or federal, have gravitated around the commission of universities to perform studies and evaluations, and to provide consultancy services on a number of topics. Also, universities are hired to enhance the institutional capacities of governments through developing capabilities and improving certain processes. In other words, these partnerships seek to profit from one another, be it through the development of capabilities or financial support, on a rationale that underpins their respective independence.

Consequently, one aspect that deserves further exploration has to do with the actual possibilities of expanding governance frameworks under the rationale of collaboration described in the previous section, that is, the articulation of collaborative efforts of the two sectors, government and academia, with a more practical orientation, thus establishing a constant feedback cycle for the government's performance under the scrutiny of academia, particularly in the field of public policy.

In that sense, the Advocacy Coalition Framework (Sabatier, 1988; Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993) argues that the existence of policy communities, formed by actors working around specific areas or topics, enables a learning process that allows for the improvement of policies. In a way, such communities resemble policy networks, which in turn can be conceptualised as cooperative experiences between the State and non-State actors underpinning collaborative governance processes. However, unlike processes of collaborative governance,

4 For instance, the recent creation of the Anticorruption National System (*Sistema Nacional Anticorrupción*) cannot be understood without the active participation of the Centre for Research and Teaching in Economics (*Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas*). Another example: the Ministry of Social Development incorporated the territorial development approach developed by the Metropolitan Autonomous University to its operative framework (*Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana*).

collaboration in policy networks works in an informal fashion. This aspect may seriously hamper the contributions stemming from such collaboration.

Government and policy evaluation in Mexico have a long history (López Rodríguez, 2017; Oropeza, 2005). Not long ago, a vibrant policy community formed around the topic, but its institutionalisation is relatively recent (Feinstein, 2012; Méndez, 2017; Ríos, 2014). In order to improve policies, and considering its relatively low institutional development, a team of scholars launched an initiative to integrate a Public Policy Evaluating Body (*Órgano Evaluador de Políticas Públicas del Estado de Zacatecas*, OEPPEZ) in the state of Zacatecas. This initiative was built with the explicit aim of establishing a permanent monitoring and evaluation system of the current policies operating in Zacatecas with a twofold objective: a) to function as an independent watchdog for the government's performance, and b) to provide a constant stream of information concerning the design and implementation of policies in order to improve them. However, this initiative underwent a rather cumbersome process in order to become operational.

The project[5] was originally developed by a team of academics from the Programme of Studies and Intervention for Alternative Development (Programa de Estudios e Intervención para el Desarrollo Alternativo, PEIDA) of the Autonomous University of Zacatecas (Universidad Autónoma de Zacatecas, UAZ), whose objective is to foster local development through social participation and involvement in the community. This particular focus gradually expanded for broadening the topic's theoretical understandings in order to participate more effectively in the design and evaluation of policies related to the problems affecting the local communities in which the programme had been active.

The initiative of establishing an evaluating body supported by public funds originated in this particular circumstance: on the one hand, the social need for reliable information concerning policy performance and, on the other, the lack of dedicated funding to cover current expenditure in such endeavours. The first attempt to create said body included its integration to the LXI State Legislature (2013-2016). The rationale behind this proposal was to provide objective analytical information to all legislators, and to consolidate the role of the Legislative body in the system of checks and balances of an accountability framework, thus giving real weight to policy evaluations. As things stand, most policy evaluations do not have a concrete effect on policies due to the lack of links between the theoretical exercise (the evaluation) and its implementation.

5 The whole project is documented in an internal report (PEIDA-UAZ, 2017). In order to systematise the project, we used the methodology of systematisation of experiences (Vega González, 2015), by focusing on the categories of goals, timeline, context and lessons learned.

This "missing link" situation could be addressed by establishing a mechanism of policy evaluation within the Legislature. The information provided to legislators would have a hypothetical impact in the policy process, given the participation legislators have in the budgetary process. In other words, this rationale linked the recommendations made by the OEPPEZ with the actual capability of the Legislature of allocating specific funds to specific strategies and programmes, and with the implementing bodies' actions oriented to follow said recommendations.

The proposed funding model only included the running costs of the OEPPEZ. That was possible due to the fact that the academics' wages would continue to be covered by the UAZ. The project was introduced and discussed during one of the Legislature sessions, and despite the interest it generated amongst an important number of legislators, those associated to the State Governor's ruling party (*Partido Revolucionario Institucional,* PRI) voted against the motion of including it in the following year's budget. The reason –they argued– was that the OEPPEZ was a political move against the ruling party with the obvious purpose of questioning the merits of the incumbent regime. The project –argued legislators of opposing parties– could have been approved and funded by members of this opposing segment. Nonetheless, to proceed in such a way would have undermined the original motive of the OEPPEZ for being a Legislature tool, turning it into a political tool. In other words, its social and political legitimacy, as well as its objectivity (beyond the scientific rigour), would have been tainted from the start. As a consequence of this, the PEIDA team decided to put the project on hold.

A second attempt contemplated the integration of the OEPPEZ as part of the State's Human Rights Programme, produced by the State's Executive initiative during its participation in discussion seminars by legislators, scholars, and members of the general public. During these seminars, the proposal to create the OEPPEZ was suggested under the rationale of guaranteeing and protecting the human rights (particularly social and economic rights) of the population of Zacatecas, and all related rights through public policies. At that moment, the academics' concern still was that of the links between evaluation and policy modification. Within this framework, the OEPPEZ would produce recommendations and suggestions related to the improvement of specific policies. These recommendations would automatically be part of the agenda of Zacatecas's Human Rights State Commission (*Comisión de Derechos Humanos del Estado de Zacatecas*). The initiative was incorporated to the aforementioned programme and was presented in March 2017. However, the person in charge of the programme was selected as Head of the Commission, which, once again, put the project on hold due to a potential conflict of interest.

The third attempt to create the OEPPEZ was approached from a slightly different position. The head of the Planning Office of the State of Zacatecas Government (*Coordinación Estatal de Planeación de Gobierno del Estado de Zacatecas,* COEPLA[6]) participated in a seminar in which members of PEIDA were also participating. The fact that both parties were participants of this seminar established a common ground, which opened the door to discuss topics like the OEPPEZ in an informal setting. The debates spurred an interest on the issue from the Head of COEPLA, giving the project a real chance to see the light of day. Moreover, staff members of COEPLA had also taken part in a public policy seminar organised by PEIDA. The interactions between academics and bureaucrats gave way to the development of an ambitious project that complemented the field of action of the OEPPEZ. Said project encompassed the creation of an academic programme in the field of public policy –a bachelor and a master's degree– designed for bureaucrats.

Several meetings took place in the latter part of 2016 in which different possibilities of bringing the ambitious project to fruition were debated. Given the UAZ's financial constraints, it was agreed that the Government of the State of Zacatecas (*Gobierno del Estado de Zacatecas,* GODEZAC) would foot the bill at least during the project's initial phases in order to support the programme's consolidation. A cooperation agreement (*convenio*) was signed by both parties. This agreement established the institutional commitments of both parties to foster different collaborations to improve policies. Amongst other actions, the UAZ committed to: a) link research activities with the actual delivery of *ad hoc* solutions to the problems of the state of Zacatecas, b) develop capabilities in order to promote human development, and c) promote cultural production. GODEZAC, on the other hand, committed to foster governance processes by actually involving social stakeholders in the government process. Furthermore, the agreement explicitly stated that UAZ would redirect its academic activity towards the actual development needs of the state, while GODEZAC would support innovation initiatives aimed at improving government and policy processes.

The signing of said agreement gave way to two more agreements (signed March 2017): one related to the creation of the OEPPEZ; the other one related to the creation of the Development and Public Management Academic Unit (*Unidad Académica en Desarrollo y Gestión Pública*) within the UAZ. This academic unit would host the bachelor's degree programme (*Licenciatura en Desarrollo y Gestión Pública*), aimed at developing a professional bureaucracy for the State. It would also host the master's degree programme (*Estudio y Solución de Problemas Públicos del Estado de Zacatecas*), whose purpose is to

6 At the time it was known as the Planning Unit (*Unidad Estatal de Planeación*).

further the development of the current bureaucrats' capabilities by linking their everyday functions and the problems they aim to tackle, with their respective research projects (a dissertation required to obtain the degree) and the works of the OEPPEZ. Both of these programmes started with an induction module (March-June 2017) that gave way to the selection of the most apt candidates to enrol in both programmes. The demand to enrol in the programmes surpassed the initial enrolment estimates by over 200%.

The two academic programmes were positively peer-reviewed, also getting the approval of the University Council (*Comisión Académica del Consejo Universitario*) in October 2017. Both programmes started in November 2017. It is worth mentioning that although the agreements stated that both programmes should have started in August 2017, there was an important delay in the process. This delay was due to the fact of internal struggles within the UAZ to block the initiative. As we will see below, this is an important factor to bear in mind when promoting innovative experiences: what institutional procedures may help avoiding power struggles that hinder innovative processes.

As for the original purpose of the collaboration, the creation of the OEPPEZ, the specific agreement states that evaluation should improve GODEZAC's decision-making processes which, in turn, would create better conditions for the people of the state of Zacatecas. In that sense, the agreement still stands. There is an imperative need for an evaluation body to conduct research with the most rigorous methodological standards. For that reason, UAZ should be involved in the exercise. It was originally agreed that the composition of OEPPEZ would include a combination of bureaucrats (staff from the planning and evaluation areas) and academics (a multidisciplinary team). The academic staff would coordinate the works of the evaluation body. The first activity of the personnel selected to integrate the evaluating body was its participation in a series of seminars (*diplomado*) in the topic of public policy evaluation (April-July 2017). To this end, the PEIDA staff signed another collaboration agreement with the University of Guadalajara (*Universidad de Guadalajara*) through its Government and Public Policy Research Institute (*Instituto de Investigación en Políticas Públicas y Gobierno*), with funding obtained from the UAZ-GODEZAC collaboration.

As for the integration of the OEPPEZ, the interactions in the seminars allowed us to perceive some peculiarities during the in-group dynamics. To begin with, the possible topics of evaluation were debated. The discussions showed, firstly, the natural differences between the two sectors concerning the perceived object of interest and hypothetical nature of the OEPPEZ; and secondly, the substantial underlying interests of the two sectors: the academics

showed interest in theoretical perspectives and debates, while the bureaucrats were more interested in procedural and normative aspects of policy.

The final product of these seminars was the design of evaluation protocols on the four agreed policy areas. Fittingly, four mixed teams were assembled to deal with one policy area each: 1) employment, 2) food security, 3) security and 4) social development (limited to upper secondary education in this initial phase). The results from the dynamic in those four groups were quite diverse. The employment team could not reach an agreement between academics and bureaucrats; this disagreement led to the development of two evaluation protocols, one by GODEZAC staff, the other by the academics. Both food security and security teams were able to integrate their respective evaluation protocols –but the bulk of all this work was done by the academics, while the GODEZAC staff only showed a marginal involvement. The social development team was the only one capable of diffusing the inherent tensions between the two sectors and integrating both visions into a sound evaluation protocol. The dynamic of this team was capable of resolving the disagreements stemming from the debates as to which idea (social development, social cohesion) should be the overarching concept, or what areas should be considered within this overarching concept. An agreement was reached between the team members to focus on this initial phase on the area of education, specifically on upper-secondary education, due to it being one of the most salient problems in the State.

LESSONS, CHALLENGES AND PITFALLS

The process described above reveals two basic aspects concerning the broadening of a governance framework: a) the latent possibilities to establish different sorts of partnerships amongst different sectors and stakeholders (Schuppert, 2011); and b) the intrinsic difficulties in creating sustainable, functional partnerships.

According to the key variables to succeed in collaborative governance experiences described in the first section (history of conflict/cooperation between actors, incentives for stakeholders to participate, power and resource imbalances, leadership, and institutional design), we can derive some lessons, challenges and pitfalls of the collaboration between GODEZAC and UAZ.

Concerning the history of conflict/cooperation between the actors, we can say that prior to the collaboration described, there was a rather acrimonious rift between the parties that became quite evident in the lack of their shared initiatives, which did not go beyond the hiring of specific services, in addition to two different, even antagonistic, narratives and conceptions of one another:

GODEZAC assuming its governing role as exclusive; UAZ proclaiming its autonomy. The most conspicuous lesson regarding this first aspect is that the broadening of the governance framework is a feasible aspiration, even when the creation of partnerships with a real chance to impact the policy process is hard to achieve. To a large extent, the inherent difficulties owe to the lack of institutional channels that could have facilitated this process otherwise. Nevertheless, informal channels and networks can play a substantial role (at least during the early phases of a project), allowing for different stakeholders to reach agreements that can be formalised at a subsequent stage.

This sort of agreements also reveals the actual possibility of independent stakeholders playing an active role in the checks and balances system. A previous history of conflict between the parties, like the one mentioned above, does not necessarily represent an insurmountable obstacle. Such endeavours, though limited, show that the transit to more modern, flexible and inclusive ways to exercise power is already a reality in our country. Furthermore, they have shown that governments should not only be subjected to independent scrutiny of their performance, they should also assume a proactive role in that regard.

One of the most evident pitfalls of this sort of experience has to do with the existence of informal interactions amongst actors in the governance framework. Even though informal interactions are inevitable to a certain degree, in a weak institutional framework such as the Mexican, they only stimulate informality to the extent that the institutionalisation of processes will continue to be the exception rather than the norm.

A more practical challenge goes through the establishment of a robust work dynamic within the different evaluation teams. There also needs to be a mechanism in place that allows the resolution of the disputes that hamper the teams' progress. So far, as we saw above, the work dynamic is different from team to team, and that has produced mixed results.

With regards to the incentives for stakeholders to participate, the collaboration itself involves a series of incentives for both parties. The academics, on the one hand, have the incentive of recording the evaluation projects as research projects, which gives them two specific incentives: 1) the professional reward of witnessing a research project with tangible social results, and 2) an economic incentive that facilitates the research project itself. On the other hand, the bureaucrats may improve the quality of their work through the collaboration, giving them a sounder professional authority, which might also translate in political gains.

Concerning power and resource imbalances, perhaps the most conspicuous challenge relates to funding, particularly during this embryonic phase. Given

that the whole endeavour relies on public funding, the risk of cash flow suddenly stopping is always a possibility, for instance on the grounds of budgetary restrictions. Even though their respective institutions covered the wages of the GODEZAC and UAZ staffs, if the funds had stopped flowing, different activities such as the participation of external actors in the exercise, fieldwork activities and current expenditure would have been compromised; the publication of the OEPPEZ products would have also been at risk. The funding scenario is not at all far-fetched.

As for the leadership variable, one of the most important lessons drawn from this experience is how leaderships, even when they stemmed from an informal interaction, allowed for this project to emerge. This feature, however, evidences how a collaboration of this sort might grow to be reliant on informal mechanisms (as referred above) rather than on institutional processes. If the project does not consolidate over time as an institutional process, it is not unlikely to imagine it at risk if any of the current leaderships, whether from the government or academia, were to abandon it (be that for administrative, political or professional reasons).

Another lesson has to do with the work dynamic in the evaluation teams. In our experience, the social development team was able to progress, in a more or less steady fashion, because the academics within the team assumed a proactive and conciliatory role amongst the team members' different postures and interests. Said leadership enabled the whole team to adopt a productive role and contribute to the team's goals. The next phase of the OEPPEZ relates to the functional integration of the evaluation teams and setting the research agenda for a first batch of deliverables.

Regarding the institutional design, there are some challenges and pitfalls that might limit the success of this collaborative experience. Even when there have been numerous attempts to establish evaluation practices within the Mexican government since the 1930s, they have all been undermined due to internal and external reasons, be that political, economic or legal (López Rodríguez, 2017). One of the first positive effects of this experience, in terms of institutional innovation, relates to the amendment of the normative framework (Planning Law of the State of Zacatecas) to institutionalise the evaluation body. The challenge then lies in institutionalising the new practices beyond the mere rhetoric and normative amendments.

Moreover, the innovation products that might derive from this collaborative experience are somehow previously constrained due to a normative and regulatory framework that operates as a straitjacket, thus limiting the impact of said innovations. The challenge ahead lies in finding the adequate channels and the flexibility to overcome the rigidities of the current institutional setting.

Besides funding, the most pressing challenge has to do with the consolidation and sustainability of the whole endeavour, both as part and parcel of the academic exercise as well as the government dynamic. This consolidation would give the endeavour institutional reliability that would safeguard it from political and financial turmoil.

Another challenge involves the adoption of the recommendations made by the OEPPEZ to the State Government. The first two attempts to create the evaluation body entailed the way in which an evaluation could be linked to policy amendments: in the first case, the link was in the form of budgetary modifications and the accountability of executive bodies; in the second case, the link took the form of issuing recommendations and monitoring those same recommendations. Those two attempts, as we saw, did not come to fruition. The third attempt finally bore fruit. However, the link was not as clear and explicit as it was in the other two cases. Although the legal framework has been amended, the proper channels in which the findings and recommendations of policy evaluation link with the planning process and budgetary considerations are yet to be defined. We would be looking for the possibility of at least setting an ambitious improvement agenda by the government. The OEPPEZ must consolidate a sound work dynamic: autonomy is key in buttressing its legitimacy.

Additionally, the academic programme (Master's degree) faces an important challenge related to the developing of research projects relevant to the State's problems and the way they can be linked and shaped into policies. Also, the issue of linking those projects with the OEPPEZ remains a challenge to be adequately addressed. In other words, to articulate, in a functional and productive context, the impact of the teaching-research-policy sequence.

A potential pitfall relates to the sudden vanishing of government programmes in Mexico without any sort of explanation. It is a well-known fact that the extinction of those programmes is largely attributable to political caprice. At any given moment, let us think, the results obtained by the OEPPEZ may not be to the ruling class' liking. This situation might easily put an implicit or explicit pressure in the evaluating body to censor the publication of those results –or even worse: this situation may lead to the alteration of the results. All of which, needless to say, would subvert the raison d'être of this endeavour. 'Speaking truth to power' can be highly problematic in this context.

Moreover, we can mention a couple of additional variables that –we think– add to the aforementioned in terms of explaining the success of collaborative governance experiences. One of those variables is knowledge transfer. This collaboration allows for a unique opportunity for knowledge transfer between both sectors. First, once the collaboration is institutionalised, the

stock of assumptions and knowledge that bureaucrats operate under could be updated (be it from the works of the academic programme or from the dynamics and products of the OEPPEZ), allowing for the design, implementation and evaluation or policy to be more efficient and with defined and explicit purposes (Patton, 2008).

Second, academia may come in close contact with all the roadblocks and avenues, whether formal or informal, within bureaucratic structures that may determine the failure or success of certain policies. This knowledge might help in the devising of alternatives to obstacles, as well as in the establishment of links between evaluation and implementation. Stimulating policy learning in a local context may also improve the contents of the policies that stem from inadequate policy transfers from alien contexts (Ettelt, Mays, & Nolte, 2012).

Even when the underlying vision and interests of academia and the government are fundamentally different –even antagonistic– it is viable to find a middle ground in which both sectors can establish a fruitful collaboration towards the development of functional products that can affect the policy process. This conception is compatible with a policy framework flexible enough to stimulate experimenting, adapting and learning, and capable of delivering robust policies adjustable to an ever-changing scenario (Anderies & Janssen, 2013).

Additionally, the interactions between bureaucrats and academics are amenable to the stimulation of other innovative collaboration experiences. It is well-known that the interaction between bureaucrats and actors external to government structures is particularly relevant for encouraging innovation processes, especially in local contexts (state or municipal governments) (Considine, Lewis, & Alexander, 2009).

The other variable we consider as key in explaining the success of collaborative governance experiences has to do with power structures. Although the history of conflict/cooperation in our case was not an insurmountable obstacle (to a great extent due to effectual leaderships), the internal power struggles in the UAZ nearly crippled the whole endeavour. One aspect to consider when embarking in this sort of innovative experiences relates to the ways in which power structures might be affected and to the ensuing resistance to innovations. In our case, external pressures defused the internal obstacles, allowing for the initiative to continue. However, a lesson we can draw from this variable is that power structures ought to be taken into account. Institutional resistance is bound to emerge, given that innovations alter the status quo. With this in mind, the challenge for similar experiences lies in analysing and devising ways in which institutional innovations can be effectively managed.

CONCLUSIONS

In this article we have argued that the governance framework is reshaped every day. This feature enables different stakeholders to interact in ways that, some time ago, were simply unthinkable. The participation of larger segments of the population in different networks, in combination with government arrangements that enable said participation, facilitate the transit towards modes of collaboration that can ultimately define and shape the policy process. A growing cross-sector collaboration, and the different ways to resolve the underlying differences amongst them, should deliver a more transparent, comprehensive and inclusive policy framework.

The case of Zacatecas as an example of collaborative governance –hence of strengthening and broadening the governance framework– constitutes a sound experience from which other innovative experiences can learn in order to form fruitful collaborations with other actors. We believe that the peculiarities of this experience can shed some light concerning similar initiatives that might be advocated in the near future amongst different stakeholders with a view to strengthening the governance framework.

The lessons derived from this endeavour give way to imagine different ways in which diverse types of partnerships can be established and consolidated. By focusing on the five critical variables (Ansell & Gash, 2008), in addition to the two additional variables we suggest, this sort of collaboration has a great potential of having an actual impact in certain policy processes. During this exercise, we learned that, in spite of being a rather long and difficult process, the 'small wins' we have been obtaining through this collaboration have managed to make an impact in the way it has been shaped and reshaped, deepening the trust and commitments of both parties with a view to have a real impact in the policy process.

The challenges and pitfalls are not easy to circumvent, but this type of initiatives, once underway, should be able to establish its own value before the public opinion, empirically justifying a persuasive narrative of change and improvement of the policy process (Shanahan, Jones, McBeth, & Lane, 2013).

To a large extent, said collaborations rely on the drive, capacities and vision of individuals or groups of individuals that might advocate for this sort of initiatives, even in adverse environments. Adversities notwithstanding, one small win at a time might pave the way for bigger wins in the future, allowing for all social actors, State and non-State, to contribute to address the many problems our society faces.

REFERENCES

Ackerman, J. (2004). Co-governance for accountability: beyond "exit" and "voice". *World Development,* 32(3), 447-463.

Agranoff, R., & McGuire, M. (2004). *Collaborative public management: New strategies for local governments.* Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press.

Aguilar Villanueva, L. (2004). *Gobernanza y Gestión Pública.* México: Fondo de Cultura Económica.

_____. (2016). *Democracia, gobernabilidad y gobernanza.* México: Instituto Nacional Electoral.

Anderies, J. M., & Janssen, M. A. (2013). Robustness of Social-Ecological Systems: Implications for Public Policy. *Policy Studies Journal,* 41(3), 513-536.

Ansell, C., & Gash, A. (2008). Collaborative Governance in Theory and Practice. *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory,* 18(4), 543-571.

Bache, I., & Flinders, M. (2004). Multi-Level Governance and the Study of the British State. *Public Policy and Administration,* 19(1), 31-51.

Banerjee, A., & Duflo, E. (2012). *Poor economics: A radical rethinking of the way to fight global poverty.* Public Affairs.

Behn, R. D. (2001). *Rethinking democratic accountability.* Brookings Institution Press.

Bevir, M. (2007). *Encyclopedia of governance.* (M. Bevir, Ed.). Thousand Oaks: Sage.

_____. (2010). *Democratic governance.* Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

_____. (2011). *The SAGE Handbook of Governance.* (M. Bevir, Ed.). London: SAGE Publications.

_____. *A Theory of Governance.* Berkeley: University of California Press.

Bevir, M., Rhodes, R. A. W., & Weller, P. (2003). Traditions of governance: interpreting the changing role of the public sector. *Public Administration,* 81(1), 1-17, 2013.

Bressers, J. T. A., & Kuks, S. M. M. (2003). What does governance mean? In J. T. A. Bressers & W. A. Rosenbaum (Eds.), *Achieving sustainable development. The challenge of governance across social scales* (pp. 65-88). London: Praeger.

Bryson, J. M., Crosby, B. C., & Stone, M. M. (2006). The Design and Implementation of Cross-Sector Collaborations: Propositions from the Literature. *Public Administration Review,* 66, 44-55.

Campbell, J., & Pedersen, O. (2001). *The rise of neoliberalism and institutional analysis.* Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

Castro Martínez, E., & Vega Jurado, J. (2009). Las relaciones universidad-entorno socioeconómico en el Espacio Iberoamericano del Conocimiento. *Revista Iberoamericana de Ciencia, Tecnología y Sociedad*, 4(12), 71-81.

Chetty, R., Friedman, J. N., Leth-Petersen, S., Nielsen, T. H., & Olsen, T. (2014). Active vs. passive decisions and crowd-out in retirement savings accounts:

Evidence from Denmark. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics,* 129(3), 1141-1219.

Congdon, W. J., Kling, J. R., & Mullainathan, S. (2011). *Policy and choice: Public finance through the lens of behavioral economics.* Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.

Considine, M., Lewis, J. M., & Alexander, D. (2009). Networks, *Innovation and Public Policy: Politicians, Bureaucrats and the Pathways to Change Inside Government.* Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

De Leon, L. (1998). Accountability in a "reinvented"government. *Public Administration*, 76(3), 539-558, 1998.

Dingwerth, K., & Pattberg, P. (2006). Global governance as a perspective on world politics. *Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations,* 12(2), 185-20.

Ettelt, S., Mays, N., & Nolte, E. (2012). Policy learning from abroad: Why it is more difficult than it seems. *Policy and Politics,* 40(4), 491-504.

Feinstein, O. (2012). La institucionalización de la evaluación de políticas públicas en América Latina. *Presupuesto y Gasto Público,* 68, 41-52.

Fukuyama, F. (2014). *State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century.* Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Fung, A., & Wright, E. O. (2001). Deepening Democracy: Innovations in Empowered Participatory Governance. *Politics & Society,* 29(1), 5-41.

Gibbons, M., Limoges, C., Nowotny, H., Schwartzman, S., Scott, P., & Trow, M. (1994). *The new production of knowledge: The dynamics of science and research in contemporary societies.* London: SAGE Publications.

Goldsmith, S., & Eggers, W. D. (2005). *Governing by network: The new shape of the public sector.* Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.

Gray, B. (1989). *Collaborating: Finding common ground for multiparty problems.* San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.

Harvey, D. (2005). *A brief history of neoliberalism.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Hood, C. (1991). A public management for all seasons? *Public Administration,* 69(1), 3-19.

Katz, B. (2014). What Should the Role of the Federal Government Be in Supporting Innovation Districts? Retrieved September 8, 2017, from https://www.brookings.edu/research/what-should-the-role-of-the-federal-government-be-in-supporting-innovation-districts/

Kjaer, A. M. (2004). *Governance: key concepts.* Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.

Kooiman, J. (1993). *Modern governance: new government-society interactions.* (J. Kooiman, Ed.). London: SAGE Publications.

_____. (1999). Social-political governance: overview, reflections and design. *Public Management an International Journal of Research and Theory,* 1(1), 67-92.

Leftwich, A. (1994). Governance, the State and the Politics of Development. *Development and Change,* 25(2), 363-386.

Liesbet, H., & Marks, G. (2003).Unraveling the Central State, but How? Types of Multi-level Governance. *American Political Science Review,* 97(2), 233-243.

List, J., & Gneezy, U. (2014). *The why axis: hidden motives and the undiscovered economics of everyday life.* Random House.

López Rodríguez, B. (2017). *The effectiveness of policy evaluation.* University of Sussex.

McMichael, P. (2008). *Development and social change: a global perspective.* Thousand Oaks: Pine Forge Press.

Méndez, J. L. (2017). Evolution of policy analysis as a field of study in Mexico. In J. L. Méndez & M. Dussauge-Laguna (Eds.), *Policy analysis in Mexico*. Croydon: Policy Press.

Messner, D. (1997). *The network society.* London: Frank Cass.

Messner, D., & Nuscheler, F. (2003). *Das Konzept global governance: Stand und perspektiven.* Duisburg: INEF-Institut für Entwicklung und Frieden.

Mkandawire, T. (2005). *Targeting and universalism in poverty reduction. Social Policy and Development* (Vol. 23). Geneva: United Nations Research Institute for Social Development.

O'Toole, L. J. (2000). Research on Policy Implementation: Assessment and Prospects. *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory,* 10(2), 263-288.

Oropeza, A. (2005). *La evaluación de la función pública en México.* México: Plaza y Valdés.

Osborne, D., & Gaebler, T. (1992). *Reinventing government: How the entrepreneurial spirit is transforming government.* Reading, MA: Adison-Wesley.

Patton, M. Q. (2008). *Utilization-focused Evaluation.* London: SAGE Publications.

PEIDA-UAZ. (2017). *Corte de la experiencia del proyecto del Órgano Evaluador de Políticas Públicas y de la nueva Unidad Académica en la UAZ: Informe (mimeo)*. Zacatecas.

Pierre, J. (2000). *Debating governance: Authority, steering, and democracy.* Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

Rethemeyer, R. K. (2005). Conceptualizing and measuring collaborative networks. *Public Administration Review*, 65(1), 117-121.

Ríos, A. (2014). *La evaluación de políticas públicas en América Latina: Métodos y propuestas docentes*. México, D.F.: Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas, Centro CLEAR para América Latina.

Rose-Ackerman, S. (2017). What Does "Governance" Mean? *Governance,* 30 (1), 23-27.

Rosenau, J. N. (1999). Toward an ontology for global governance. In M. Hewson & T. Sinclair (Eds.), *Approaches to global governance theory* (pp. 287-301). Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.

Sabatier, P. (1988). An advocacy coalition framework of policy change and the role of policy-oriented learning therein. *Policy Sciences*, 21, 129-168.

Sabatier, P., & Jenkins-Smith, H. (1993). *Policy change and learning: an advocacy coalition approach. Theoretical lenses on public policy.* Boulder: Westview Press.

Salamon, L. (2002). *The tools of government: A guide to the new governance.* (L. Salamon, Ed.). New York: Oxford University Press.

Schuppert, G. F. (2011). Partnerships. In M. Bevir (Ed.), *The SAGE Handbook of Governance.* London: SAGE Publications.

Shanahan, E. A., Jones, M. D., McBeth, M. K., & Lane, R. R. (2013). An Angel on the Wind: How Heroic Policy Narratives Shape Policy Realities. *Policy Studies Journal,* 41(3), 453-483.

Stephenson, P. (2013). Twenty years of multi-level governance: "Where Does It Come From? What Is It? Where Is It Going?" *Journal of European Public Policy,* 20(6), 817-837.

Susskind, L., & Cruikshank, J. (1987). *Breaking the impasse: Consensual approaches to resolving public disputes.* New York: Basic Books.

Thaler, R., & Sunstein, C. (2008). *Nudge: Improving decisions about health, wealth, and happiness.* New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Vega González, R. (2015). *Curso de sistematización de experiencias.* México.

Wildavsky, A. (1979). *The art and craft of policy analysis: Speaking truth to power.* London: Macmillan.

Williams, D., & Young, T. (1994). Governance, the World Bank and liberal theory. *Political Studies,* 42(1), 84-100.

World Bank. (1989). *A Framework for Capacity Building in Policy Analysis and Economic Management in Sub-Saharan Africa.* Washington, D.C.

ANÁLISIS DE POLÍTICAS PÚBLICAS: PERSPECTIVAS PRAGMÁTICAS, INTERPRETATIVAS, DE REDES Y DE INNOVACIÓN PÚBLICA

Bairon Otálvaro Marín*

Roth, A. N. (2017). *Análisis de Políticas Públicas: Perspectivas Pragmáticas, Interpretativas, de Redes y de Innovación Pública,* Bogotá: Universidad Nacional de Colombia

The book is a selection of papers from an International Colloquium on Public Policy titled "Teorías y métodos para el análisis de políticas públicas", that took place at the Universidad Nacional de Colombia in 2016. The text's main questions are: What analytical perspectives can be gained by the subjective and everyday experience of the actors involved in the implementation of public policies and what do these contribute? What innovations have been tried to take on complex problems and reach collaborative solutions in the field of public policy? What are the possibilities of combining theories and methods in public policy analysis?

The importance of this book is that it poses a discussion on Policy Analysis as a method for generating solutions to complex and dynamic public problems. Its authors state that public policy analysis should be considered as a method to generate knowledge "in action" for solving public problems in practical ways (Zittoun, 2017). Their research suggests using a pragmatic approach to draft solutions and redefinitions for public problems, as well as to improve the processes of redistributing resources and powers when formulating and implementing public policies.

These works were published in three thematic blocks to show the importance of formulating new ways to approach public problems and the strategies to

* Professor of the Administration and Organizations Department of the Administrative Sciences Faculty of the Universidad del Valle. Candidate for a Doctorate in Political Studies and International Relations (Universidad Nacional de Colombia). Master in Public Policy and Social Worker of the Universidad del Valle, Cali-Colombia. Email: bairon.otalvaro@correounivalle.edu.co

"solve" a society's multiple ills. The analysts suggest the use of constructivist and dialogic approaches as an alternative before the difficulty of delivering appropriate solutions to citizens; they warn that rational and normative analysis possess serious difficulties to account for public problems, which is why it's necessary to find alternatives to reform, improve or supplement existing solutions.

In Latin America, and particularly in Colombia, the foundational approach of Policy Analysis emerged during the nineties, guided by technocratic, bureaucratic and rational models led by experts. Analytic guidance viewed public institutions as formal organisms in charge of formulating and implementing public actions with almost no citizen participation.

In the current context, characterized by global order, it is argued that public policy analysis should adapt to the rapid changes of the times, which implies the development of processes for public innovation. New public policies aim to build exits, in a deliberative and consensual way, from the public controversies among several parties or actors in power and decision-making; larger civic participation processes are being sought for affairs of collective interest –a complex task in Colombia–, given that it went from using the experts' approach to collaborative processes and networks that increased working in association and public deliberation.

The second part of the book is a reflection on public innovation, an approach that comes from different epistemological aspects based on reflexive pragmatism that aim to co-create problem solutions that need new strategies, concepts, ideas or intentions (Zurbringgen, 2017). Public innovation argues for experimentation and learning while solving public problems: it is a method, or path, of reflexive research focused on finding solutions to normative, treasury and administrative deficiencies, as well as an alternative that opens the door to new actors of global and local order that participate in the governance of societies.

The relational approach suggested through public innovation cannot be understood as a simple administrative and managerial fact. It is the transformation of traditional administration guided by logics of command and control of the vertical kind, a new organizational order that demands the opening of spaces for networks of social actors, like private enterprises and communities, with the purpose of building tailored solutions for the reality of the context, taking all of the different groups of interest's particularities into account.

The third part of the book presents public policy analysis approaches that combine different theories (the network theory and the interorganizational theory) or renew analysis approaches like the Bounded Policy Transfer. These guidelines offer an analytical framework to understand the transference of the

politics, concepts and methodologies that are adopted and developed by other political communities.

Summarizing, the book contributes to the deliberation on the persistence of rational, positivist and quantitative logics in public policy analysis –perspectives that can be surpassed by interpretative approaches that value the importance of the voices of social actors, subjectivities and normative values–. Interpretative approaches (theories, approaches and methods) have managed to build rigorous alternatives in the face of a reality that is perceived as absolute, as a permanent social construction. The understanding of reality as a whole is the knowledge of the chaos of modern societies. That is, what is sought through these perspectives is a plea to value the role of subjects and communities in the building of knowledge to solve public problems.

REFERENCES

Roth Deubel, A. N. (2017). *Análisis de políticas públicas: perspectivas pragmáticas, interpretativas, de redes y de innovación pública.* Bogotá: Universidad Nacional de Colombia.

Zittoun, P. (2017). Hacia un enfoque pragmático de la acción pública. in A. N. Roth Deubel, *Análisis de políticas públicas: perspectivas pragmáticas, interpretativas, de redes y de innovación pública* (pp. 17-46). Bogotá: Universidad Nacional de Colombia.

Zurbringgen, C. (2017). Politeia: construyendo un nuevo espacio público. In A. N. Roth Deubel, *Análisis de políticas públicas: perspectivas prágmaticas, de redes y de innovación pública* (pp. 111-145). Bogotá: Universidad Nacional.